the balancing act. About what I expected. Especially since we have a propensity to ignore our own doctrine on such things as command relationships - witness UNOSOM II
Cheers
JohnT
Originally Posted by John T. Fishel
What interests me is the command relationship between the BCT cdr and the MiTTs in his AO. If he has them OPCON he should have no problem at all. If they are TACON then he should be able to give them a new mission. But, it it is any other relationship he has a problem - greater or smaller but a problem (or should I say challenge). Of course, if he is a culturally insenstive jerk then I, for one, don't want him to have OPCON or TACON of the MiTT.
What is the "normal" command relationship in this situation?
Cheers
JohnT
It is very much a function of AO and commanders. And it is a balancing act--without a command relationship, the MiTTs suffer on support. With a tight command relationship they risk becoming an extension of the BCT and that affects their role with their host nation forces.
Rob of course can offer more detail
Best
Tom
Tom, I like your phrasing about
the balancing act. About what I expected. Especially since we have a propensity to ignore our own doctrine on such things as command relationships - witness UNOSOM II
Cheers
JohnT
Rotating Into (and Out Of) The Advisor Corps
I appreciate the learned discussion the NYT Op-Ed on an Advisor Corps generated, but I feel the need to clear up a persistent misunderstanding about my Advisor Corps proposal. It is not a BRANCH--like the Military Police Corps or the Adjutant General's Corps--but a UNIT, like the XVIIIth ABN Corps or the III Corps. Thus, soldiers rotate into and out of it. The original CNAS paper was pretty clear on this point:
"This proposed organization would solve the vast majority of the problems afflicting embedded combat advisors—providing them with doctrine, training, and a permanent home. Service members would be transferred to the Advisor Corps for a standard three-year Army tour of duty, during which they should expect to deploy for one year and then hand off the mission to the next advisory division, facilitating the consolidation of lessons learned. Upon the end of their combat tours, some advisors could remain at the Advisor Corps as trainers and doctrine writers, while others could return to the conventional Army sporting their new “Combat Advisor” tab—which should give them a competitive advantage for promotion as the advisory mission becomes the main effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan over the next few years."
The proposed increase in the size of the Afghan National Army, from 80,000 to 120,000, will only increase the already unmet demand for Combat Advisors. We need to do that task better, and we need to do it soon. The discussion on the Small Wars Journal is important in building consensus at least on that need, if not on how to solve the problems afflicting our current answer to this pressing problem.
Multitude of valid thoughts....my 2 cents worth
I tend to try to learn from history and view those lessons as they apply today. Many are in agreement that current force structure/force taskings are misutilizing todays forces. Many think various branchs should grow, the military should grow, and the debate goes on. My number one questions is why do we even do rotations/tours? It is my personal belief that when the order was given we should have gone with everything we own. Not half our force and relay later on units rotating out. If we would have brought the full brunt of our military from the beginning would we be in the situation we are? We would have enough SF to conduct FID/COIN operations, conventional forces to #1. Secure all borders (we can't do that here) nothing in nothing out, 2# Man damn never every city, town, village. We could lock the entire country down. Unfortunately our politicians and society has deemed war a game to be played fairly, humanely, and without true force. How many times did units rotate out of WWII? I remember reading a few years back about guys who were gone for 7 years straight. I look at it like this, we do it the right way over a period of five years straight or do we play this game for 10-15 years.
Don't remember who posted about the SF growth and subsequent postings. Problem is the Army's inate ability to manage personnel. They knew for years close to 50% of SF would be retirement eligable over a 5 year period, guess what they did just that retired and went elsewhere. So the Army says hey 20 years ago we brought guys off the streets straight into SF it worked then why not now. Problem is that huge 50% of retirees. 20 years ago a few sprinkled inexperienced guys could be trained, mentored, and developed by seniors without a ripple effect throughout the force. Not mention these college educated, 4 years SF experience with multiple tours are ripe for every other agency and private sector jobs out there, how many are stick around? If I'm not mistaken the average age in SF has gone from 32 years to 27years...huge experience and maturity gap.
What all this does is tie into the fact that everyone wants to do everyone elses job. Conventional forces want to do what SF does, guys in SF want to do what Infantry guys do and so on and so on. If everyone stayed within their capabilities and scope of things they would stay busier than ever and we would be leaps and bounds ahead of where we are currently. Yes there are many great individuals throughout the force and many different entities actually conduct joint operations as it should be. Unfortunately for everyone of those there is more not doing this.
Sorry I kinda rambled have a million more thoughts but will spare you those and save them for later.
That's foremost a societal thing. Even in a volunteer service - who is willing to spend his life in the bogs, some desert or jungle, when others of his age have a familiy life, are much more comfortable and prosperous?
Excessive rotations and ratios of 6 or 7 to 1 are certainly undesireable. 4 to 1 I guess should be the goal. But the current armed forces still have a structure that is designed for a full-scale blow-up in case of mobilisation with a very top heavy structure. Also don't forget all the perks and promotions that come with deployments - everybody wants a piece!
And it's also a question of mentality. The warrior spirit, or whatever you might call it. Not doing it as a job, or as duty for the fatherland, but out of a mentality (not necessarily one compatible with civil society). It would also need a vastly different social structure of the forces, a different definition of duty, discipline, ranks. Strategic compression in the extreme, and almost like a religious order. Takes a certain desperado mentality. People who are fed up with society, those who are running away from something - you end with something like the Légion Etrangčre. No way to build larger forces on that.
A more realistic way might be foreigners. Promise them U.S. citizenship and an education for X years in the bogs. No need to rotate them. The Byzantine way.
Hi John, I think Tom has got the most important piece of it:What is the "normal" command relationship in this situation?
The role of the BCT CDR cannot be underestimated. Depending upon who he is and what the conditions are - such as: is there an existing TT structure in his AOR?; what is the enemy situation?; how big is the AOR?; what types of HN security forces and how many are there in his AOR?; how mature are they, and do they work together?; what do the CDR's other LOEs (Lines of Effort) look like? and a host of other questions shape the situation.It is very much a function of AO and commanders. And it is a balancing act--without a command relationship, the MiTTs suffer on support. With a tight command relationship they risk becoming an extension of the BCT and that affects their role with their host nation forces.
Add into it the way those conditions shape the other players and the challenges of the CDR to retain balance grow.
Over the last two weeks we've interviewed three different BCTs who operated in Iraq at the same time, but in different locations. All inherited different conditions and as such approached the problem different from one another. It had to be that way, a cookie cutter solution would have resulted in problems, and tied their hands in a number of ways. That is one of the strengths I think in the way we develop leaders, and we should exploit that strength at all levels. They employed different organizational solutions, different TTPs, different emphases, and different levels of trust based on the conditions and personalities in their AOR.
What I think needs to be emphasized is the CMD vision that begins in this case with MNF-I, comes down through MNC-I and MNSTC-I to the various GO level commands such as MND-N or MND-B, or IAG (at least at my time) and makes its way out to all subordinate commands, so that regardless of the conditions, the desired endstate and key components of that vision are understood - so that even as the tactical and operational level leaders adapt to the conditions in their AOR(s), they are still guided by overarching themes.
Unity of command may not always be required (or desired if the personalities don't support it (of course if its a personality issue, the personality in question may need to be addressed)), but unity of effort is critical! Whatever supports Unity of Effort should be the rule, if things are tracking because the right personalities are in place and the current command relationship works and works well, then it may not be a requirement, but if the current command relationship is broke - either because somebody in the chain is recalcitrant, does not get it, or is just so removed in time, space, and understanding as to be ineffective and incapable of good consistent judgment, then the command relationship needs to be adjusted as to support unity of effort.
I'll put up a summary of the last couple of weeks over the next few days that captures the different approaches and some of why those approaches were chosen - maybe on the SWJ blog - I just need to catch my breath and sit down and do it.
The three big take aways - BCT CDRs have a key role in SFA in Iraq, there should not be a "cookie cutter" approach to how this is done, and there absolutely must be unity of effort.
Best, Rob
Ken:
Sage advice from you as usual. Too bad others in higher places might not be listening. I think your plainly spoken words might be a good recipe for Afghanistan.
WM here seems to agree:
If we can get the policy right then many of the recommendations by others on this thread like John Fishel and Tom Odom makes sense.I agree with you that an in-country presence in a stable environment is probably the best way to try to improve an existing capacity. It does not require importing a ton of resources to execute, and one can observe and critique in a relatively leisurely way. It is sort of like coaching a sports team during an unopposed scrimmage.
But, we do not seem to have that sort of luxury in the current AOR. Instead, we are playing an away match in a hostile stadium (think England v. Italy in Rome playing a Round 1 World Cup spoccer match) in a "best-of-seven" tournament.
gian
Additionally the human relationships and stability
One of the issues with constantly rotating units is the lack of stability in regions. One unit does things one way the next unit reinvents the wheel and this cycle keeps repeating itself. I'll play my own devil's advocate in that I know this can also be beneficial in the fact that different approachs and views can solve problems as well. Unfortunately about the time you build a good working, trusting relationship with the local population your tours done and the relationship building starts again. Additionally with unit rotations this could be minimized by rotating the same units in the same areas, many of the local population will remember many of the units personnel thereby building the relationship quicker. This also needs to happen here at home between the SOF community and conventional forces. There is no reason why SOF units and conventional forces cannot link up and train together prior to deployment, this alone would prevent a lot infighting and help establish each others roles within BCT AORs. When BCT commanders have a good feel for the forces within their AOR, a solid working relationship built prior to deployment, and their capabilities and assets they bring to the table these CDRs are much more likely to utilize them properly."Excessive rotations and ratios of 6 or 7 to 1 are certainly undesireable. 4 to 1 I guess should be the goal. But the current armed forces still have a structure that is designed for a full-scale blow-up in case of mobilisation with a very top heavy structure. Also don't forget all the perks and promotions that come with deployments - everybody wants a piece!"
A realistic approach to this would be direct accession of mid level NCOs. Bring them into the SF Groups for a 90-120 day assessment period. After that time of assessment you would either make them 18 series or they would return to their normal capacity. This would mainly work within MOS that are compatible ie 11B = 18B, wouldn't be able to this for medics but many of these guys could go to the school house later to receive medical training. This additionally would help fill the void with seasoned NCOs without taking them out of the fight for 12-24 months for formal training. There use to be a policy in place to be able to do this don't know if they still exist or not but would be a great way to boost the force, down side is many conventional forces would be losing quality NCOs that otherwise might not have made the switch.want to expand SF (or the entire force) precipitously. My focus was pretty long term. IMHO SF should never reduce quality - I am skeptical of direct accession. Would much rather see SF accessing real sergeants than ones who just came on board.
ODB
Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:
Why did you not clear your corner?
Because we are on a base and it is secure.
What's the problem?
Sorry, I may be over simplifying this but, isn't the raison d'etre of every officer and NCO to be able to able to train and lead troops?
So if said officers and NCO's can speak a second language, they can lead and train troops using that language, (assuming no cultural impedimenta versus the target audience).
So you have the ability to train and a second language. What more is needed? Form specialist training cadres as and when required. That's how the UK does it. All you need is a good language training programme.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
UK vs US approach
Wilf,
You ask what is the difference... Essentially I would tell you the difference is scope. The US has a good language training program as well, but it, like everything else, is stretched at the seams. LTC Nagl's proposal for a 20k MTOE unit pulls at those seems as well. If I understand Gian correctly, we primarily have a policy crisis. To use an analogy, it appears we (US and closest allies) have behaved similarly to a character in "Caddy Shack". As Spalding approaches the snack shop he starts listing all the things he "wants". In a sense, we have done the same thing... and created a lot of indigestion.
Live well and row
Hacksaw
Say hello to my 2 x 4
Hi Wilf,
It is also worth noting that "trainer" and "Advisor" are not synonymous. Neither do the qualities that make a good commander of “his” or “her” unit directly transfer to the role an advisor plays – part of which is to build confidence by having his or her counterpart assess the situation independently and make decisions.So you have the ability to train and a second language. What more is needed? Form specialist training cadres as and when required. That's how the UK does it. All you need is a good language training programme.
You can train someone in rote style fashion to run a range, to qualify on a system, to conduct a battle drill, even to conduct planning. Lots of science available in training. Advising however is also a great deal of art – it means assessing the situation as your counterpart sees it, and helping him to reach the right conclusions while at the same time judging when to pick up the ball if the consequences of the wrong decision are such that they cannot be recovered from. Certainly being technically, and tactically competent in the area you are advising is critical – nobody wants an advisor who lacks a skill set, however, the ability to influence – bending without breaking is important to the long term success. As such personality matters – and attributes and traits play a role in how successful the mission is. These people exist in all of our formations, and yes I think the leaders who we often identify as folks we’d follow anywhere or would wish to work for again posses, or often possess them in spades. However, we still advance people we would not wish to follow anywhere, or would not wish to work for again, sometimes its out of necessity, some times its an oversight – but it is what it is. Sometimes we would do one, but not the other – i.e. we would welcome the hard, authoritarian character of a professional who was competent under the toughest conditions, but we would not want to work for them otherwise. Sometimes we’d be willing to work for a guy in other conditions, but might not want them leading troops into combat. The best advisors I’ve seen embodied both – they could give advice without actually running the HN force for themselves – micro management breeds apathy, and we have to be very careful there.
Best, Rob
P.S. Tom, I think you had a good idea on the need for a spinoff thread.
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 04-05-2008 at 12:00 AM.
Standardized HN forces training
Might be misplaced here but I think it goes along with the subject. We all have our personal preferences on what to train the HN forces in. In here lies part of the problem. Along with deciding the proper force to use to train HN forces we need to standardize their training across the board. Accordingly this training is based on the type of HN force unit. Many of the basic tasks can be and should be trained identically throughout the host nation. A standard POI should be developed for all basic tasks for all forces to use to train HN forces. This would help HN forces training progression along with replacement units knowing the HN forces level of training and capabilities. In a dream world this would be easy to implement, but unfortunately many of us know we have a difficult time doing this with our own forces. Would like to know your thoughts on this?
ODB
Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:
Why did you not clear your corner?
Because we are on a base and it is secure.
Developing Host Nation Engagement
Hey ODB,
Good points.
It wasn't long ago (circa 2003) that only Army CA, FAOs and G-5 personnel received training in the execution of host nation relations. That said, they had little to do with developing operational doctrine (once known as "host nation engagement strategies") for the theater CINCs or ASCC. Before we begin training based on HN capabilities (or shortcomings), a little lesson in relations at the tactical level is in order.
BTW, welcome aboard First Class
Regards, Stan
If you want to blend in, take the bus
Yes as long as we are cautious and measured in applying such models. I say that because in my earlier life as a DATT in Rwanda I had worked closely with the Rwandans, USEUCOM, and USSOCEUR to model the proposed training to Rwandan capabilities and needs. 3rd SFG of course was to get the mission and I had a 3rd SFG LNO with me while all of this was agreed to. What happened afterward was the battalion that actually got the mission turned around and took the training plan for Cambodia from 1st Group and tried to implement it. Caused major problems that went all the way to Vice President level to sort out, all of which could have been avoided had the unit listend to its own LNO.
Standardized training can work if applied intelligently. What does not work are cookie cutters. The cookies never come out quite right. Africa is chock a block full of military hardware from that approach. All of this goes back to the art of the advisor because if things are set up correctly, the advisor should be influencing the program versus merely conducting a set training program or managing training accounts from an embassy SAO.
best
Tom
When an author chooses to join the debate
on his own work, it is wise, perhaps, to listen to what he has to say.John Nagl's post caused me to go to the original CNAS piece (which I confess, I had not read- Sorry John
). It is well thought out and, more importantly, makes the case to solve certain current problems.
That still leaves some of the issues we've discussed here as relevant and raises a few others. The original piece does not, for instance, address the command relationship question in the field. What, for example, is the relationship between the Advisor Corps commander in his role as advisor to the MOD and the Joint Force Commander? And with the Ambassador? Not that these are unresolvable issues but they will come up - perhaps more strongly with a MTOE organization than ad hoc ones.
Another issue is doctrine proponency. As I understand it the Advisor Corps would be a deployable unit - in some cases the primary one (hopefully most of the time). The Imperial XVIII Airborne Corps doesn't write airborne doctrine - TRADOC institutions do. So, what John is proposing is that the 4 star TRADOC commander cede his responsibility for advisor doctrine to the 3 star commander of the Advisor Corps. I know, we all felt that we in the field knew what the doctrine should be much better than any doctrine writers. But, did we have the time to do it right? My greatest frustrations were not that somebody else was writing the doctrine but that my (and others like me) comments, critiques, and objections were not being taken seriously and were simply ignored. This aspect of the proposal needs, IMO, refinement to resolve a potential problem that is sure to arise. My own suggestion would be an Advisor Corps LNO cell at CAC where, I think, the doctrine proponency should reside.
One more issue is how long the Advisor Corps should exist. I don't think I have seen a better way to address current problems which will exist for some period of time. But if the Army needs to expand to meet a new peer threat will we continue to need the Advisor Corps of 20,000? Alternatively, is an Advisor Corps the best solution for the long term or would expanded SF do better?
What about task organizing BnAT with elements of an SFODA?
Worth the debate. Thanks John, for sending us back to the original full piece.
Cheers
JohnT
I too returned to the original proposal to refresh my memory.
Said item is refreshed about as well as it can be -- but I did not change my mind.
The Advisory Corps is not a good idea. Some reasons why:
As slowly as we react, given a decision to do that today, it would take three years to stand up. Will it be required or desired in three years? Possibly, possibly not
Will it probably be required in three years and into the future. Possibly in the three year window, beyond that, I'm quite skeptical. My suspicion is that Congress is going to be very skeptical of any large commitment to FID (emphasis on large) anywhere in the world for some time. As they should be.
I say they should be because we do not do FID at all well. The Advisory Corps idea envisions a series of one year tours and the theory is that the Corps will force or ensconce continuity of effort. I submit that rotations of those in command will not provide the continuity envisioned. The fix to that is to make it a five or six year tour with three or four spent in the AO. Don't think that will fly and lacking that, the rotation will adversely impact the Advisory effort.
If my very flaky Math skills are correct, the Advisory corps would require a rotating crop of over 600 MAJ, 120 LTC and over 34 COL. While I believe the US Army to be over-officered, I don't think the overage will cover that at all well and I submit that rank structure will effectively remove the field Grade complement of over 10 BCT -- or strip a lot of staffs (which may be a good thing...). I do not think the Army can afford an Advisory Corps.
Using the ask for fifteen, expect ten and get five rationale, what about an Advisory Division? That means your problem is only a third as large. That is still quite high cost for a capability that MAY be required -- and may not be...
Capability to provide adequate language training spaces(and in which languages?) is highly suspect.
Better to adapt the T-MAAG concept and keep the Advisory element training at Riley going while ramping up language training and developing accelerated language training (six to 12 weeks) to minimal conversational competence in likely languages.
A far greater problem than our admittedly ad-hoc and in some ways flawed current advisory effort is our tendency to short change our nominal allies in the host nation on equipment. Troops without shoes using hand me down will tend to have problems.
I have no question that attempts to pull us into small wars will occur for the next few years. I do question the way some propose to handle them. We should play to our strength, not deliberately plan to do something we have proven we do not do well.
Augmenting SFODA
I think we can all agree toda's SF is stretched thin, add to the fact the State Dept missions are being picked up again for SF during their time between deployments. Growing them is not a bad call but to what extent beyond the current growth? The residual growth needed as well, schools, bases, ranges. Current trends on installations is all land and ranges have been given to BCTs and SF Groups are left to beg BCTs for land and ranges or train off site. The trend seems to be heading towards squeezing SF out of the picture. Looking at the current picture Conventional forces conducting FID and COIN, loss of land and ranges......and this articlehttp://www.veteransofspecialforces.o..._farewell.html which is also in SOF magazine with the title Demise of the Green Berets.Alternatively, is an Advisor Corps the best solution for the long term or would expanded SF do better?
This would make a tremendous amout of sense. FID being an SF mission to begin with the elements that are required to support, train, equip, etc... HN forces are in place. Gives the MTT/AG a direct source of support, allows ODAs to focus on COIN/UW if needed and the ability to supplement the MTT/AG in training. Could be a win, win situation, but those a rare.What about task organizing BnAT with elements of an SFODA?
This touch on an earlier post of mine dealing with lack of cooperation between units. Too many closed minded people making decisions, not looking at what is already in place and what the lessons learned are. Many people need to learn it for themselves, instead of taking advice from another unit or organization. Personally have seen this many times over my career and never understood it, will save that for another time perhaps. I completely agree with not having a cookie cutter solution, except in basic tasks, those which can be applied across the board. Skill level I and II for the most part. A good part of the problem is the TTP's being taught to HN forces are not consistent throughout the country. One HN unit is taught one way by one unit and then the next unit tells them to forget that now they are going to do it this way instead. Becomes very confusing to them and is a major setback. Interesting you bring up Africa, just seen an article where conventional forces are in Africa conducting FID.Yes as long as we are cautious and measured in applying such models. I say that because in my earlier life as a DATT in Rwanda I had worked closely with the Rwandans, USEUCOM, and USSOCEUR to model the proposed training to Rwandan capabilities and needs. 3rd SFG of course was to get the mission and I had a 3rd SFG LNO with me while all of this was agreed to. What happened afterward was the battalion that actually got the mission turned around and took the training plan for Cambodia from 1st Group and tried to implement it. Caused major problems that went all the way to Vice President level to sort out, all of which could have been avoided had the unit listend to its own LNO.
Standardized training can work if applied intelligently. What does not work are cookie cutters. The cookies never come out quite right. Africa is chock a block full of military hardware from that approach. All of this goes back to the art of the advisor because if things are set up correctly, the advisor should be influencing the program versus merely conducting a set training program or managing training accounts from an embassy SAO.
Always wanted to fly First Class but for some reason thought the flight attendants were better looking in First ClassBTW, welcome aboard First Class
ODB
Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:
Why did you not clear your corner?
Because we are on a base and it is secure.
Ken, I'm curious
as to why you say we don't do FID well. My experience in Latin America suggests that we do it rather well and have done so on many occasions over time. Recent FID missions in the region include both Panama and El Salvador. In the former, the primary advisors were not SF although SF played an important but secondary role. In El Salvador SF played the primary role while non-SF played the important secondary role.
I could go on with other cases and probably expand to other regions but I really am interested in your argument.
BTW your other arguments are ones that we (and John N) ought to consider seriously.
Cheers
JohnT
You caught me in a misspeak -- shoulda said
the Army does not do large scale FID well. One of those cases where I knew what I meant but no one else did because I said it poorly.
I did mention large scale with respect to Congress and future commitments. I should have made clear the big ones were my concern in all cases. I apologize for my error.
I agree the CentAm efforts went well and I strongly agree with your statements here about the advisability of using SF in that role. I also agree that we have done others here and there fairly well but I note that none were massive efforts requiring the bulk of the Army -- those haven't worked out well from the Philippines forward.
My concern is that the big Army and far more importantly, the Nation, do not have the patience or inclination to do it well on a large scale. The troops are capable of adapting to it and I contend that if Joe is trained for COIN, he can adapt to conventional war with no problem. Conversely, if trained for conventional war, he can also adapt to COIN but the transition is not as smooth. Joe is not the problem. Nor are the LTs and CPTs -- it's the senior NCOs and Officers that have the adaptation problem. That can be rectified but if it is, then you're likely to be confronted with a difficult adaptation being done for no reason because of no commitments to do that by the time you complete the adaptation.
That because the Nation doesn't want to do it. My belief is that the Nation put its head in the sand post Viet Nam and will want to do so again even though this war cost far less than did Viet Nam (in everything except money and we have so much more of that now than we did then it really doesn't count as 'more'). Given that factor, the senior leadership of the Army is likely to want to replicate the actions of their predecessor's post VN and eschew COIN. That would be a bad mistake. We have to possess the capability but we should aim to do it on a small scale and let the pros do it if it is remotely possible.
There's no dichotomy there; we need to be prepared to do it on a large scale -- we just emphatically do not need to go looking for an excuse to do it.
Parkinson's Law and capabilities come to mind...
Thanks Ken
Not sure I agree with all you said but cetainly with some. You do address my biggest fear - thhat when this set is all over the Army and the nation will want to stick their collective head in the sand and prepare only for the "big one." While we certainly need the big war capabilities we also need to be able to do small wars - we have done far more of them throughout our history than big ones, both well and badly. And we will most likely do a lot more small wars in the future.
Enough! Time to call it a night. got to do my bedtime reading - The Great Game!
Cheers
JohnT
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