None the less, American strategic and military culture does have a long standing tendency to take a narrow military view of war, which is perhaps understandable for a military culture rigid in its determination to to eschew politics, and in practice to discount consideration of, and preparation for, the character of the peace that should follow. This is a classic example of an army
(I think meaning "military" - Rob) having the vices of its virtues. The U.S. Armed Forces have a long and praiseworthy tradition of staying out of politics. The military are professionals in 'the management of violence', while policy, the purpose for which violence is managed, is strictly a civilian responsibility. Despite the basic merit in this division of responsibilities, it has the potential for strategic disaster, disappointment at least, if the political and military realms fail to conduct an honest dialogue. That dialogue obviously threatens to draw soldiers into policymaking and civilian policy makers into military planning and strategy. There should be nothing surprising about this condition. After all, Clausewitz argued:
Once again: war is an instrument of policy. It must necessarily bear the character of policy and measure by its standards. The conduct of war, in its great outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword instead of the pen, but on that account does not cease to think according to its own laws.
A little earlier, Clausewitz cautioned that 'a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy'. That requirement is far from habitually met, and points to the need for civilian amateurs to engage with military issues, possibly in opposition to the views of military professionals.
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