....it appears that Iran may have had input on both sides during the Basra showdown. The smaller pro-Iranian parties within the SIIC’s umbrella organization put pressure on Maliki and may have nudged him toward taking stronger action against the Sadrists than originally contemplated. But the conclusion of a ceasefire on Iranian soil shows that Tehran’s ability to influence the other end of the spectrum—the traditionally Iraqi nationalist Sadrist movement—may now be stronger than ever before, quite possibly the result of Moqtada’s relocation to Iran at the beginning of the surge, when he may have felt cornered by U.S. policy.
To the United States, the good news is that Maliki still seems to insist on a certain independence vis-à-vis the SIIC and Iran. A look at the composition of Maliki’s entourage during his previous mission to Basra when he imposed emergency rule in May 2006 suggests that his power base is evolving. At that time he arrived with the chief of the SIIC-linked Badr Organization, Hadi al-Amiri, as well as a former Sadrist minister from Basra, Salam al-Maliki. This time his aides consisted of independents, Interior Ministry staff and Shirwan al-Waili of the Tanzim al-Iraq branch of the Daawa Party. The constant in all of this seems to be Maliki’s desire to come across as a strong leader: In 2006, he promised an “iron fist”; this time he announced “the assault of the knights.” Through the process, he may well have rediscovered the usefulness of siding with the SIIC, but there is nothing to suggest that Maliki acted as he did for the sake of the nine-governorate Shiite federal entity.....
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