Quote Originally Posted by Vic Bout View Post
I wrote a naive graduate thesis on g-war and geography. Using some rudimentary statistics, I found that the most successful post-WW2 irregulars absolutely enjoyed some kind of cross-border sanctuary. What I failed to incorporate (or think of at all for that matter) was a measurement for how much that sanctuary added to the insurgent cause. Percentage-wise across time etc. And does it trump popular support as a variable? Hmmm....And obversely, 'cause memory fails me, has any sanctuary in recent history (say 1945-present) failed an insurgency as a supporting factor? I'm inclined to say "Of course not...why go to Hooters if you're not welcome there?"

My apologies for the stream of consciousness...just typing out loud
No not at all. Good question on sanctuary versus popular support. I kinda separate classic guerrilla versus insurgent on that issue, the guerrilla not necessarily basing what he does on the need to increase or maintain popular support, the insurgent in contrast has to do just that.

Brascino emphasizes that the Soviets did adapt in Afghanistan and their brutal tactics in some areas did have the effects they sought. What hurt them the most was the issue of the cross border sanctuaries where the Muj could R&R at will (at least at first).

I know in addressing the threat from the Hutu camps along Rwanda's borders, they were a combination of refuge and host population, all catered by the UNHCR and the international community. As former refugees, insurgents, and counterinsurgents in two wars, the leaders of the RPF had no doubt that the camps were a threat, one that had to be addressed. When the international community failed to do so, they did. The results were and still are horrific in the Congo--but it allowed the RPF to win the COIN effort inside Rwanda. After years of meddling by Mobutu, the RPF leaders were more than willing to make that choice, especially if it got rid of Mo in the process.

Best
Tom