The Basrah Gambit

[SWJED]

The Basrah Gambit – Defining Moment for Iraq or the Jaysh al-Mahdi? By Malcolm Nance at SWJ Blog.

Engaging the Mahdi Militia in Basrah and labeling them as equal to Al-Qaeda in Iraq is a deadly gamble that may leave Iran the winner.

On 19 March, 2008 CNN’s Iraq war correspondent, Kyra Phillips gave a live interview from in front of the crossed Swords at the Tomb of the Unknowns parade ground in Baghdad’s International Zone (IZ). She cheerfully reported that Iraq had somehow changed after five years and the lack of mortar and rocket fire allowed her to broadcast live. Rockets and mortars were a daily occurrence in the heavily fortified center of government over the previous 1,825 days. On this indirect fire free day, Phillips proclaimed, “there was a time twice a day there would be mortar rounds coming into this area. Now, five years later, Kiran, very rarely are you seeing that type of action, mortars or rockets coming in here. And the fact that I'm here live right now tells you this is a sign of progress.”

The media’s definition of “very rarely” would be exactly four days. That Sunday the IZ and surrounding neighborhoods would be bombarded with a 12-hour long barrage of rockets and mortars, which killed 13 civilians in the outlying neighborhoods. The barrages continued throughout the week and embassy workers and residents of the IZ were informed they could not go outside of concrete structures without body armor and helmets – a standing order for the first five years, which somehow needed to be reiterated. Phillip’s ridiculously premature assessment that the surge had dispelled mayhem and resentment of the 2003 invasion, was short-circuited by the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), or Mahdi Militia...

[Ron Humphrey]

After reading this I find myself with some questions

1- Considering that something like this did have to happen at some point (as the author points out) and that JAM did as expected (which is to say disappeared before incurring too many losses). Then also taking into account that either militia Badr or Mahdi both have Iranian connections. Does anything change the fact that it had to happen and at least in large part seems smarter to have done so when there would be more rather than less backup available if needed.

2. Am I mistaken and have the militias been effectively providing for and caring for their area and that everything that a government should do was being done by these hero thugs in Basra: if so why did the actual Iraqi government have to go in there and screw it all up? Am I missing something here.

3. Although I did hear and see that Sadr called a ceasefire I don't remember hearing that the IA/ IP have stopped moving through the area and securing neighborhoods. Are we to believe that Maliki doesn't realize exactly what this means and let's not forget that this operation was Iraqi planned and although support may be provided all in all it would seem that it will be dealt with in more of an Iraqi manner than what might be done in an American operation.

4. How exactly should this have been handled since everyone seems so certain that this wasn't the right way.

[Ken White]

After reading this I find myself with some questions.
. . .
4. How exactly should this have been handled since everyone seems so certain that this wasn't the right way.

Heh. Fair question, though...

[tequila]

If you're going to whack the hornet's nest, and yes it did need whacking, then at least make sure (1) the hornets don't win (2) you don't just go after just one species of hornet when there are at least four that need to get dead.

What Sadr has done is show that his militia can stand up to and defeat the best efforts of the Iraqi Army, that he can turn the violence on and off even in the face of an offensive by said army, and thus can control the streets of southern Iraq and Baghdad even from a perch in Qom. Maliki looks pathetic while the Iranians preen as the one side that all Shia factions can go to for intercession.

We'll see how this plays out, but right now it's hard to imagine the last few days as any kind of success.

[Abu Buckwheat]

If you're going to whack the hornet's nest, and yes it did need whacking, then at least make sure (1) the hornets don't win (2) you don't just go after just one species of hornet when there are at least four that need to get dead.

BBWwaaaahahahahahaaa.... well that comment made writing the whole blog entry in one flight back to CONUS worth it. Hey tequila, can I use this in my next book?

Seriously though ...

My assertion is that this was not part of the surge but a completely different component of a North-South offensive. The MNF-I and the Kurd IA Divisons would clear Mosul while Maliki would be give the chance to use the Badr Corps, er, I mean, the "Iraqi Army" and police to clear Basrah.

The ruse of going after only the "rogue" JAM units surely weakened the JAM but no one who has spent anytime there (I spent almost a year in Basrah and all of my Iraqi bosyguards are from there) was going to think that the JAM was not wildly popular. they are more popular than the central government, but not because they provide services. They provide a gunweilding voice and see that the future could bear great promise for them. The JAM, the Hizb'Dawa and the Badr Corps have been banging away to gain dominence for five years and this last year the JAM has made headway. Granted, the Garamsheh tribe runs all of the guns and crime, and this is fueled by the money that still flows from the tolerated Ali Baba port at Mina Abu Floos. The big question is what made Maliki think Shiites were going to really fight hard against the JAM when the JAMs could come to their family's front door any given night and kill them all? Thats why policemen surrendered ... for their family's sake. Everyone knows everyone in Southern Iraq.

4. How exactly should this have been handled since everyone seems so certain that this wasn't the right way.

To answer the question they could have bought a Kurd/Peshmerga division down south quietly and let them do it. They would have done the job in a slugfest like bloodbath that would probably raze a good piece of western and northern Basrah. However, Maliki would be out of office the next day. The final answer: Train IA units for the mission in secret in Fallujah (live fire training), pretend you are going to Ramadi, turn left, drive overnight and blitz Basrah with heavy US armor and air support from the afloat Marine unit in the Gulf ... then effect the BSP super rapido! ... however this would have taken allot of troops we just don't have and a level of planning they don't have. There was no real airpower or heavy armor (the T-55s and T-72s being up in Taji-stan) supporting the offensive except for some M113s and some police Cougars. This was doomed from the inception and it appears both Cheney and McCain were briefed about it. Thats MHO.

[Tom Odom]

Malcom,

Great blog, Welcome back!

Tom

[Rank amateur]

I've noticed a number of editorials that say all of the fighting took place amongst anti AQI groups. That could be a big factor in the domestic debate.

[Abu Buckwheat]

All Shiite groups are anti-alQaeda ... they're Shiite! AQ thinks Shiites are apostates anyway which, by Takfiri definition, they're Kufr and that means any Shiite can be killed at anytime.

[Rank amateur]

All Shiite groups are anti-alQaeda ... they're Shiite! AQ thinks Shiites are apostates anyway which, by Takfiri definition, they're Kufr and that means any Shiite can be killed at anytime.

I knew that - except for the words Kufr and Takfiri - but when we're moving troops to take part in inter shiite battles it's a lot harder to argue that "Iraq is the central front in the war on terror."

[Ken White]

I knew that - except for the words Kufr and Takfiri - but when we're moving troops to take part in inter shiite battles it's a lot harder to argue that "Iraq is the central front in the war on terror."

just watch what goes on. To my knowledge, no one other than politicians and pundits uses that phrase. What, precisely, does Central Front mean in any event?

Not that, even were that 'central front' statement remotely sensible, would it be negated by the fact that we're moving troops to take part in inter Shiite battles. That occurs on almost a daily basis there. Given a fight of any kind in Iraq, we're almost certainly going to be at least peripherally involved. Look at Najaf in '04. What difference does that make?

[Rank amateur]

even were that 'central front' statement remotely sensible,

I'm an ad guy. "Not remotely sensible" is what I do. Not remotely sensible can also decide elections. Just my opinion, but I think "bring home the troops who are not fighting Al Qeada" could win votes.

[Ron Humphrey]

I'm an ad guy. "Not remotely sensible" is what I do. Not remotely sensible can also decide elections. Just my opinion, but I think "bring home the troops who are not fighting Al Qeada" could win votes.

But this begs the question are those votes associated with grievance against a wrong action or are they votes without an inform and accepted awareess of the consequences of doing so.

In other words if you want me to do something because it's what you feel, believe whichever fine your the populous and ultimately you rule, However if you require this without consideration of it's very likely aftershocks and the very good possibility that you or your family may suffer from it in the long run then it's on you.

If on the other hand you are like many others who wish to push for what they want without being willing to accept responsibility for its outcomes, then Should the decision be quite that simple?

[Ken White]

I'm an ad guy. "Not remotely sensible" is what I do. Not remotely sensible can also decide elections. Just my opinion, but I think "bring home the troops who are not fighting Al Qeada" could win votes.

doing things that were not highly sensible would get you killed, you'll not mind if I agree with you on deciding elections and even on the bit about winning votes while pointing out that such an attitude has no place in geopolitics (See Kennedy, J; Johnson,L; Carter, J. Reagan, R; Bush G.H.W.; Clinton W.).

IOW, there's a time and place for not being sensible and one for being very sensible. It's sort of important not to conflate the two...

That doesn't mean for a second that bringing the troops out precipitously would be sensible and I'll also suggest that it might not buy nearly as many votes as you think. Further, the majority of those it did buy would be voting against a party, person or issue rather than for the issue cited.

I don't know of anyone who isn't ready for Iraq and Afghanistan to be over and done with. They aren't and won't be for a while. Why we're in either place is not irrelevant because the 'why' is directly related to the failure of four previous administrations from both parties to confront an obvious threat. That's hard for the western mind to grasp but it's harsh reality. A precipitous departure from either place will be touted as another failure. That, too is hard for western minds to grasp.

Whether you or I would have done it the way it was is immaterial; it was done that way. What the future holds is murky but I'll wager one thing -- if we leave early, we'll be back there (and it will be far harder) during your lifetime.

Sort of like Ron said above -- gotta think about the aftershocks...

[Rank amateur]

then Should the decision be quite that simple?

John Kerry thought that every issue should be analyzed and explained in agonizing detail. (If I could've figured out a way to get him elected I'd be a lot smarter - and richer - than I am.)

[Schmedlap]

I'm unclear on some assumptions that seem to underpin much of the discussion about recent activity in Basra and Nassiriya. My impression is that the following are generally accepted as true:

1. JAM/Sadr is no better or worse than Badr/ISCI in terms of the security situation and any possibility of a future stable Iraq

2. Some type of action had to be taken against JAM and/or Badr in Basra, at some point in the near future

3. JAM has inflicted more damage upon the ISF than the ISF has inflicted upon JAM

If 1 and 3 are accepted as true, could someone please explain why?

[tequila]

1) ISCI/SCIRI began life as a creation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. It was originally a breakoff faction of al-Dawa which split mainly because its members chose to follow Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of vilayet-i-fiqh, or clerical rule. It may have achieved some independent political life since 2003, but its IRGC ties are strong and well-documented. Its political position regarding Iraqi federalism (advocating for a strong southern federal region with near-independent powers) is in line with Iranian interests.

3) Who knows proper casualty figures - I doubt anyone does. What matters is that the ISF was unable to seize or maintain control over any Mahdi Army strongholds in Basra until Sadr told the militia to stand down, while Sadr's forces were able to launch attacks throughout the south and put the ISF on the run in numerous locations including in Nasiriyah. I saw TV footage of Mahdi Army militia strolling about in broad daylight as late as yesterday, as well as several Mahdi Army fighters driving captured ISF hummvees. That Maliki extended his "deadline", took the deal, as well as claiming all along that he never targeted the Sadr Current specifically, shows that the ISF did not exactly sweep all before it.

[Schmedlap]

Its political position regarding Iraqi federalism (advocating for a strong southern federal region with near-independent powers) is in line with Iranian interests.

And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.

What matters is that the ISF was unable to seize or maintain control over any Mahdi Army strongholds in Basra until Sadr told the militia to stand down, while Sadr's forces were able to launch attacks throughout the south and put the ISF on the run in numerous locations including in Nasiriyah.

It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?

[tequila]

And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.

It is also the recipe for a divided, militarily weak central government.

My own assumption is that Iran's maximal solution is a stable but weak Iraq which which it can dominate through its tight relationships with Shiite religious parties and the Iraqi Kurdish parties. The best way to accomplish this is through a strongly federalist constitution and a weak central government.

It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?

My own feeling is that Sadr did not want to force the U.S. to intervene on the side of the ISF. He knows from 2005 that taking on U.S. forces head-on is suicide. Routing the ISF comprehensively in Basra would only bring in more airstrikes and possible U.S. intervention in Baghdad and perhaps even down south. An outright military defeat of the ISF and the US is not in the cards, but a military standoff combined with a well-orchestrated political victory that shows the hollowness of Maliki's posturing looks pretty good. Not a bad place to be with local elections on the horizon.

[Ron Humphrey]

And the assumption is that the Iranian interests, in this case, do not align with Iraq's interests in long-term stability? A "federal region with near-independent powers" sounds like a description of Kurdistan.



It sounds like the criteria of success hinges not on what is accomplished, but how. ISF was only able to get this far because Sadr stood down. Nassirya may be under control now, but not before JAM seized the initiative. Why did Sadr tell his goons to stand down? Was he feeling generous? Was JAM incurring too many losses to sustain? Was he acting upon advice from Iran?

And I think we'll find that this may come down more on the side of an IO/IE failure on the part of ISAF than on actual capability to accomplish the mission.

[Rank amateur]

The NYT has more info - via the UK - on the fighting.

The defense secretary, Desmond Browne, also used his statement in the House of Commons to acknowledge that British military involvement in last week’s fighting in Basra was more extensive than previously disclosed.

At one point, he said, British tanks, armored vehicles, artillery and ground troops were deployed to help extract Iraqi government troops from a firefight with Shiite militiamen in the city.

Mr. Browne said British involvement in that battle was in addition to other actions in support of Iraqi forces.

He said those actions included aerial surveillance of the city; low-level missions by combat aircraft aimed at reinforcing Iraqi troops by establishing a menacing aerial presence over combat zones; the use of helicopters that carried food and ammunition to the Iraqis; and medical care for wounded Iraqi troops at British combat hospitals outside the city.

Mr. Browne said the use of British ground troops in the fighting was ordered “in extremis,” suggesting that the deployment of forces from the British base at Basra was a last-ditch measure to save Iraqi troops.