....The problem with the Basra offensive is that it only adds complexity to the already fragmented state of Iraqi politics. First off, the military operation can intensify intra-Shiite conflicts, exacerbating the factionalism that has dominated Iraqi politics since the December 2005 elections. While the United States openly backs other Shiite militias like the Badr Corps and helps organize and arm Shiite tribal forces in the Awakening (sahwa) movement, the Sadrists will only be motivated to reinforce their military operations against perceived American threats. Since most of the Shiite militias are class-based military organizations, the SIIC-Maliki-backed military attacks on a Mahdi Army supported by the urban poor will only bolster class tensions in a country that is already fragmented by tribal divisions. The irony here is the way in which the expansion of factionalism and militia politics is occurring under the very surge strategy aimed at suppressing militia power in order to jump-start the political process, a key to achieving security in Iraq. Oddly, the renewed political process has only added to a conflict-ridden political situation that has poured fuel on the flames of militia rage in the southern regions.
Secondly, the Basra fighting may in fact enhance the military prestige of the Mahdi Army among the urban poor and certain tribal regions. As a nationalist, Moqtada can strategically use the Basra affair to bolster his leadership credentials and emerge stronger than before as an anti-occupation leader whose appeal may transcend beyond the Shiite community. But the most problematic feature of this military operation is how the recent events have in fact reduced the opportunity for the Sadrists to become a fully legitimate political movement with non-violent operational activities. The most problematic aspect of the recent fighting is the possible reversal of the five-year process that saw the gradual incorporation of Moqtada and his followers into mainstream Iraqi politics.....
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