400 to 500 building 10 to 15 square miles, something that a system comparable and substantially better than DIT's would support.
Not true. The number of towns and villages in the box is much greater. Shughart-Gordon remains the main MOUT site due to instrumentation.Fort Polk only has about 40 buildings and I’m researching facilities that can simulate a small city or town.
Not sure what size you are going for with "small city or town". The CTCs look at the brigade fight; the MOUT sites meet those needs.
Tom
400 to 500 building 10 to 15 square miles, something that a system comparable and substantially better than DIT's would support.
Recommend you check out the Rand web site and look for a book by Dr. Russ Glenn. In the last year or so he did a very comprehensive study on urban training facilities. I think his list of facilities is probably the most detailed.
I recommend that you Google Alan Brosnan and the Olive Security Training Center. Brosnan is in the midst of expanding his facilities to include a large MOUT-type complex. There are already evasive driving tracks, shoot houses, sniper ranges, and explosive breaching structures, so live-fire can be integrated pretty seamlessly with blanks/simunitions. And considering that his is a commercial enterprise, he is looking for most bang for the least buck...
Some of you know that I am a skeptic when it comes to modeling and simulation of a Small Wars scenario - especially in an urban environment. I have no idea how an intelligent agent (if and when one might ever exist) can model and simulate human behavior to include the intentions of an asymmetric foe, the actions and reactions of a local population, our actions and reactions in a COIN environment that relies on the human behavior of our tactical units - and all the second and third-order effects associated with the kinetic and non-kinetic actions and reactions of all the “players” mentioned above. I could very well be wrong – won’t be the first time – but I would like someone to explain to me in “layman’s terms” why I am so off-base here.
Posted below is the latest JFCOM press release on Urban Resolve – any comments, thoughts, musings, etc. (especially by participants) would be most appreciated. I’ll keep an open mind and stand corrected if proved that my knowledge of the capabilities of M&S of Small Wars is lacking…
Urban Resolve 2015 Leaders Meet with the Media
By Robert Pursell
USJFCOM Public Affairs
(SUFFOLK, VA. - Sept. 20, 2006) -- U.S. Joint Forces Command's (USJFCOM) Joint Experimentation Directorate (J9) and its partners show a behind-the-scenes look at Urban Resolve 2015 (UR 2015) to the media today at the Joint Futures Laboratory here.
The Urban Resolve series helps improve the warfighters' ability to operate and control the urban environment, isolate the adversary, and maintain urban stability by denying the enemy access to physical or information resources from which he could conduct de-stabilizing operations.
J9 Director Rear Adm. James Winnefeld explained the mission of UR 2015 and why the focus is on the urban environment.
"In Urban Resolve, we're trying to find ways to operate more safely and more effectively in that very complex terrain called the urban environment. It's very difficult. It's a crowded place. It's a complicated place. It's not like working out in the middle of the desert. So there are a lot of different problems that we have to try to solve to try to do this job correctly," he said.
Army Col. Mike Postma, the experimentation lead for UR 2015, said the experiment's focus was "to isolate the adversary and control key pieces of the urban environment. It's the major mission of what we're trying to do."
Because the event uses one of USJFCOM's facilities, many of the modeling and simulation tools are available. This allows participants to simulate the scenarios from a room full of laptops, instead of experimenting out in the field. Postma explained the importance of this.
"Nobody's life is at risk inside the experiment. This is the environment that enables you to look at those things without getting anybody hurt," he said.
Winnefeld said the participants of UR 2015 include USJFCOM, Special Operations Command, the Joint Staff, the services, and other U.S. and multinational agencies. He explained the importance of the multinational presence.
"We get a tremendous benefit from working with international allies. One of the principal thrusts of what we do out here in the Joint Futures Lab is working with our multinational partners," said Winnefeld.
You would be surpised at how well computer models can simulate social situations. Basically, any knowledge that can be put in a book, such as how a population would react to certain military or civil-military actions, can be simulated in an expert system. I'm not suggesting that JFCOM's model is perfect -- far from it, in my experience working with them. I do think that any exercise, in the field, or in a computer model, that gets senior military leadership thinking about COIN is a good thing.
Then again, rereading it, does the press release actually say they are trying to simulate a COIN scenario, or does are they just trying to simulate combat in an urban environment? Having worked with JFCOM's simulations in the past, I'd guess it would be the latter.
Last edited by pcmfr; 10-06-2006 at 07:31 PM.
My take-away is that you believe that the real value of COIN / Small Wars M&S is "getting senior leadership thinking about COIN." I would submit that if our senior leadership has not been seriously thinking about this in light of current and projected operations then they need to find a new line of work. Should we really invest millions in M&S when the real experimental venue is happening every day in Iraq, Afghanistan, HOA, PI and elsewhere?
Dave, I don't know if this helps, but since I retired from LE I am now a security manager at a large hospital. This is how LE has adapted the CARVER targeting process. It is now called CARVER+SHOCK. It talks of agents and
2ND and 3RD order effects, but most importantly it is designed to get you think like the enemy. the attached pdf link shows it being applied to a food a processing plant.
At the hospital we have an infection control nurse who monitors out breaks of strange illnesses all over the country/world. As you recently saw Spinach was in the news, it is not yet known if this was an accident, a failed attack or a test run to judge our response capabilities. One scenario is that it was an attack by migrant workers because of immigration and border control.
Link http://www.ngfa.org/pdfs/Carver_Shock_Primer.pdf
I will take a look at the doc and you caught my attention with the "spinach scenario" - but that might be a different thread in the "2 Shop" section. Interesting stuff, and scary, to say the least.
That said, M&S seems to be great for phenomena that has a “signature” – either “tech” or say biological as in the out-break and spread of an infectious disease. The first, “tech”, can be modeled for intentions because parameters are often known. The second, biological, also can (more like monitored) because many parameters are also known.
When it comes to COIN the parameters of human behavior of the insurgents (and terrorists) as well as the local populace are not known in such a detail as to be of any value in an automated system – M&S won't solve our problems here.
19 October American Forces Press Service - Joint Forces Experiment Looks at Gaps in Urban Warfare. (Reposted here in full per DoD guidelines).
Joint Forces Experiment Looks at Gaps in Urban Warfare
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service
WASHINGTON, Oct. 19, 2006 – The U.S. Joint Forces Command is in the midst of the most important and complex experiment the command has conducted since Millennium Challenge in 2002, officials said here yesterday.
The experiment is Urban Resolve 2015 and is designed to test solutions for that most complicated warfighting task: combat in cities.
Dave Ozolek, executive director of the Joint Futures Lab at the command, said the experiment is designed to examine solutions for current and future gaps in warfighting capabilities.
He said the experiment is enabling the command to get inside two concepts. First, how does the U.S. military operate in the new urban environment? “Ten years ago, we saw the (military) operating space as the great plains of Europe and the deserts, and we basically avoided operating in the urban environment,” Ozolek said. “That’s no longer possible. That’s where the fight is, that’s where the enemy is, that where the center of gravity for the whole operation is.”
This is more than the old military operations in urban terrain that the armed forces practiced for years. “We need a new approach, because the environment is not only terrain, it’s infrastructure, it’s culture, it’s governance, it’s rule of law, it’s legality, food, water, fire and safety and all of those things that make up a complex environment of a city,” he said.
The military must make the urban environment “toxic” to the enemy and achieve success in ways other than trying to hunt them down one at a time and kill them, he said.
The second concept is stabilization operations. How does the military stabilize the situation in a city, transition to local control and rebuild a shattered economy? “How do we bring safety and security to the city without destroying it?” Ozolek asked.
The experiment takes place in Baghdad, but it could be any urban environment. The scenario is five days of major combat operations, followed by 30 days of stability operations. An insurgency arises that requires a joint task force. The joint task force now faces the threat.
More than 14,000 people around the United States have worked on and operated the experiment. The main place is the command’s Joint Experimentation Directorate in Suffolk, Va., but the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps have integrated their systems into the U.S. Joint Forces Command system for it. Representatives from 12 nations are participating, as well as members of other federal agencies, such as the State Department, Commerce and Justice.
The experiment is testing seven solutions for urban operations capability gaps, according to Air Force Col. Terry Kono, head of experimentation and design at the command.
The population is the center of gravity for any urban operation, Kono said. “The urban operations concept breaks into two ideas: isolating the adversary, controlling the urban environment,” he said.
The experiment plugs the seven solution sets into the scenario. The first is a Joint Command Post of the Future. The experiment will examine ways to improve joint force collaboration and provide the tools needed for commanders and their staffs to operate in the environment.
A second solution is the Communication Strategy Board. This enables commanders to develop a coherent communications strategy using information operations, public affairs, special staffs and other to influence public opinion and keep all populations informed.
A third solution is the Joint Intelligence Operations Center. This is essentially a merger of an intelligence center and an operations center. Divisions in Iraq are already moving in this direction and are integrating the two separate staffs into one.
A fourth solution is the Joint Urban Operations Surveillance System. These are network-controlled, long-duration, unmanned aerial vehicles that can be used for continuous and persistent surveillance. It could, for example, backtrack a vehicle used in a car bomb attack.
Fifth, Predictive Analysis. This is modeling that commanders can use to assess decisions.
Sixth, Integrated Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense. The year is 2015 and the predictions are that a terror group would possess a chemical or biological weapon. The U.S. military needs to understand what it has to do to protect a city under such a threat.
And finally, Tags. These are radio frequency vehicle tags, personnel identification and invisible tags that can be used to track critical targets and activities.
The experiment ends Oct. 27, but the analysis should be very quick to turn around, Ozolek said. Urban Resolve 2015 took about a year and $25 million to set up. Millennium Challenge, conducted in 2002, took about three years to set up and cost about $250 million.
Please tell me they are going to be using RFID.....
Tags: A method for the enemy to completely inventory your movement to battle and prepare a defense.
Sorry my cynicism is showing. Have people forgotten about radio silence and passive versus active emissions, and further that passive just like old submariners will tell you is just as bad as active?
15 November post at the Secrecy News blog - Army Doctrine on Urban Operations.
The conduct of military operations in urban areas is the subject of a new Army doctrinal manual.
"Of all the environments in which to conduct operations, the urban environment confronts Army commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found elsewhere [due to its] intricate topography and high population density."
The hazards and threats posed by the urban environment, and the spectrum of potential responses to mitigate or exploit them, are considered at length in the 315-page unclassified manual.
See "Urban Operations," U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-06, 26 October 2006 (a large 14 MB PDF file).
This comes from RAND, written by Brian Michael Jenkins, 1972. Couldnt find it in the library here, so here ya go. Nothing revolutionary, but it succinctly states a variety of important principles. Short, easy read.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2006/P4670.1.pdf
"The Infantry’s primary role is close combat, which may occur in any type of mission, in any theater, or environment. Characterized by extreme violence and physiological shock, close combat is callous and unforgiving. Its dimensions are measured in minutes and meters, and its consequences are final." - Paragraph 1-1, FM 3-21.8: Infantry Rifle PLT and SQD.
- M.A. Holzbach
Capt. Holzbach, just finished reading the paper you posted. There was an statement made by the author that I thought was interesting. He thought effective COIN campaigns are more like Political campaigns. That is an interesting way to look at it. Maybe military commanders should work on political campaigns as part of their training. It would definitely get them familiar with effective propaganda campaigns.
I am with you on that slapout. Galula, Trinquier, Mao, and the rest would make the same arguement as well. The problem is that as soon as we label anything "warfare", it becomes a military problem. The military is only one tool. Regretably, many people lose the bubble on this concept.
Now that would be an interesting experience. I think it would cause problems and a bit of outcry, because the military is supposed to be apolitical. And of course, then you have to decide which campaigns to work in, and you would have to be fair, balancing left and right blah blah blah. Its an interesting idea that the military could make work. But skell politicians would sink it fast.Maybe military commanders should work on political campaigns as part of their training. It would definitely get them familiar with effective propaganda campaigns.
"The Infantry’s primary role is close combat, which may occur in any type of mission, in any theater, or environment. Characterized by extreme violence and physiological shock, close combat is callous and unforgiving. Its dimensions are measured in minutes and meters, and its consequences are final." - Paragraph 1-1, FM 3-21.8: Infantry Rifle PLT and SQD.
- M.A. Holzbach
Liveblogging: Joint Urban Warrior 07
Chris Hoffpauir from U.S. Joint Forces Command Public Affairs blogged live all day May 21 from Joint Urban Warrior 07. Co-sponsored by the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory at the Bolger Center in Potomac, Md., the latest iteration of the Joint Urban Warrior series of wargames focuses on how actions in a tactical urban environment affect operations across the whole spectrum of conflict...
...hope that didn't suck up too much bandwidth! Oh that's right, he can blog since he's not in a combat zone!
"But the bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet withstanding, go out to meet it."
-Thucydides
Dave,
This sounds great. I'd argue there's few if any more important issues for us to figure out than how to improve our role in the IO fight in the 21st Century. Very much look forward to reading/hearing more about it. Semper Fi, Scott
Nice bit of coverage, Dave. Could you talk a bit about your impressions of how the topic was talked about and received?
The old adage "freedom of the press belongs to the one who owns the press" is no longer true.
Thanks to the Internet, anyone who wants his or her voice heard can simply rent time on a computer at an Internet cafe and post their musings on any number of Web sites. If they're willing to spend a few dollars more, they can post podcasts and vodcasts, the Internet equivalent of radio and television.
Like it or not, new media is here, not to be ignored.
I spoke with Dave Dilegge, a consultant at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab's wargaming division, about how the military is looking at new media. He's uniquely qualified to discuss the topic because in his off-time he's the editor-in-chief of the Small Wars Journal (SWJ), an Internet publication that takes full advantage of the freedom the medium offers. SWJ features an electronic magazine, a blog, a message board, an electronic reference library and an extensive list of links.
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Bookmarks