The SC-MAGTF

[Ken White]

with Paul Van Riper when he was one -- even though he was with the VNMC and I was with a neighboring Ngay Dzu Bn -- I'm inclined to disagree with the concept of a dedicated Advisory element in either service.

Perhaps if I'd had the benefit of the MATA course I might feel differently; perhaps if I'd felt my results and those of the many other dedicated advisors I saw over the years there were worth the effort expended, I might feel differently.

That's inconsequential stuff. My biggest fear is the Parkinson's Law effect. We develop a capability that we need here and now but may not need in the future. If that capability exists and is not needed, the pressure to put it to work becomes significant -- whether it's the best solution or not...

[Boot]

I understand the confusion. I am a little confused myself.
SCETC is only and enabler; They arrange and enable the training the Transition Teams headed to OIF/OEF.
This will eventually go away as Iraq and Afghanistan draw down...whenever that is. SCETC is not an operational unit and belong to TECOM.
Now here is where it gets muddled; MSOAG (old FMTU) trains and advises indigenous peoples. MCTAG trains conventional forces already existing, and advises them. The missions are pretty much the same; MCTAG's center of gravity is FID with a secondary focus on coin (since the two tend to go hand and hand). MSOAG belongs to MARSOC and SOCOM. MCTAG belongs to MARFORCOM and teams will chop to the COCOM for employment world wide.
MCTAG is supposed to be an enduring organization for the long war. The unit is at the barely breathing stage.
The same skill sets required by an MSOAG team are the same ones a MCTAG team will need to execute FID. Its not a new concept and I would submit the Marine Corps has done some sort of FID/COIN during its entire history. Most notably the Banana Wars which the Small Wars Manual was written in 1940 as a result of that experience.
I hope this clears it up a bit, I look forward to your comments. I don't speak for MCTAG or the Director but simply know what is going on.

[Ken White]

and just didn't or don't realize it...

In any event, I'm on board with MCTAG and MCSOAG -- as well as with the SC-MAGTF which I think is a great idea. As Bill Slim said, a good Infantry Battalion with the proper training can do most anything one could want...

[COMMAR]

I understand the confusion. I am a little confused myself.
SCETC is only and enabler; They arrange and enable the training the Transition Teams headed to OIF/OEF.
This will eventually go away as Iraq and Afghanistan draw down...whenever that is. SCETC is not an operational unit and belong to TECOM.
Now here is where it gets muddled; MSOAG (old FMTU) trains and advises indigenous peoples. MCTAG trains conventional forces already existing, and advises them. The missions are pretty much the same; MCTAG's center of gravity is FID with a secondary focus on coin (since the two tend to go hand and hand). MSOAG belongs to MARSOC and SOCOM. MCTAG belongs to MARFORCOM and teams will chop to the COCOM for employment world wide.
MCTAG is supposed to be an enduring organization for the long war. The unit is at the barely breathing stage.
The same skill sets required by an MSOAG team are the same ones a MCTAG team will need to execute FID. Its not a new concept and I would submit the Marine Corps has done some sort of FID/COIN during its entire history. Most notably the Banana Wars which the Small Wars Manual was written in 1940 as a result of that experience.
I hope this clears it up a bit, I look forward to your comments. I don't speak for MCTAG or the Director but simply know what is going on.

Your on the right track w/the MCTAG, but I read some blurring of the lines btwn the MCTAG & MSOAG/SF mission.

Yes they will require similar mission sets but its important to partly see MCTAG, for the sake of clarification, as a Unit that free's up MSOAG & SF to focus more on the Spec Ops side of FID.

Long has SF been tied down with teaching Basic Infantry/Light Infantry across the board to tens of thousands. They've recently gotten some help from MSOAG but they're still being tied up by the Basics instead of teaching more specialized skills to Partner Nations SOF.

Its also important to understand that MCTAG's mission goes well beyond teaching. And this kind of answers what an earlier poster wrote about maybe creating a corps of 20,000 or so Advisors.

Their main mission isn't so much to teach but to be a teaching/relations Facilitator. Maintaining a constant presence in these various countries networking and faciliting the needs and concerns expressed, shaping the building of our Partner Nations' capabilities.

Their role is similar to a care provider or waiter, "Oh, so you want some Small Unit training, a sniper course, a road and a few schools built. We'll see what we can do, how about some Medical assistance on the side."

They then foward it up the chain. It comes back down in a Package provided by the SC MAGTF, who'll link up with the MCTAG to facilitate the implementation.

The actual training is done by the SC MAGTF, implemented & over seen by the MCTAG which negates the need for thousands of advisors.

[CaptCav_CoVan]

Ken:
I think insurgent warfare is here to stay. We already coverted arty batteries into MPs and infantry, and being trained as an 03 commanding a company is not the same skill set required fo advisors. Some of the better Army MiTT advisors I worked with in Iraq were Army reservist - not the hard-charging, kick-the-door-down infantry commanders we create as Marine officers. Thery had the pateince and understood the capacity development side of things as many of them were businessmen back home. If not a dedicated force, then expand training, and develop a capability in the Marine Corps similar to the Army FSO program so we can be prepared for Africa or South America and it does not take us three years to figue out what is going on and how we should fight it.

[Ken White]

Ken:
I think insurgent warfare is here to stay...

It will try to be, whether we let it or not is TBD. Regardless, I don't question the need to be capable of fighting it, just a matter of where one places ones emphasis.

...We already coverted arty batteries into MPs and infantry, and being trained as an 03 commanding a company is not the same skill set required fo advisors.

Agree that we did that and that those so converted basically did a good job. I'd also suggest that was necessary because the force structure was still oriented to crossing the north German plain -- eleven years after the need to do that had probably disappeared for many years in the future. The Army is now changing that and hopefully, will get a balance about right.

You're of course correct that advising a battalion and commanding a Co require different skills. However, I think most Captains, Army or Marine are good enough to cope with both skill sets -- all that's required is a good MATA like course. There are also some guys who'd make great advisors but are only marginal co cdrs -- and vice versa. We don't do will in fitting pegs into holes.

We also need to develop some highly accelerated conversational language training modules with acceptance of the fact that a 75% solution is better than none.

...Some of the better Army MiTT advisors I worked with in Iraq were Army reservist - not the hard-charging, kick-the-door-down infantry commanders we create as Marine officers. Thery had the pateince and understood the capacity development side of things as many of them were businessmen back home...

Totally agree -- my solution for the Army would be use to use the USAR for that mission; say an active BCT worth of dedicated advisory experts plus the school which should remain in being and then four of five times that in the USAR who train for only that mission.

...If not a dedicated force, then expand training, and develop a capability in the Marine Corps similar to the Army FSO program so we can be prepared for Africa or South America and it does not take us three years to figue out what is going on and how we should fight it.

Again, I agree. It's always irked me that the FSO program spends a fair amount of change training people -- then the system tends to ignore their generally quite sound advice. Dumbb with two 'b's. The Corps and the Army need good FSOs and the senior leaders need to listen to them (that's probably more important than having more of them).

The key thing to me is that we not make the mistake of post Viet Nam and try to totally blank out COIN and FID. We don't need to repeat that stupidity.

We're in broad agreement, just quibbling over implementation.

[Boot]

with Paul Van Riper when he was one -- even though he was with the VNMC and I was with a neighboring Ngay Dzu Bn -- I'm inclined to disagree with the concept of a dedicated Advisory element in either service.

Perhaps if I'd had the benefit of the MATA course I might feel differently; perhaps if I'd felt my results and those of the many other dedicated advisors I saw over the years there were worth the effort expended, I might feel differently.

That's inconsequential stuff. My biggest fear is the Parkinson's Law effect. We develop a capability that we need here and now but may not need in the future. If that capability exists and is not needed, the pressure to put it to work becomes significant -- whether it's the best solution or not...

Yes I share your fear wrt to Parkinson's Law effect. It seems we tend to forget all the lessons learned as an institution from the war we just fought. Its clear we completely (as organizaitons) forgot the lessons Vietnam taught us. The money isn't in small dirty wars of peace...but in the big ticket defense systems (see Osprey, AAAV in the Marine Corps case, F-35 etc...).
FID/COIN (I don't think anyone will disagree with me) are people intensive endeavors where there is plenty of gray area. We all like the stand up knock them down fight, because is a simple one to wage.
I think the Army and Marine Corps needs to have this capability for the duration of the time our services exist. MCTAG is a step in this direction.
One last thing; I think in the Marine Corps case, this has been overlooked.
Many of the mid grade to senior Officers and SNCOS who won the battles in the Pacific during WW II, cut their teeth in those small dirty savage wars of peace between the World Wars. I am willing to bet that this probably holds true for the Army to some degree also.

[Ken White]

...One last thing; I think in the Marine Corps case, this has been overlooked. Many of the mid grade to senior Officers and SNCOS who won the battles in the Pacific during WW II, cut their teeth in those small dirty savage wars of peace between the World Wars. I am willing to bet that this probably holds true for the Army to some degree also.

or written...

When I went in the Corps in 1949, a lot of those folks were still around and I have absolutely no doubt in my mind I learned more about combat from them in four years than I learned in the subsequent 40 or so...

If you can do the basics really well, all the rest is quite easy.

Good points all...