Strategic Compression

[SWJED]

I would like to keep the discussion going - any additional thoughts on the earlier posts and discussions would be most appreciated.

We have identified several historical examples (just the beginning of our research) of strategic compression - the overlapping or merging of the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. Please comment on these and feel free to suggest additional case studies / areas to explore....

Strategic compression has been a common aspect of warfighting throughout the past. It is not that strategic compression is a new reality to warfighting. Rather, it is the mechanisms in place in the current security environment (C4ISR, CNN effect) that are new and that exacerbate the problem. The examples below are intended to give a historical perspective of strategic compression and show how the levels of war moved closer together or further apart, as well as well as some of the historical mechanisms that brought strategic compression about.

Warrior-Kings of Antiquity

As previously mentioned, strategic compression is not new to warfare. In fact, at times, all three levels were represented in the form of single actors such as Alexander the Great or Genghis Khan. These leaders would initiate wars at the strategic level, plan campaigns, and sometimes even fight at the front. In these instances, the main mechanism that allowed for strategic compression to take place was the charismatic warrior-king who decided to follow his soldiers into battle rather than delegate that authority to an inferior. The later rise of the nation-state, the levee en masse, and the resulting approaches to administering large forces through delegation had strong effect in delineating the levels of war.

Lawrence of Arabia (1916-1918)

Lawrence of Arabia is one of the most recent pre-WWII examples of tactical level actors making strategic decisions. Away from lines of communication and under a broad mandate, T.E. Lawrence took his own initiative to seek peace between the Arab tribes and then the operational and tactical decisions needed to wage a guerilla campaign against the Ottoman Empire. Until recently, tactical actors in remote locations regularly made strategic decisions due to the inability to effectively communicate with strategic or operational actors. With the development of technologies such as the wireless field radio, tactical units in the preceding years were rarely left to make strategic or operational decisions without higher guidance. The lone tactical commander granted a broad mandate or even plenipotentiary powers such as T.E. Lawrence had largely become an anachronism by World War II.

World War II and the Cold War (1939-1945, 1947-1991)

During World War II through the Cold War, the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war became quite distinct and had minimal overlap. World War II provides an interesting example. Strategic level actors such as President Roosevelt or Truman could direct the war effort by determining war objectives and setting domestic priorities. Operational level actors such as General Eisenhower could plan and direct theater wide campaigns. Tactical commanders and units were responsible for the actual organization and fighting of individual battles. The accomplishment or failure of specific tactical actions did not necessarily determine the operational outcome of the war. Individual tactical actions rarely (if ever) had an effect on the strategic level war. Conversely, strategic level actors, while responsible for giving general guidance to operational level commanders, usually had limited or no interface with tactical level commanders or units. The state of World War II era communications technology and situational awareness made effective strategic level micro-management of the tactical level unlikely and was the mechanism for not having much strategic compression.

Highway of Death (1991)

While media coverage played a significant role in America’s eventual departure from Vietnam and the Beirut barracks bombing in 1983. The Persian Gulf War’s ‘Highway of Death’ incident stands out as a clear instance of strategic compression according to the model. American units destroyed retreating Iraqi Armor so that Saddam Hussein would be deprived of his military assets including his Hammurabi division of the Iraqi Republican Guard. Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, wary of the fallout of targeting retreating soldiers and how it would play in the international media, stopped the air war before all original objectives were complete. The CNN effect or the fear of the CNN effect played a role in forcing changes to strategic objectives.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)

More recently during Operation Iraqi Freedom, C4ISR had become a mechanism driving strategic compression. There was an instance during the war where American units that had previously made a quick advance toward Baghdad slowed and even stopped. CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks was upset that “on the CENTCOM computer screens, the blue icons that represented the Army had not been moving north” what the screens didn’t show was that Army units were stalled because they were engaged in heavy fighting against Saddam’s Fedayeen units. The CFLCC Lieutenant General David McKiernan was at odds with Franks for not seeming to grasp the tactical situation and insisting that the units continue to advance. A telling statement showing how C4ISR technology allows higher level actors to potentially micro-manage the tactical level of war was captured by reporter Michael Gordon who quoted McKiernan as saying that the “Blue Force Tracker drives the CINC.”

[SWJED]

Here is another area for comment if there are any takers - again - remember we have just started to explore strategic compression and I thought I'd get Council member input before we really drill down into this subject.

The list below is not intended to be exhaustive or definitive but rather a incomplete snapshot of a few key implications from the perspective of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as another aspect that does not fit neatly into the levels of war construct, training.

Strategic Level

With current and future C4ISR capabilities, strategic level actors such as the president or the secretary of defense could theoretically bypass normal operational channels and issue direct orders to field commanders in real time while watching (and possibly directing) the action from C4ISR platforms. This ability can alter (even undermine) the traditional chain-of-command concept and compress the operational sphere of war.

Increased C4ISR can also create a temptation amongst strategic or operational level actors to micro-manage the operational or even tactical level of war. The lure of micromanagement can grow especially if tactical or operational objectives aren’t met or met in a timely fashion or if domestic public opinion changes rapidly. Similarly, operational level actors may be tempted to micro-manage the tactical level if pressure is exerted from the strategic level. [Example: Refer to the earlier Highway of Death paragraph]

Operational Level

Amount of units needed to achieve desired strategic and operational effects is decreasing. This aspect results in 1) a smaller logistical supply line infrastructure 2) smaller units can achieve goals that formerly only larger units could and 3) faster attainment of objectives.

In order to combat the CNN effect, increased information flow to the lower ranks is essential. Clear mission objectives, effectively and rapidly disseminated are crucial. Making sure all soldiers understand the strategic situation and how mission objectives fit within the strategic picture is a must. Changes and/or updates to commander’s intent need to be relayed immediately to all ranks.

Tactical Level

Because of the CNN effect soldiers are now on the frontlines of American foreign policy. Every tactical action or result of a tactical action has the potential to receive close scrutiny. This means that every soldier has increased performance expectations and needs to fully understand the strategic context and goals in which their tactical objectives operate under. Soldiers will increasingly be held accountable for their actions. Therefore it is crucial that at all times they act in accordance with strategic level intent.

Training

There are a variety of aspects of how training needs to adjust to accommodate the reality of strategic compression.

1. Training how to operate independently/decision making
2. Cultural training/awareness
3. When to take act/take initiative and when to show restraint
4. Media/public affairs training: every soldier is a potential spokesperson for the military, training of how to conduct oneself when interacting with the media is necessary to properly explain tactical actions.

[zenpundit]

What about a systemic consideration of factors that exert a countervailing effect ("strategic de-compression") to disaggergate war into levels ? They could be man-made or something natural like distance/time

I would hazard that these variables always exist to some extent in tension with the forces of compression. Perhaps a comparative taxonomy ?

[SWJED]

What about a systemic consideration of factors that exert a countervailing effect ("strategic de-compression") to disaggergate war into levels ? They could be man-made or something natural like distance/time

I would hazard that these variables always exist to some extent in tension with the forces of compression. Perhaps a comparative taxonomy ?

One school of thought is that there are no "man-made" factors that could contribute to de-compression. (Short of say an EMP attack or some other counterproductive and catastrophic device).

Seems that distance-time has been regulated to the back-waters when it comes to command, control and intelligence.

This brings us to yet another focus area - command and control can be instantaneous - yet bringing to bear "physical aspects" of warfare have not yet caught up - troops and logistics stand out here. Does this force us to rely on those physical aspects that are "timely" - airpower for example?

The school of thought that there is little or nothing we can do to control strategic compression seems to be pointing towards command awareness that it does indeed exist and providing the tools, training and education to enable timely mitigation when negative incidents of strategic compression occur.

This last item raises another question for the Council – are there positive aspects of strategic compression that we can use to our advantage?

[selil]

What about cyber-warfare as a impetus to de-compression? If for example command and control has been over taken by the adversary and they can listen to and change the communications conduit (Hezbollah?) what happens to compression? Is compression necessarily bad or is it an asset when used appropriately?

Consider the scenario where commanders in the field are exerting up to the minute movement orders and those communications are subject to monitoring by the adversary. In that situation the adversary does not have to divine the intent of movement by a unit they can monitor changes in movement orders and be prepared.

[slapout9]

1- I have written about this before but since you brought historic examples I will add some more. This is based upon his "War and Peace in the Space Age"written in 1958 and a personal interview at his winter home in Winter Park,Fl. in 1985. He no longer believed that Strategy at the military level existed! Here is why. He believed in 58 that once the earth was mapped with satellites and ICBMs came on line the whole world was now a tactical battlefield. Anyplace in the world could be hit with a missile. So all military functions of shooting-moving and communicating would be sent to a tactical battle command system, i.e. C4ISR. Strategy was now in the realm national policy only. Wars would become "Pushbutton" fast and furious with breaks in between for political solutions. This is why he fought so hard for a national missile defense system. My personal opinion is this is why he had a winter home in Florida near the Martin Co. which actually produced an operational missile defense system before Henry Kissinger gave it away in SALT treaty one.

[slapout9]

I had more to post the first time but I hit a wrong button so the rest of my original post is lost in cyber space somewhere. However to continue. General Gavin also believed and never really understood why ICBMs could only be equipped with nuclear warheads, he would very much agree with the Navy's recent proposal to put conventional warheads on long range submarine launched missiles. Or land based missiles. He also thought ALL ships in the navy should be submersible.

He was highly upset over the military failure to understand the implications of the Falkland islands missile attacks on British ships. Besides being better than aircraft missiles are cheap.


Finally he thought good generals should know tactics. He literally believed that the only way military strategy could be defined was generalship. If a general had to have a strategy then he had failed to realize that he (the general himself was strategy) and good generals know tactics.

To me this makes a lot of sense. Example look at Iraq, if our strategy is clear, hold and build. That makes know sense. Clear,hold and build might be goals or objectives but they are not a strategy.The general must know (how) which tactics to use before anything happens. If you don't know clearing tactics and holding tactics you will not reach your objectives. How to do something is the hard part, what to do is easy.


We have talked a lot about the Strategic corporal maybe Strategic Compression is nothing more than how to be a "One Minute General"

From the Slapout, Alabama the cultural center of the universe, good night.

[Steve Blair]

I intend to post some more on this subject, as it's very fascinating to me. I just want to go over the main points and get my own thoughts sorted and organized.