Quote Originally Posted by CaptCav_CoVan View Post
Ken:
I think insurgent warfare is here to stay...
It will try to be, whether we let it or not is TBD. Regardless, I don't question the need to be capable of fighting it, just a matter of where one places ones emphasis.
...We already coverted arty batteries into MPs and infantry, and being trained as an 03 commanding a company is not the same skill set required fo advisors.
Agree that we did that and that those so converted basically did a good job. I'd also suggest that was necessary because the force structure was still oriented to crossing the north German plain -- eleven years after the need to do that had probably disappeared for many years in the future. The Army is now changing that and hopefully, will get a balance about right.

You're of course correct that advising a battalion and commanding a Co require different skills. However, I think most Captains, Army or Marine are good enough to cope with both skill sets -- all that's required is a good MATA like course. There are also some guys who'd make great advisors but are only marginal co cdrs -- and vice versa. We don't do will in fitting pegs into holes.

We also need to develop some highly accelerated conversational language training modules with acceptance of the fact that a 75% solution is better than none.
...Some of the better Army MiTT advisors I worked with in Iraq were Army reservist - not the hard-charging, kick-the-door-down infantry commanders we create as Marine officers. Thery had the pateince and understood the capacity development side of things as many of them were businessmen back home...
Totally agree -- my solution for the Army would be use to use the USAR for that mission; say an active BCT worth of dedicated advisory experts plus the school which should remain in being and then four of five times that in the USAR who train for only that mission.
...If not a dedicated force, then expand training, and develop a capability in the Marine Corps similar to the Army FSO program so we can be prepared for Africa or South America and it does not take us three years to figue out what is going on and how we should fight it.
Again, I agree. It's always irked me that the FSO program spends a fair amount of change training people -- then the system tends to ignore their generally quite sound advice. Dumbb with two 'b's. The Corps and the Army need good FSOs and the senior leaders need to listen to them (that's probably more important than having more of them).

The key thing to me is that we not make the mistake of post Viet Nam and try to totally blank out COIN and FID. We don't need to repeat that stupidity.

We're in broad agreement, just quibbling over implementation.