I think the realistic answer is that a combination of all 3 of these will continue.
Pat I think you've nailed it. There are questions of capabilities and questions of capacity. There are "surge" requirements and "steady state" requirements.

While ARSOF has a great deal of capability with regard to FID (for reasons of character selection, because they receive specialized training, and because the missions they do build experience in those areas), the capacity requirements have created conditions where the demand outstrips what was up to time our answer as a resource. There are also other missions which have increased the OPTEMPO for all of our SOF. I'd say one of the great things about ARSOF is that offers us a capability to work with indigenous forces where the infrastructure and sustainment mechanisms are immature, and they offer us a higher probability of success when the outcome requires people with special character, training and skills we don't normally see in the GPF.

With regard to BCTs, the reality on the ground is that BCTs are being placed in conditions that often require them to either field, augment, or support the gamut of transition teams. The character of the BCT CDR determines how successful they will be. Even within a BCT though, there are issues of capability and capacity - e.g. if a BCT gets asked to field a BDE MiTT, and 3 x BN MiTTs to work with an IA BDE on a 1:1 ratio, that is pretty well withing both their capability and capacity - considering that they still must conduct day to day offensive and defensive operations, and support the TTs they have fielded. If however that same BCT got asked to work on a 1 to say 6 ratio they would have a capacity issue. If they got asked to provide 2 IA BDES worth of MiTTs, 6 x PTTs (police) and 6 x BTTs, they'd have both a capacity and a capability issue. This last bit is important, because although we are using military teams to train PTTs, SpTTs, and BTTs, the skill set we as a military bring to a table is not going to be a perfect lift for training police (although we probably could mitigate that some with a good train up - in the end, we are often the only folks who can operate in those conditions). If a BCT was given the mission to do more, far enough out to do a good MA, and were given the additional resources (time, augmentation, special training, etc.) they could improve more I think - but you can only pile the plate so high before stuff falls off. I'd add that as more people come from TTs back into BCTs, the training base for the BCTs to draw on with regard to understanding the advisory mission is growing.

Individual augmentees brought together in an Ad-Hoc fashion - will remain a staple I think for as long as our steady state looks like it does now, or increases - ex. the need for more TTs in Afghanistan has already been identified. While this is far from perfect, it does allow for some tailored solutions. It goes not only to what normally springs to mind when we say "advisory effort" in Iraq now, but also to the PRTs, and the advisory teams that work at the ministerial levels working to build institutions and bureaucracy's that supports the kind of DOTMLPF developmental challenges HN security forces must create to support the government. Yes it is ad-hoc, but I'd say mostly these teams have done OK (and in many cases better then OK, and a few not so good), and at a time where manning is so critical across the force, it may just be the best we can do. I'm not saying we can't or should not tighten up with regard to HRC selection - particularly when there is a critical advisory job that requires both specific technical experience and professional maturity, but I am saying that within the broader context of the mission in Iraq, I think we continue to get better at it.

Some of the problems we create for ourselves. Ex. if a BN CDR responsible for day to day security operations in a city has assessed that the HN Army forces or doing pretty good and can stand on their own with minimal assistance, but the police need allot of help or they are going to fail, and he does not have the organic combat power to form PTTs out of hide, should he have the authority to reorient those ad-hoc, non-organic MiTTs in his AOR to turn them into PTTs? My point is that every set of conditions is a little different and somebody has to be in charge of the limited resources available in order to move things forward as effectively and efficiently as they can be, we often create self inflicted GSWs with regard to making it difficult for the tactical and operational commanders to adapt to the conditions that are emerging vs. the ones somebody sees from way back in space, time, or both.

The last think I'd say to consider, where does this mission go in the future? After Iraq and Afghanistan (whatever that means in years) do we believe that we no longer have a capacity issue? If you have no capability in a given area, then do you have any capacity? If you believe that you are going to have capability and capacity issues in meeting requirements generated as a result of a broader strategy, or FP - how do you institutionalize it do where you don't have to go through the Ad-Hoc process we did in Iraq and Afghanistan? What is the risk to the GPF for doing so? What is the risk for not?

These are some of the challenges with regard to determining where SFA (Security Force Assistance) needs to go, but they are not all. No easy answers.

BTW - I talked with a BCT S-1 this last week, he told me they had projected inbound for their unit reset a total of three FGs for the BCT - they will go through the reset like everybody else, piecemeal, and hopefully they'll have all their folks prior to deploying, but I'd be willing to bet there will be some 03s filling some 04 holes, and 02s filling some 03 holes - things are tough all over.

Best Regards, Rob