Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons, and Organization

[Ken White]

PT person?

(Actually he's a messenger to cope with periods of radio silence, comm failure and such. We used to have 'em on the TOE as well. one or two per walking infantry Platoon, two to four per company. They came out post Korea because the Comm equipment had gotten more reliable [true] and our egos said we'd never have to resort to radio silence again 'cause we're so big and good -- or something [myth])

[Norfolk]

When I was in, the main role of the Runners was to immediately break and run back to Company HQ as soon as Contact or an Ambush took place. The general idea was that hopefully at least one might make it alive to Coy HQ to tell them what had just happened if the Platoon or its Sections for whatever reason could not radio Company HQ. They were, as Ken mentioned, also useful for mantaining radio silence. We also used to tap into landlines to avoid using radio at Company, Battalion, and Brigade levels until we absolutely had to use radio, or because the ruse was up anyway.

[Norfolk]

Lionel Wigrams' Letter on Lessons of the Sicilian Campaign, 16 October, 1943.

Stumbling on this piece sometime last year, I rather imprudently dismissed it as an historical eccentricity. Wilf drew my attention back to it not long ago, and I realized just how careless I had been in ignoring it. This ties well into Wilf's own articles "Patrol-Based Infantry Doctrine" and "Organising Infantry". For that matter, Wilf's own article on Lionel Wigram was just published last month in British Army Review.

In short, without giving away the specific contents of Wigram's letter, the organization and TTP's that Wigram proposed for Infantry Sub-Units and Minor-Units were (and to a certain extent still are) radical and eye-opening. It's reasonably short in length, but may lead to a fair bit of contemplation.

[Kiwigrunt]

I have thouroughly enjoyed these threads and associated links. This stuff has interested me for many years.

Here is my proposal for light inf. platoon org.

Platoon HQ Capt.
Pl.sgt.
2x sig.
Weapons squad (6 men) 2x 8.6mm Lapua Magnum rifles (2 pers.)
1x 60mm commando mortar (3 pers.)
1x squad leader
2x section (each 20 men) 1x Lt. with IW
1x section sgt. with IW
3x 6man squad: 1x leader with IW
1x 2ic NCO also no.2 on gun
1x 7.62 Minimi (FNH or Mk48)
1x IW with UGL
2x riflemen with IW
(squad leader leads 4 man rifle group and 2ic
leads gun group)

This gives the platoon 6 rifle squads of 6 pers each, with a total of 6 7.62 LMGs. No 5.56 LMGs or 7.62 GPMGs at platoon level. (kiss)

This section is small enough to chop and change without affecting the 'band of brothers' bonds too much. Everyone knows each other.

When required (and in line with Lionel Wigram's theories) the 3 guns can group under the section sgt. and the 3 4man rifle teams under the Lt.
When 10 men groupings are favorable one squad can split up.
When USMC size 'squads' are needed, regroup into 2-squad teams (plenty of rank available to lead them).
When anti armour or bunker busters are required, hand out something like the Matador in whatever numbers required, or lighter weapons like AT4CS or SMAW-D or even the good old M72 (CS versions under development). Against MBT use the new UK MBT-LAW or Pzf3 IT600. I have also got my eyes on the IMI Shipon. Enough of that for now!

There appears to be a consensus, for many reasons, that for a section to operate independently, it needs to be over 10 strong. And even then it may need additional support. However, the 'standard' platoon of 30 to 50 is too large, and a waste of pers, to commit to section/squad tasks.

I have considered having 3 sections to a platoon but:
-Makes platoon very large and therefore also the company and batalion excessively large. (if we stick with 3+1 all the way up)
-Turns the platoon into a miniature coy and therefore the section into a miniature platoon and that wil totally defeat the purpose.
-Makes the platoon so large that the 'family' bond becomes a nonevent which makes chopping and changing through the squads less attractive.

The big question is, do we use 5,56 lmg's and/or 7.62 gpmg's? It appears that the UK (and I think also US) infantry in the sandbox try their hardest to get as many gimpy's right down to section/squad level as they can. They sometimes operate literally with more mg's than rifles. How to measure to what extent that firepower is truly effective (read Karcher etc.) and to what extent it feeds a perception of (macho?) invulnerability.
5.56 lmg's have replaced (in most army's now) 7.62 gpmg's because of obvious weight issues. If it is however still that important to the troops to maintain 7.62 at lower levels, then how effective is 5.56 next to 7.62 and is there reallly much point in having both side by side?
This is where I propose the 7.62 Minimi. At least the gun itself is an lmg. The ammo however is stil #%^&* heavy. (Ohhh, for the 70's 6mm saw or the 6.5 Grendel, for which my 6 man squad would be best suited.) Using a 7.62 Minimi in a 6 man team sort of averages between what we see happening now with 4man teams with a 5.56 lmg each and a gpmg attached per 2 or so fire teams. Also ammo resup is simplified as 7.62 belts are the same as those used for vehicle mounted gpmg's and tripod mounted sfmg's at coy and batalion level.

Too much rank in my platoon? Rank is not only an appointed level within the hierarchy. It is (to be hoped) also an indication of education and experience. Not all the rankers need to be in charge of a body of troops all the time. Some can be assigned roles like support fire coordination, intel etc.
The platoon commander could for instance pull one or both section Lt's back for these roles and leave the nco's to lead the troops, depending on situ.
Also, having a large section led by higher rank would be in line with USMC DO concepts and the article 'Transformation: Victory rests with small units.' It was this article from which I borrowed the idea of a 2 section platoon. However, I have 3 squads instead of 2 and much smaller. I have created a shift to having a squad halfway between the current fire team and the current section/squad, eliminating the fire team concept as such. So my section is really the smallest org to conduct effective F&M, even after 30% losses. (Or, if things get desperate, combinations of 2 squads) In the article it is already suggested that the platoon (with one of its four squads of 14 as a weapons squad) becomes a pocket coy which, as I mentioned earlier, I want to avoid.

I had better cut this shorter than I intended to. My apologies for this long story, hope I haven't bored anyone.

[jcustis]

I had better cut this shorter than I intended to. My apologies for this long story, hope I haven't bored anyone.

For a first post, you've definitely struck a chord. Excellent one at that...I just need to digest it a bit.

and outstanding avatar selection by the way. Where by chance did you happen to come across that image?

[Kiwigrunt]

outstanding avatar selection by the way. Where by chance did you happen to come across that image?

The image is of an unofficial NZ forces armpatch. The official Kiwi is more passive and unarmed.

[Norfolk]

Now that was an interesting post, one that makes you really think. A pair - Commando-style - of Wigramian "Sections", each composed of three Owen-style "Squads". Light, agile, easy to control, yet very hard hitting - 6 x 7.62m LMGs in a Platoon?! That's a whole lot of firepower!!! Plus the ever-useful 60 mm mortar, a pair of .338 Lapuas, UGLs, and AT weapons carried to taste.

Welcome to Small Wars, KiwiGrunt, and we are rather happy to have you with us. Please introduce yourself to the Council members here. We are looking forward to seeing more of your posts.

[William F. Owen]

I am working on Wigram Grouping a lot at the moment, with a a friend of mine in the UK who runs a Regimental training team.

The whole point of Wigram's idea was,

a.) Use with almost any amount of troops found in a platoon, so 18-40.
b.) It used exactly the same method of Manoeuvre as was taught to sections in the 1940/1 "Battlecraft" manual, but applied to the platoon. Wigram had never taught 'section manoeuvre' and his original manual discussed the "section IN the Attack", NOT, the "Section Attack."
c.) The Group contained three complementary elements of, "Reconnaissance" - The Rifle Group, "Suppression-Strike" - the Brens, and "HE-Projection" - The 2-inch mortar.

So a 30 man platoon could be,

Recce Group, = 3 x 5 man teams with IWs and TIWS
Strike Group = 2 x 5 man teams - each team with GPMG
STA team = 1 x 5 man team with 60mm light Mortar (M6-640) and 1 x 8.6mm rifle.

[William F. Owen]

.

Here is my proposal for light inf. platoon org.

Platoon HQ Capt.
Pl.sgt.
2x sig.
Weapons squad (6 men) 2x 8.6mm Lapua Magnum rifles (2 pers.)
1x 60mm commando mortar (3 pers.)
1x squad leader
2x section (each 20 men) 1x Lt. with IW
1x section sgt. with IW
3x 6man squad: 1x leader with IW
1x 2ic NCO also no.2 on gun
1x 7.62 Minimi (FNH or Mk48)
1x IW with UGL
2x riflemen with IW
(squad leader leads 4 man rifle group and 2ic
leads gun group)

First off, nice effort. My feedback would be,

a.) You may want to look at carried individual loads. Crunch some numbers. I have core data if that helps.

b.) You grouped the 8.6mm LRR with the 60mm! - Excellent idea. I had discussed this with some folks before, as the 60mm really needs a hand held LRF, and that is normally LRR type kit.

c.) IMO, do not split the manoeuvre/function of a 6 man fireteam. Have all of them supporting the Gun, = 3 gun handlers and 3 Ammo carriage and security.

d.) Why have you got dedicated signallers? Does your platoon carry HF sets?

Any ideas of how this set up is actually operated? As per NZ Infantry doctrine?

[Kiwigrunt]

First off, nice effort. My feedback would be,

a.) You may want to look at carried individual loads. Crunch some numbers. I have core data if that helps.

b.) You grouped the 8.6mm LRR with the 60mm! - Excellent idea. I had discussed this with some folks before, as the 60mm really needs a hand held LRF, and that is normally LRR type kit.

c.) IMO, do not split the manoeuvre/function of a 6 man fireteam. Have all of them supporting the Gun, = 3 gun handlers and 3 Ammo carriage and security.

d.) Why have you got dedicated signallers? Does your platoon carry HF sets?

Any ideas of how this set up is actually operated? As per NZ Infantry doctrine?

First of all, thanks all for such immediate and enthusiastic response. I’m honored.

a) I am aware of weight of 7.62 belt and don't like it (as I touched on in my post). I do indeed love the 5.56 LMG with ability for gunner to carry plenty ammo by his little lonesome. Am aware that 2man gimpy group with no2 carrying an IW gives approx. 15 kg of weapons alone. That is the exact equivalent of the same 2 pers carrying 2 5.56 LMGs. Each of these two 5.56 gunners can carry the same number of rounds as the 7.62 gun group, by themselves, for the same weight penalty. My reason for going 7.62 though is the apparent need for 7.62 at section (or near-section) level.
What we are seeing more frequently now in the sand box, is GPMGs being added to LMGs at section level. Do they really compliment each other at that level or is it a case of not being able to make up our minds as to which caliber to go for?
b) Suppose I got that right without trying! Technology is really starting to catch up here though. (In Civvy Street you can now get LRFs up to about 1200m, the size of a packet of cigarettes.) Mortar team should really have their own. You got me thinking though, should I add a no2 to the 8.6 rifles? Are the Brits doing that with their 8.6 rifles at platoon level?
c) If all 6 men are there only to support the gun, then it is hardly a maneuver unit. It becomes a support unit. Even in ‘old’ gungroup/riflegoup scenario’s the riflemen carried extra belt for the gimpy but the gun group was still only 2 or 3 strong. The rifle group was still just that. In fact, didn’t Wigram propose exactly that (separating the guns from the rifles when needed)?
d) I must admit ignorance here. Coms is an area I have never looked into very much. When I left the army 6 years ago, we were still using Vietnam era PRC-77 sets. Even at section level a rifleman was appointed as radio operator. If technology here has advanced to the point that the platoon commander carries his own radio, I’ll happily sack the sigs. (takes a few pers off a relatively large platoon). Would it not be prudent though to have a sig. baby sitting ‘up hill’ radio traffic while pl.com. concentrates on running the platoon?
e)Not NZ doctrine. NZ doctrine has always been fairly close to UK doctrine, with maybe a personal flavor based on experience in Vietnam. Not sure how things have changed since LAV3 replaced M113. When I joined we actually still operated gungroup/riflegroup principals with our 5.56 weapons, with one C9 LSW per 10 man section. It was not until late 90’s that we were given an additional C9 and 203 to apply fire teams.
As for ‘my’ platoon, I can see advantages with my additional officers and sergeants (read also Tom’s article on transformation) but I can also see plenty of potential for over management and over analyzing and debating rather than decision making (at levels as low as section/platoon.)

Oh dear, another long one…that’s what you get though when asking lot’s of questions. But hey, bring it on. That’s what this is all about isn’t it?

P.S. Is Wilgram's battlecraft manual available on line? Love to read it.

[William F. Owen]

P.S. Is Wilgram's battlecraft manual available on line? Love to read it.

Sadly not. I know of one surviving copy and it is held in a UK School of Infantry archive. 4 years ago, I got to sit and read it, and was allowed to copy a couple of sections. Last I heard, it had got some bad water damage from being stored in a damp box. I did try to get it made into a .pdf by the Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, but they were "busy."

The nearest document to pure Wigram is the 1942 THE INSTRUCTOR'S HANDBOOK OF FIELDCRAFT AND BATTLE DRILL
http://www.helion.co.uk/product.asp?...379&P_ID=13119 - This is a reprint. I have an original !

This is actually extremely good and well worth studying if you are interested in Infantry Doctrine.

[Cultana]

The closest to this “1942 THE INSTRUCTOR'S HANDBOOK OF FIELDCRAFT AND BATTLE DRILL”, that I have is “The Instructors handbook on FIELDCRAFT and BATTLE DRILL 1943”. But that is a reprint with amendment No 1, dated Sept 1943. This is an Australian print of the manual not the British printing.

Actually I was more impressed with the following “Infantry Minor Tactics-1941” an Australian pam. It appears in some areas more orientated for the AMF than the AIF.

The 43 manual seemed to contradict some of the material in the IMT 41 book. Some of the IMT material was reinforced with brig Wooden’s AAR after Milne Bay, Sep 42 so it is a bit hard to make comparisons.

As I scanned both these at something like 150% actual size and about 200 dpi the files are not exactly emailable; 500- 700 MB in size. If wanted it can only go by snail mail.

[William F. Owen]

The closest to this “1942 THE INSTRUCTOR'S HANDBOOK OF FIELDCRAFT AND BATTLE DRILL”, that I have is “The Instructors handbook on FIELDCRAFT and BATTLE DRILL 1943”. But that is a reprint with amendment No 1, dated Sept 1943. This is an Australian print of the manual not the British printing.

Actually I was more impressed with the following “Infantry Minor Tactics-1941” an Australian pam. It appears in some areas more orientated for the AMF than the AIF.

The 43 manual seemed to contradict some of the material in the IMT 41 book. Some of the IMT material was reinforced with brig Wooden’s AAR after Milne Bay, Sep 42 so it is a bit hard to make comparisons.

As I scanned both these at something like 150% actual size and about 200 dpi the files are not exactly emailable; 500- 700 MB in size. If wanted it can only go by snail mail.

PM sent mate!! Good stuff.

[Kiwigrunt]

I spent the last few days re-reading this thread and other relevant ones. The depth to which issues have already been discussed is quite amazing (maaaan, this is a time consuming hobby). It is also so easy to fall into repetition and quite unavoidable at the same time.

Norfolk, you beat me to it with the 20 man section in ‘rifle squad composition’ post 156.
It appears we think very much along the same lines.

Wilf, I came across a printout I have had filed for some time and forgot I had, of your article on ‘fire and maneuver effects’. Excellent article and certainly very relevant to the 5.56 versus (or plus) 7.62 conversation.

Combining a few of the older threads into this ‘combined’ thread certainly seems to make sense as you can hardly have for instance above mentioned conversation without immediately effecting things like unit composition.

So, at the risk of being repetitive again, is the concept of suppression really as straight forward as putting any size of rounds down in the direction of the enemy just to keep their heads down. Is the value of suppression not increased (adding shock) if the rounds do more physical damage with regards to crumbling away the cover that the enemy hides behind with associated demoralization and the increased ability to actually kill some enemy in the process? Would this not also increase your momentum and speed with regards to winning the firefight and the following assault?
If this is so, then how much more effective is 7.62 over 5.56? If it is by a factor of more than 2, then maybe the double weight of 7.62 over 5.56 is justified. But how do we measure this?

[William F. Owen]

@ Norfolk, you beat me to it with the 20 man section in ‘rifle squad composition’ post 156.
It appears we think very much along the same lines.

@ Wilf, I came across a printout I have had filed for some time and forgot I had, of your article on ‘fire and maneuver effects’. Excellent article and certainly very relevant to the 5.56 versus (or plus) 7.62 conversation.

@ Is the value of suppression not increased (adding shock) if the rounds do more physical damage with regards to crumbling away the cover that the enemy hides behind with associated demoralization and the increased ability to actually kill some enemy in the process? Would this not also increase your momentum and speed with regards to winning the firefight and the following assault?

@ So is that a heavy Squad or a light Platoon? What this shows to me is the silliness of focussing on the squad level of organisation.

@ Thank you! Actually I think that my best work - and no one ever reads! It was actually incorporated into the Slovenian Army's infantry manual!

@ Suppression is the lack of action caused by fear of harm. If heavier rounds can degrade cover, then they can increase fear. Anything that increases fear, increases suppression. This is why an 8.6mm Long Range Rifle has such an interesting capability.

- now the rub. It was the US fixation with Squads - plus poor infantry tactical doctrine - which lead to the creation 5.56m belt fed weapons for fire teams. Technically, tactically and doctrinally there is very little to support the case for 5.56mm belt fed weapons. The near ideal mix is 5.56mm in 30 round mags and 7.62mm link for your support weapon.

[Norfolk]

I spent the last few days re-reading this thread and other relevant ones. The depth to which issues have already been discussed is quite amazing (maaaan, this is a time consuming hobby). It is also so easy to fall into repetition and quite unavoidable at the same time.

Norfolk, you beat me to it with the 20 man section in ‘rifle squad composition’ post 156.
It appears we think very much along the same lines.

Wilf, I came across a printout I have had filed for some time and forgot I had, of your article on ‘fire and maneuver effects’. Excellent article and certainly very relevant to the 5.56 versus (or plus) 7.62 conversation.

Combining a few of the older threads into this ‘combined’ thread certainly seems to make sense as you can hardly have for instance above mentioned conversation without immediately effecting things like unit composition.

So, at the risk of being repetitive again, is the concept of suppression really as straight forward as putting any size of rounds down in the direction of the enemy just to keep their heads down. Is the value of suppression not increased (adding shock) if the rounds do more physical damage with regards to crumbling away the cover that the enemy hides behind with associated demoralization and the increased ability to actually kill some enemy in the process? Would this not also increase your momentum and speed with regards to winning the firefight and the following assault?

If this is so, then how much more effective is 7.62 over 5.56? If it is by a factor of more than 2, then maybe the double weight of 7.62 over 5.56 is justified. But how do we measure this?

Hello KiwiGrunt,

I have to admit that, yes, the idea of a 20-man Section (with 3x6-man Squads) originally came from Senator and former US SECNAV James Webb, although he envisioned only a single man in the HQ; Tom Odom's (et al's.) article suggested 2 men in the HQ, with the Commander free to fight the Section and his 2i/c handling the comms and admin (great idea). I think that the 2-Section Platoon does that, restoring Fire and Manoeuvre to the Platoon level, yet remaining flexible enough to adapt and reorganize as necessary to meet the situation at hand, under conditions of some adversity. I also took one of Wilf's Platoon proposals (the 20-man version) to broadly, if not exactly, reinforce the notion (he would broadly disagree on this point, though).

The purpose of the threads on this board have not been to find some "one-size fits all" ideal Squad/Section/Platoon/Company organization, but the organization best suited to adapting to the tactical situation as it changes - METT-T and all that. In other words, we are looking for the "best" basis for change. The Platoon organization that you propose is perhaps the "best" in this regard that I have seen so far. The Canadian Infantry Pam begins with this quote:

"The platoon is, for all purposes, the unit for whose perfection we strive. Because, a perfect platoon means a perfect battalion and brigade or division: and the efficiency of any army corps is to be measured by that of its platoons."

MGen Sir John Monash, from Chapter 1, B-GL-309-003/FT-001, Infantry, Volume 3, The Infantry Section and Platoon in Battle, 1996.

Now, I grew up on the old 1982 Infantry Pam, which differed in some ways (some substantially, in some ways better, in some ways worse) than the 1996 Infantry Pam, but as we can see from Wigram's work, never mind more recent work like Wilf's, that much the same old problems persist, and for many of the usual reasons.

What most strikes me about your proposed Platoon composition, KiwiGrunt, is its 2-Section organization. As the Section you propose has its own 2-man HQ and 3x6-man Squads, it is fully capable of independent missions by itself, or semi-independent tasks during a Platoon mission. As it is a mini-Platoon in effect, with its own full HQ and its own Reserve (whether for Fire Support or for Manoeuvre), it can perform F&M by itself if it has to. Operating as part of the Platoon, the Section can bring to bear a substantial portion of the firepower of a Platoon during a Fire-Fight, and either continue to suppress during the Assault, or handle the Assault all by itself while the other Section and the Platoon Mortar continue to suppress. It also makes the Consolidation a little more secure and easier, as the Assaulting Section possesses considerable firepower and fighting power by itself, while the Covering Section moves up to join it.

There is another advantage to it, its ability to operate dispersed over a relatively wide area in small patrols. That was what struck me most about the German Infantry Group, how it operated not so much as an open-order field formation during the approach, but more so as a Patrol, moving from fire position to fire position using all available cover, and only when in the heat of battle would it rely upon suppression by fire in the absence of any available cover ("Effect over Cover"). Even in the Fire-Fight, normally the German Group would fight with only the Group Commander and his Machine Gun Troop of 3 or 4 men, while the Group 2i/c and the bulk of the Group remained under cover, unless circumstances forced it to be otherwise. Wigram and Wilf have each further developed this, and what you propose KiwiGrunt, potentially takes it a little further.

As each of the 6-man Squads can easily form its own self-contained Patrol, or break down into a pair of 3-man Patrols for reducing sign to the utter minimum possible whilst achieving the greatest practical coverage and dispersion. The 2-Section organization of the Platoon makes coordination much easier; 6x6-man Patrols could get complicated for a Platoon HQ to coordinate, and a dozen 3-man Patrols would be positively nightmarish. As is, a 6-man Patrol is really the largest you can use without sign and control likely becoming a significant problem. 3- or 4-man Patrols, as you know, leave the least trace of their presence, and are the easiest to control. As each Section would coordinate half of the Patrols, the Platoon HQ could concentrate on coordinating the two Sections as a whole with the Platoon Mortar Squad. Tighter control of the Patrols by the Sections could make it easier and faster to coordinate the Squads/Patrols, and especially to mass them for attack or quickly disperse afterwards as necessary; the Platoon may find it rather harder to do so with so many Patrols. I do notice a vaguely passing resemblance to the Patrols Company in a Parachute Battalion here.

As is, KiwiGrunt, your proposed Platoon organization may afford the advantages of both Wigram's and Wilf's ideas, not least by disposing of the almost mechanical formations and drills that Infantry presently are indoctrinated in, and moreover to restore Fire and Manoeuvre to the Platoon level, where it is best handled (usually). And I am very much in agreement with your ideas on Suppression, the 7.62mm round, and the 6.5 mm Grendel as a possible "best" cartridge at Squad level.

Excellent work.

[Rifleman]

Webb articulated his case for the larger fire teams well, but I have to agree with Wilf on this one: 18 man "squads" seem more like small platoons in action, especially if they have additional attachments.

The three fire team USMC squad made a lot of sense in the BAR days of WWII and Korea. It probably took 3 BARs to equal the suppression capability of one MG 42.

The more I read through everyone's posts again the more I think Paul Melody's ideas make sense: the squad can fire; the squad can maneuver; the squad shouldn't try to fire and maneuver (in the sense of enveloping attacks) as a regular practice. At least that seems sensible to me for the 8-10 man squads that most armys have.

US Army light infantry experience in Vietnam bears this out. The squad was usually reduced (by combat attrition) to 6-8 men with one M60, one M79, and a handfull of riflemen. It didn't have enough people to subdivide and conduct enveloping attacks at squad level. SLA Marshall's bright idea of a two team, 11 man squad suppressing with one team and flanking with another didn't cut it for very long.

Is anyone familiar with SOPs for the Vietnam era special projects? I'd like to know if Mike Forces, Mobile Guerrilla Forces, CIDGs, and SOG SLAM/Hatchet units normally used enveloping attacks at squad level or if that was a platoon function.

[William F. Owen]

"The platoon is, for all purposes, the unit for whose perfection we strive. Because, a perfect platoon means a perfect battalion and brigade or division: and the efficiency of any army corps is to be measured by that of its platoons."

Any chance you have the Canadian PAMs as .pdf's?

Yes, it is all about Platoons. The fixation on the perfect squad is what I call "Error 37" from the UK 1937 Platoon re-organisation.

Once folks lock into Platoon concepts and not section concepts, I get the impression we all seem to come back to same stuff and same approximate numbers.

I am not sure you need a Platoon HQ anymore. I don't think you needed one in 1918 or 1945. Modern radios like PRC-148 make dedicated Signallers/RTO a luxury, and not really relevant. Not having a platoon HQ does streamline a lot of stuff and IMO makes tactical conduct more efficient.

[Norfolk]

E-mail sent.

[Distiller]

Was busy + travelling, no time for the board for some time. Good to see some more discussion going on now


For my taste by putting the 60mm mortar into the platoon you'd create too large a body of men tasked with indirect fire into a fast acting direct-contact formation.

Does the platoon have the oversight for utilizing a 4000+ yards weapon? I think a MGL would be better suited.

And as long as you don't put six men for each barrel into the mortar section you don't have enough ammo for any meaningful fire in case you have to carry everything on your back.
And loading up the regular riflemen with grenades is also not good, as on contact their job is not to first run back to the mortar section and drop their load, but to instantly try to respond to enemy fire, or go for cover and act as fire directors for indirect fire or CAS.

If you put it at company level the mortar section can be more easily converted to a rifle section in case the mortar is not needed, without "braking up the harmony" of the platoon.

And I'm also not sure about a Lapua as marksman rifle. Might be too heavy, and for sure is a repeater. A 7.62 like the M110 is lighter and a semi-auto which can serve as high precision fire to supplement the high volume fire GPMG.
Again, a Lapua might be too long range for the horizon of a platoon.

Regarding coms I would say a dedicated man could come handy, but only if he has the equipment for some basic ELINT. Otherwise technology provides small enough equipment for miniaturized NavCom to be carried by each troop leader. Troop leaders should also be equipped with a precision engagement targeting device (laser or geo-location transceiver) for CAS and precision indirect-fire ammo.

Wilgram's views are sure interesting (and right), only thing is they are basically incompatible with current U.S.-dominated view of command and control. Giving the individual troops more or less tactical autonomy would be more German.

About section size: Don't forget you really should be able to fit into a IMV, IFV or UH-xx without splitting up the squad/section. Gives up a 8 or 9 men section. And not splitting up for mot/mech/air transport might be more important than the question of X men sections in a Y sections platoon.

All in all I think that concentrating on the platoon as smallest unit is more useful than concentrating on the squad/section. And what exactly would be the benefit of a 2 section platton? Why not go for a 6 section company then?

And not wanting to get into caliber discussion here, but a 6.5 Grendel is quite close to a 7.62 NATO. Might well go for a single caliber then. But also the more AK-47 style 6.8SPC for assault carbines and the 7.62mm NATO for MGs plus DMR should be considered.