The issue goes beyond that of individual soldier training; in some ways the issue relates directly to the key word, "individual". Training and development systems focus on individuals and we develop good Soldiers and ultimately great leaders. The problem is that they never practice their skils at the level where they gained them. The result is we do not increase the collective experience of our units so that the "strategic corporal" idea can grow in the fertile ground of an experienced company, platoon, and even squad.
See my article in Mil Review May-June 2005.
Best
Tom
From my limited perspective.
The key is in a clearly articulated Commander's Intent. When the CO can give a no kidding operationally sound intent and Rudy with the rusty rifle in the third rank that never gets the word understands that intent then you have the Strategic Corporal.
The only thing that high speed low drag schools will guarantee is the T-shirt.
Invest time and effort in learning the art of the Commander's Intent.
Link to Tom's Article...
Transformation: Victory Rests with Small Units by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Odom, U.S. Army, Retired; Sergeant Major of the Army Julius W. Gates, Retired; Command Sergeant Major Jack Hardwick, U.S. Army, Retired; and Specialist First Class Robert Ehrlich, U.S. Army.
Devils Advocate and Stirring up the Pot - I Hope
Some would argue a clearly articulated commander's intent would be better served with 23 - 24 year-old small unit leaders with more training, education and experience as well as maturity vice 19 -20 year olds.
The age of NCOs serving in our usual coalition partner’s forces is older – and they have more experience under their belt. Yes, I know we have PFCs, LCpls and Cpls on their second and third combat tours – but what has that gotten us? Some would submit a worn-out force and one that has led to some of the damning strategic consequences of tactical actions – Abu Graib and Haditha are but two examples. Yes, I understand that incidents like this are committed by a slim minority of the force and the vast majority perform heroically - but that minority still has the potential to completely derail any chances of executing successful Small Wars - and in particular COIN. Can't we find a way to weed them out before the damage is done?
Moreover, why should the majority be required to learn the hard way?
An often unsympathetic – sometimes hostile mainstream media as well as the IO efforts of our foes compounds this situation.
Others would argue that the problem is not with the Strategic Corporal - but with the next higher leadership level up through and including the SECDEF. That argument partially supports the commander's intent thesis. I suspect that it is more than just a clearly articulated commander's intent - that other capabilities would give the Strategic Corporal more tools in his kit to carry out that intent - and in the absence of a clearly defined end-state and / or commander's intent carry-on successfully in a complex and changing operational environment that includes asymmetric foes in close proximity to the local populace.
Don’t get me wrong, as I most certainly do not have an answer to this. An older force has a lot of implications for U.S. military conventional forces. A seasoned force from a smaller pool and increased longevity and retention rates are but a few of the variables we would have to overcome. Training and education costs are another consideration.
The Strategic Corporal is here to stay – whether we like it or not – it is not something we can wish away or apply simple solutions to as we plod along in this IO-rich environment.
I take exception to the view that training and education would be a waste of effort.
That said, I am purposely stirring up the pot here and enjoin this board to begin posting possible solutions for debate – we all seem to have a handle on the problem set and apparently many of us are struggling to find answers.
Last edited by SWJED; 08-01-2006 at 06:19 PM.
Start working closer with law enforcement
A Strategic corporal is more like a cop to me. Police officers are trained to make life and death decisions from day one. We have to do this without waiting for an operations order or some officer (supervisor) to tell us what to do. We have a lot of experience with doing it on camera, both good and bad. In the 28 articles for COIN and many other COIN writings you always here about acting like a beat cop. Do you know how to act like a beat cop??Do you know what a beat cop would do?? From what I have seen(which is limited )you have alot to learn. It hurts me to see such brave soldiers/marines get into such sh** because nobody has ever trained them on other options.
One way to start is this. Cops don't think Ends,Ways,and Means we think Motive,Means,and Opportunity!!! We don't think about total victory we think about control to a reasonable level.
OK now everybody take a shot!!(joke)
If a commander's intent type statement can work with a properly prepared 12 year old, it can work with a properly prepared 19-20 year old. The training and education piece is what we as an institution are lacking.Originally Posted by SWJED
Eyeballs........snap sir!!!!!!!
Sir, the private doesn't know sir!?!?!
From front to rear, count off!!!!!!!!!!
This is my rifle, there are many like it.................
SMEAC, BAMCIS, ADDRAC, METT T, IA Drills, TTPs, 6 line, 9 line.........
Marines, today's period of instruction is on the AN PRC 119.............
There is no requirement for the Marine to THINK in the above examples. This system worked great for a large draft army, it doesn't work in today's environment.
Von Stueben had it figured out during the Revolutionary War, you need to tell the American soldier "why."
Why don't we push critical thinking in bootcamp?
Why don't we push executive level thinking at the L/Cpl level?
Because, we are lazy. It is a lot easier to have the Marine blurt out Situation, Mission, Execution, Admin & logistics, Command & signal then to explain how the current enemy/friendly situation could effect the mission and ultimately the commander's intent.
What determines how a Marine becomes situational aware?
Perception = something is happening........
Comprehension = the alarm clock went off.....is this familiar?
Projection = if I turn it off, I get to sleep longer......
Prediction = if I sleep longer, I could get fired......
Decision = go to work
Our training takes the Marine to the Comprehension stage and then turns him loose with immediate action type decision making. This is the point where experience plays a critical function. Without teaching critical thinking he doesn't care about familiarity. His decision could very well be based on Hollywood, Soldier of Fortune, Sea Stories, video game.........
Fellow Pot Stirrer
I too believe in training and education--kinda obvious given my background.
My key point is that we cannot teach or train experience. Maybe someday we will be able to "insert" it via brain chip. But in the interim, training, educating, and "experiencing" is an individual track, not a unit collective track. More unit stability is a good start.
But I believe that the Army (and I can't speak for the Corps) has wasted the rank of Major for too long. A successful young Captain who succeeds at company command can wait more than a decade before that officer commands a battalion. I believe Majors should command companies, Captains, platoons, and that Lieutenants lead sections of 2 squads. Army squads (again speaking heretically) are too small. Operating in sections would go a long way toward strengthening units below platoon.
We need to strengthen our NCOs and get away from making the NCO corps do the resume march of individual checkmarks that has long plagued the officer corps. Senior NCOs (E7 and up) should be rewarded and encouraged to remain tactical as long as possible. I would love to see the day when a platoon daddy was an E8 and a first sergeant an E9. Above that I would make SGMs and CSMs warrants like the Brits do.
All of this I would see as building years of critical experience into small units versus simply producing experienced leaders whose advancement removes that experience from small units.
I stand ready to be led to the stake; who has a match?
Best
Tom
Sir, I find myself in disagreement with you on your enlisted structure. The Army changed the SquadLeader to a SSgt after WW II as an incentive, I might be wrong on this.
Could be that slowing down the enlisted ranks promotion but increasing the pay based on time in service vice time in grade could help.
With that said, I'm done working for today, reading your book excerpt gave me some flashbacks of Bangui.....I'm off to the MCA Bookstore to get a copy.
Training...
This was also discussed heavily in JUW 06 - The need for more of the "how to think" about fluid and complex situations instead of “templated solutions on what to think".
At this event it was our pleasure to have Brigadier Rod West (Australian Army) as one of our senior mentors. He talked about the value of "scenario-general" training over what we seem to do best - "scenario-specific" training. I thought that was a very valid point. Scenario-general training - with a range of problems to solve.
This also proved true in my dealings with the Corps’ Project Metropolis experimentation that resulted in the USMC Basic Urban Skills Training (BUST) package. Readers Digest version – the only Battalion Landing Team that received the package prior to OIF thought that the range of complex, and seemingly “off-the-map”, situations (scenarios) that were thrown their way were in the category of “yea fine – but we’ll never see this…”
The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (Project Metropolis Team) sent a lessons learned team to Iraq after this same battalion completed the “March Up” to Baghdad. Funny thing, their assessment was - yep – we did not see the scenarios MCWL gave us – but sure enough the program sure taught us how to think and deal with the unexpected…
That said, kudos to Mojave Viper (USMC training at 29 Palms) and the JRTC (US Army training at Ft. Polk) - it is my understanding that they, and others have picked up on the scenario-general... Let's hope all ground forces get this type of training and after it is all said and done - not s***-canned like some of the Vietnam-era lessons learned, programs and training programs were.
Last edited by SWJED; 09-17-2006 at 02:56 AM.
Nick,
Yep they did. The Army also wisely look at the Marine Raiders structure using team leaders under those squad leaders. Our squad has varied over the years from 10+ to today's 9. I believe 9 is too light. I alo believe in the tactical superiority of "3" versus 2, be that 3 as a "buddy team" versus 2 as a buddy team or 3 maneuver/support elements versus 2. 3 inherently has greater depth and flexibility than 2.
Structure in the squads in that article came from very intense and repetitive discussions with the senior NCOs listed as co-authors.
Overall my point remains the same: we demand (not ask) much more of our small units in terms of fighting on a complex battlefield. We also have much fewer infantry and they are getting increasingly complex missions. We must look at adding capabilities and experience.
I never did Bangui though some of my friends did.
Best
Tom
You are describing the rank structure for an SF company. The commander is a Major and his senior enlisted adviser is a Sergeant Major. Each of the teams is lead by a Master Sergeant and his senior commissioned adviser is a Captain. Of course SF does not have Lieutenants. Certainly, this structure could work in the the conventional army but with the Lieutenants as assistant platoon leaders rather than leading squads.
SFC W
This is also creeping back towards the "Old Army" organization, which was fairly NCO heavy by today's standards. And again, you saw NCOs with a great deal of responsibility and authority. A Frontier Army company first sergeant was selected by the company commander and confirmed by the regimental commander, not based on checklists but on demonstrated ability. And a good thing, too, since that first sergeant more often than not ended up commanding the company if (as was all too common) all the officers were absent.
Over reliance on officers has been a weakness in many military organizations throughout the world and history. The solution to our problems today is NOT more officers and more micromanagement which is what will you will get by adding more officers or pushing them down to lower levels of command like squads. Doing that will weaken the NCO corps and no professional army can afford to do that. One of the best assignments I had on the conventional army was as an infantry fire teamleader in 1/509. The is the OPFOR at JRTC. During the Low Intensity Combat phase of each rotation the each fire team would be given its own sector where the teamleader would have significant autonomy. We would be given specific missions from time to time particularly toward the end of the phase but mostly we just had a commanders intent and specific parameters to work within. My point is that many of those E4 E5 fire teamleaders excelled in that situation. There is a tendency in the conventional army toward group think and a strict adherence to very specific guidelines. Initiative is encouraged but only in certain directions. In other words a subordinate leader may be expected to take the initiative to do what his higher would have told him to do anyway but not to do something on his own. Part of what makes SF good at what they do is the training that they receive, of course, but also it is the mindset. In SF the ability to work autonomously with little guidance is not only encouraged, it is required. I believe that in part at least, the NCO corps has lost focus. NCOnet is a prime example of this. If you go to the COIN forum there you will find a few topics with generally few replies whereas in other forums you can find long scholarly discussions about whether or not pens should be visible in the ACUs or detailed discussions on the minutia of uniform regs. Not all NCOs are like this by far but there are enough in influential positions that I believe that there has been a shift in the culture of some organizations from NCOs as trainers and leaders first to NCOs as guardians of the regulations first. This is what fosters the strict adherence to the letter of the reg rather than its intent and the unwillingness or inability to act autonomously. That is what we need to fix, not Lieutenants as squad leaders. That's my opinion anyway.
SFC W
Xenophon, I've only recently joined this board, so forgive me if I come across as a wet-behind-the-ears contrarian, but while reading one of your posts on this thread I found some information to which I wanted to provide a respectful counterpoint.
As a former US Army infantry officer, I'd disagree that we received no leadership training prior to leading our first platoon. If you want, I suppose you can discount the four years of pre-commissioning general leadership training that both ROTC and service academy cadets receive, as its not always combat leadershp specific, but I believe that in terms of basic leadership principles, its not as ineffective as some would like to claim, and is delivered over a rather long period, with significant reinforcement of fundamental skills and concepts.
Following commissioning, an infantry officer (this is my area of experience, so I will relate to this specific officer branch training) attends a 4-month long Infantry Officer Basic Course. Following this, a vast majority of infantry 2LTs attend the US Army Ranger Course, a rather intense 61-day leadership training program. I would argue, therefore, that new Army infantry 2LTs do indeed receive general, branch-specific, and combat oriented leadership training prior to reporting to their first operational unit.
That actually isn't true, either. The Army has created a 7-week long, combat oriented leadership course for new 2LTs of every Army branch called Basic Officer Leadership Course II. It is an attempt to ensure that regardless of branch (transportation, quartermaster, finance, etc.), all new platoon leaders receive basic infantry-related combat skills training at the squad and platoon level prior to training in their specialty branch. You can find more information on BOLC II at: https://www.infantry.army.mil/BOLC/content/mission.htm...(they haven't even figured out that EVERYONE needs combat training, not just grunts)...
Certainly, this isn't the desired objective state for new officer leadership training, but I believe its a step in the right direction.
There is no doubt that the Officer side of the house gets leadership training in all services.
The Corps has a pretty good system with The Basic School followed by MOS school. By the time the officer gets to the fleet he or she has had the leadership training & education pieces, how they apply it is a different subject.
Slight rudder adjustment.
now back to Rudy with the rusty rifle in the third rank that never gets the word.....
Rudy goes to Boot Camp and is trained to follow orders, his Drill Instructors have the training schedule in their covers that breaks down the day into micro-managed minutes.
Rudy is taught history, first aid, and what it is to be a Marine.
Rudy reports to his MOS school (non infantry Marines first attend a very basic infantry course called MCT) Rudy is infantry so he finds himself at SOI still not getting the word. Rudy is still following orders, no critical thinking involved. If Rudy decides to question the validity of this or that concept he is usually given a name like Private Brain or something of that nature. He isn't ridiculed but his place in life is pretty pointed out as being in the third rank.
Rudy is now checking into his first fleet unit for he is a full fledged Infantry Marine with his red & gold libo jacket. What will Rudy notice?
Chances are he will see micro-management (traditional C2) in effect. The Plt Commander will be leading him in PT, check writing, inspections.......
Rudy will probably take note that the NCOs are treated better but he really won't be able to explain how.
Rudy has a few of choices; reading/studying military history, get married, buy a car, live payday to payday buying beer/pizza......
The next morning Rudy will again see the Plt Commander micro managing or the NCO saying "because the CO/1st Sgt said so." Rudy will then go back into the third rank.
The mirace of all of the Rudyisms is that we still manage to have some unbelievable outstanding NCOs that break out of the third rank.
That's exactly what it's about. However, we need to provide Marines with the information and training to make good decisions within the context of Commander's Intent.IMHO...
The Strategic Corporal is not about education level, ability to call a 9 line, or level of responsibility. It's about making dynamic decisions NOW in context of the Commander's Intent without having to wait for authorization.
I see your point, Razor, and agree that the Army is moving in the right direction. But I'm pretty much going through one of your BOLC III's right now here at Ft. Sill, and the 135 Army Lieutenants in my company do not support your argument. ROTC training is all well and good, but not all officers get it. I have no doubt that infantry officers do receive good training, but again, that's a minority in the Army. I can tell you that these artillery officers are getting nothing in the leadership and decision making training here. BOLC II is a waste of time, these Lieutenants don't even know how to interact with superior officers, one of them stood up (after being told to stand) and asked the Battalion Commander if artillery BOLC III "sucked" as much as he'd heard. The Marines were absolutely appalled. Their attitudes are horrible. We tried to get the soldiers in our platoon to PT in boots and utes and flak jackets. They literally said, "We dont' want to because it's hot in Oklahoma and that won't help with the PFT." And these are officers who will be in charge of enlisted soldiers' lives.
But you're infantry and maybe the Army, rightfully so, has focused on the development of its infantry officers first. I certainly hope so. It certainly wasn't a cheap stab at the Army, although I don't buy that a 5 week course does the job of transitioning a person into a professional officer. Same goes for ROTC training and infantry training that only a minority of officers receive. You're only as strong as your weakest link.
Well said...
I believe that the answer isn't shoving higher-ranking officers lower down the food chain. All that would do (in reality) is create more micro-managing and even more jockeying for command positions than exists now. I also believe that it would take the weight out of the NCOs that come up under such a system, as they'd be so used to being 'lead' by officers that they would have precious little incentive to develop the needed skills on their own. In a related vein, one reason you may see NCOs becoming the guardians of regulations is that their officers tend to rotate through faster and thus they end up being the pillar that gets the unit through each inspection. In the heavy peacetime mentality getting Outstandings on inspections can often be more valued than having a well-led unit. Obviously that's a generalization, but the mentality does tend to creep in.
At some point in the culture, maybe during Vietnam, we seem to have stopped trusting our NCOs to actually lead and relegated them to more administrative roles. Again, something of a generalization but it clearly does happen in many instances. I see that every day working with the Air Force. It produces good technicians, but poor leaders simply because they are never really expected to lead for the most part (with some exceptions based on AFSC, of course) until they reach E-8. Then *boom* instant leader time! It of course doesn't work. It's a shame, and a trend that must be reversed if we're to be successful in the coming conflicts.
The bottom line on strategic corporals is this:
Can you find the guy who can take commander's intent, key tasks, and endstate and run with it? The onus is on the leader to make a realistic, feasible, and reasonable intent and endstate backed up by quantifiable tasks that are achievable.
Empowering the young professionals below you to accomplish your end by whatever ethical and moral means possible is the essence of the strategic corporal. The young soldier who takes his job seriously, is professional, and, above all, competent, can do this with great ease if he's allowed to by his superiors.
In practicality, this works best when you don't have a micromanaging neolith in the position of greater responsibility; rather, someone confident enough of his own abilities as a leader to not get involved in every last detail and, most importantly, someone who knows his soldiers well enough to understand their strengths and weaknesses and place them in positions where they'll flourish.
Perhaps the solution is are more comprehensive commissioning and training system for junior Officers? Maybe an equivilent of Sandhurst?
Is it the responsiblity of the big Army to train the junior officers as to the finer points of warfare or the gaining units? How much additional training do you recommend? At what point do you write the kid off as a piss poor leader?
I've seen some stellar PLs. I've also seen PLs I wouldn't put in charge of the mess hall, let alone allow their soldiers to drag them through combat. I would recommend it is the responisbility of company commanders and senior NCOs within that young officer's platoon to mold him or her into being a combat leader.
I will admit that the younger generation is having a pretty hard time of knowing where their place is. I've written recently on the subject as it relates to generational effects of coddling, instant gratification through things as simple as 24 hour news or video games, and reasonable expectation. As a microcosm of sociey, it is reasonable to believe that certain elements of the miltary, particularly the newly indoctrinated custodians of authority, would be subject to difficulties adapting to a regimented lifestyle such as is the hallmark of military service.
What do we do with these young "leaders" when we find that for reasons good, bad, or indifferent they have joined the military with less than altruistic intentions and clearly cannot understand the culture? Do we conduct an ad hoc version of natural selection and thank them for their service and let them on their way? Do we continue to attempt to mold them and drag them along? Do we promote them with the hopes that added responisbility by virtue of rank will increase their own personal awareness as to the severity of their profession? One could argue that we're doing a combination of all of these down at the company and platoon level.
To paraphrase George Orwell "All animals are equal. Some animals are more equal than others."
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