One minor problem with Gray's construct -- and to a lesser extent, yours and Cordesman's, IMO, is that all three envision a political and military convergence that has never existed in this country. The British do it very well as do most Commonwealth countries but it is alien to historical practice here. I cannot say it will never happen but believe it is unlikely given our current structure of government. The frequent (if not constant) tension caused by domestic politics between Congress and the Executive branch has and will generally serve to disrupt any meaningful effort to get significant cooperation. Cooperation and unity of effort can be and probably will be improved but integration on the European model is highly unlikely.

I'm pretty well convinced that in any counterinsurgency effort, any talk of victory or defeat, of winning or losing is specious. Those words shouldn't be used to talk of possible outcomes. Not only the politicians but the Armed forces need to stop using them. The best that has been since WW II or can ever be achieved, short of scorched earth -- which we aren't going to do -- is an acceptable outcome; the worst is abandoning the effort and the possibility of an undesirable but usually not crippling outcome to us as an assister, for the host nation it can be a disaster. This particular effort is subject to those parameters but also has an added consideration. Perception of 'defeat.' In the case of Iraq and to a lesser extent, Afghanistan, our precipitous departure would trigger the perception, not the reality, that AQ et.al. had 'won.' They would of course tout this view loudly even though it would be incorrect and it would do them some good for a while. It would likely embolden them to attempt other attacks in order to attain their goals. In short, it would not be a disaster to us but it most likely would be the source of more and more grave long term trouble than would staying in both nations for quite some time. Obviously it would be far more dangerous for Iraq.

Al Qaeda in Iraq is problematic, no question and they aren't going away soon; in Zawahiri's latest Q&A session videotape, he acknowledges Iraq is their principal concern. However, both he and Cordesman rely on the long term viability of AQ for their assessments -- possibly they're correct. However, there are a number of other efforts than those readily visible addressing AQ as an entity. We'll see.