Stryker collection (merged thread)

[SWJED]

... by Charlie at the OPFOR blog.

[SWJED]

18 September Associated Press - Army's Newest Stryker Vehicle Boasts More Firepower.

Soldiers at Fort Lewis have begun training on the Army's 10th and final version of the Stryker armored vehicle.

Five years in the making, the Mobile Gun System looks a lot like its predecessors but has a 105 mm cannon, and Army officials say it packs more power than other versions armed with a heavy machine gun, a grenade launcher or anti-tank missiles...

The MGS, as the Army calls the new vehicle, is designed to back up infantry with a gun that can blast through walls, knock out fortified sniper nests, stop other armored vehicles and clear streets of enemy fighters...
The 49,000-pound MGS is operated by a three-man crew: a driver, a gunner and a vehicle commander, said Thomas Crooks, the company's service leader at Fort Lewis. The gunner and commander track targets on computer screens inside their hatches in the turret.

The vehicle can carry up to 18 rounds, and the gun is loaded by an automated hydraulic handler. Its computerized fire-control system is virtually identical to the one in the M1 Abrams, the Army's main battle tank.

The MGS will carry four types of ammunition: a depleted-uranium armor-piercing round, a high-explosive anti-tank round, a high-explosive plastic round for blowing through walls and barricades, and a canister round filled with 2,300 tungsten ball bearings for firing on enemy fighters.

The MGS packs "exactly the same, if not a little more enhanced" firepower as the much heavier 70-ton Abrams tank, but is not as sturdy defensively, Cooper said...

The MGS also does not need as much logistical support as the Abrams, gets better gas mileage and is built on the same basic chassis as other Stryker vehicles.

[Tom Odom]

the MGS packs "exactly the same, if not a little more enhanced" firepower as the much heavier 70-ton Abrams tank, but is not as sturdy defensively, Cooper said...

Dumb statement. An Abrams' armor is an OFFENSIVE tool because it provides mobility under fire. Too many folks tend to look at Strykers as tanks already and this sort of PR encourages that line of thought. A Stryker (MGS or otherwise) is a troop carrier. Period.

For the risks of such thinking see: No. 12: Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, Dr. Christopher R. Gabel. (PDF)
at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/downlo...ubs/gabel2.pdf

Best

Tom

[RTK]

As an Armored Cavalry officer, I have some issues with all this.

105mm v. 120mm: You've got to be kidding me that it has as much, if not more, than an Abrams.

It carries less than half the UBL of an Abrams. After the ready rack is expended, you have to expose a soldier to reload the bloody thing.

This is not a replacement to the MBT. It's an enhancement for Stryker units. Comparing the MGS to an Abrams is mixing apples and oranges.

[pcmfr]

Ok, obviously SFC Cooper made a bit of a stretch comparing the firepower of this vehicle to an M1A, but don't you guys think this is a great thing to provide more infantry units in Iraq with better fire power? Also, the lighter weight, mobility, and logistics footprint makes MGS a good platform to support future expeditionary ops.

Tanks are great, but we only have so many of them and they are a difficult to transport anywhere in a hurry and support them once we get there.

[Jones_RE]

The mobile gun system isn't exactly easy to ship overseas in a hurry either - unless they've fixed the problem where you have to lift the turret off with a crane before the thing'll fit inside the airplane . . . .

Still, the MGS will probably perform fine in the field - or at any rate it's problems will be more or less manageable. Systems aren't the most important issue here, it's doctrine and soldier training. If the army spent half the money that went into Stryker on counter insurgency training for the current (heavy) force, we'd have gotten a lot father a lot faster in Iraq.

And no, the thing is not a tank. However, it won't be employed that way. Stryker doctrine calls for two mobile gun systems in each company to support infantry operations with direct fire. While the lessons of the Tank Destroyer Corps are important to keep in mind, the Army has (at least doctrinally) produced a micro-scale combined arms force in the Stryker company - direct fire, indirect fire, anti-tank weapons and infantry under a single command which will train together regularly. They should be vastly more effective thank Tank Destroyer battalions.

[RTK]

Systems aren't the most important issue here, it's doctrine and soldier training.

I agree. However, I have a hard time believing that the Stryker is giving the Army the keys to the kingdom in the respect of force modernization. We're contracting the maintenance of the Strykers, meaning that while a tank or Bradley crewman can change track in his sleep, Stryker crewmen have to take their vehicle to Jiffy Lube to change their oil. -10 level maintenance tasks are few and far between and Joe isn't allowed to perform maintenance to the extent that he can on a tracked vehicle yet.

The Army has (at least doctrinally) produced a micro-scale combined arms force in the Stryker company - direct fire, indirect fire, anti-tank weapons and infantry under a single command which will train together regularly.

Sound an awful lot like armored cavalry to me. I revisit your early statement in that we need to improve doctrine and soldier training. We're making these Stryker units infantry heavy but requiring them to essentially perform a scout mission. There either needs to be a shift in MOS specific skills or a relooking at MTOEs as far as 19D billets in these areas. It is not as easy to teach an infantryman to be a scout as one would think. There's a mindset. Not saying that taddletales and cowards make the best scouts, but our job is to report PIR and avoid contact, especially with the way reconnaissance units are being restructured.

The Stryker is performing (in Infantry units) the same mission that M113s were performing long ago. They aren't that much better equipped as far as firepower than an M1114. Most are equipped with .50 CALs with a thermal sight system. They do offer better force protection than a HMMWV, but they're not going to be able to be decisively engaged with a mechanized force. I would hazard to guess that none of you would make a Stryker unit your main effort in a frontal assault against an enemy tank brigade of T72s and T82s.

Much has been talked about the lack of mobility of heavy armor in the MOUT fight. I disagree, as someone who was on both tanks and bradleys in Fallujah, Ramadi, Khalidiyah, and Al Qaim. Mobility is often not restricted as much by the capabilites of the platform as they are the competency of the crew. I've taken tanks on hills and mountain trails that motorized forces said they could not traverse with little difficulty. It goes back to the training piece Mr. Jones alluded to.

In the end, I agree that the Stryker improves mobility to the fight. The MGS will improve lethality for Stryker units. It is not a replacement for heavy armor. It's just one more tool for the Army to use to get troopies into the fight.

[pcmfr]

Much has been talked about the lack of mobility of heavy armor in the MOUT fight.

I think most references to heavy armor's lack of mobility refer to its lack of strategic mobility, ie, it's great once it gets there, but it's tough to bring to the fight. The Bradley's and M1As you rode in Iraq took a long time and a lot of manpower to get there via MPF ships and trucks from Kuwait.

[Jones_RE]

I think the traditional concern has been tactical mobility. See battle reports on Grozny, for example. The preconception is that urban terrain forces the tanks to move in predictable paths, while exposing the vulnerable roofs, flanks and rears to enemy anti-tank gunners. In fact, the difficulties suffered by tanks in urban warfare are most often compounded by poor training and employment.

In fact, I believe that armor which is properly supported by infantry and properly employed (i.e. by well trained crews, with adequate maintenance) is extremely effective in a streetfight. The key factor remains training - both by tankers and supporting infantry, however sound employment and numerical superiority can make up for deficits in individual abililty (at the expense of materiel and personnel casualties, increased time and increased collateral damage).

[jcustis]

Dumb statement. An Abrams' armor is an OFFENSIVE tool because it provides mobility under fire. Too many folks tend to look at Strykers as tanks already and this sort of PR encourages that line of thought. A Stryker (MGS or otherwise) is a troop carrier. Period.

What do we make then, of the USMC LAV? Troop carrier? Wanna-be IFV? Consider the way in which they have been employed the past 20 years.

[Tom Odom]

A combination of both and then different as well. As an Army guy, I look at LAVs as fighting vehicles but with a recon role. We (the Army) don't have them; the MGS Stryker is changing that I guess. In regard to LAVs as recon armor, they are exactly like the light tanks (the Stuart for example) that we entered WWII with. In the case of the Stuart, mobility was confused with speed. No tank was/is fast enough to outrun a German 88. The same held true with tank destroyer doctrine; that heavier gunned, but lighter armored (no covered turrets) TDs could move rapidly across the battlefield, mass at the correct place and time, and slaughter massed armor. The reality was they could NOT move because they did not have the necessary armor to move under fire, especially with open turrets.

Other countries have played with this concept, notably the French, the South Africans, and the Soviets. The French Panhard series is seen all over Francophone Africa. They did well against the Libyans in the 1980s as the latter's armor (T55s and T62s I recall) was slower and the French literrally drove circles around them. The French used their light armor as the western screen for the US/Coalition assault in Desert Storm. That said, Panhards in the former Rwandan army were meat on the table for the rebel RPA, who had no armor and generally light AT systems (RPGS and some RRs).

But getting back to MGS Stryker and LAVs. The MGS is a support vehicle for a Stryker unit giving it more firepower in certain roles. LAVs fight as LAV battalions do they not? That means they can mass and move rapidly in roles suitable for light armor. Neither system, however, was built to attack and breach a defensive line as 1st ID did in 1991 or to hit Iraqi armor as 2ACR did at 73 Easting (with then Captain H.R. McMasters as the lead troop commander).

Best
Tom

[jcustis]

LAVs fight as LAV battalions do they not? That means they can mass and move rapidly in roles suitable for light armor. Neither system, however, was built to attack and breach a defensive line as 1st ID did in 1991 or to hit Iraqi armor as 2ACR did at 73 Easting (with then Captain H.R. McMasters as the lead troop commander).

Tom,

Yes, the battalion is the primary tactical formation for ops. We in the USMC LAR community adhere to a hodgepodge of cav/recce and in-house doctrine, but (and I say this hesitantly) I think that as a community, we also believe that we would fight against anything in order to gain the information.

It's funny that you mention the 73 Easting and 1st ID's breach. I was assigned to be the breach force commander for the breach, marking, and improvements of lanes astride Hwy 80 into Safwan. Although 3d LAR was a supporting effort and I totally expect a DAG's worth of artillery to come raining down on us in the process, my company secured five breach lanes that were cut with, would you believe it, a commercial Caterpillar dozer. There wasn't much reconnaissance involved, just a plan for plain smashmouth tactics. Maybe it's the 25mm that provides the confidence to accomplish any task.

What's even more interesting is the background of Task Force Tripoli. LAR Bns were not employed in the Diyala crossing and Baghdad push in a very significant way, and most LAR guys believed because it simply wasn't our true role. Then came the tasker to ATK to SZ Tikrit. Three LAR Bns with an attached infantry force (can't remember if it was a Co or Bn(-)). Now that was interesting to say the least...We didn't face much resistance, and I shudder to think what would have happened if all the fighting positions, RPG cache sites, and Roland launchers had been manned. We still worked the planning process and looked at combat power, then launched forward.

I think a historian would have the guts of a good book if he were to look at all of the TF's actions as Phase III ops wound down.

[Tom Odom]

That dozer operator was either very nervous or nerveless. Light armor does great things when used correctly and I suspect the same will hold true with MGS and Stryker. Too often, units get misused because their role is not understood or the fickle finger of fate means they are available when a more suitable unit is not. That is of course not just limited to light armor; it is a recurrent problem in all specialty units, especially SOF.

A long time ago (in a galaxy nearby) I was a young 1LT S2 and just retired BG Jim Warner was the 1LT S3Air in 2-505. Jim and I were RANGER buddies and had ended up in the same battalion. Anyway we were the chief planners for the Airborne Anti-Armor Defense (AAAD); every battalion got a 10km by 10km square to establish an attrition-based anti armor defense. Jim and I did the grunt work in picking out kill zones and such. Our problem was our battalion commander; he saw TOW jeeps (not HMMWVs but M151A2s) as mobile gun platforms--just as they were when we had 106 RRs on the things. He insisted that such gun jeeps could survive a fight inside 500 meters with a T62 and forced us to plot kill zones that way. Naturally our TOW platoon leaders thought we were crazy until they learned the real score and just adjusted their kill zones accordingly. Still a TOW vehicle did look sort of like a 106 just like a LAV sorta looks like a tank...


Best
Tomo

[Shek]

I agree. However, I have a hard time believing that the Stryker is giving the Army the keys to the kingdom in the respect of force modernization. We're contracting the maintenance of the Strykers, meaning that while a tank or Bradley crewman can change track in his sleep, Stryker crewmen have to take their vehicle to Jiffy Lube to change their oil. -10 level maintenance tasks are few and far between and Joe isn't allowed to perform maintenance to the extent that he can on a tracked vehicle yet.

RTK,
This statement is false. Unit mechanics can perform all the tasks necessary to maintain these; however, by design, the maintenance teams are much smaller, which then requires additional contracted support. The only exception to this is during the initial training and fielding, when the mechanics aren't qualified, and when the repair involves a part that is still under warranty - the warranty part is no different from any other vehicle that has a warranty on it (the unit mechanic could work on it, but it would void the warranty).

Sound an awful lot like armored cavalry to me. I revisit your early statement in that we need to improve doctrine and soldier training. We're making these Stryker units infantry heavy but requiring them to essentially perform a scout mission. There either needs to be a shift in MOS specific skills or a relooking at MTOEs as far as 19D billets in these areas. It is not as easy to teach an infantryman to be a scout as one would think. There's a mindset. Not saying that taddletales and cowards make the best scouts, but our job is to report PIR and avoid contact, especially with the way reconnaissance units are being restructured.

The RSTA squadron is made up of 19Ds. No change is needed since scouts are performing the scout missions.

The Stryker is performing (in Infantry units) the same mission that M113s were performing long ago. They aren't that much better equipped as far as firepower than an M1114. Most are equipped with .50 CALs with a thermal sight system. They do offer better force protection than a HMMWV, but they're not going to be able to be decisively engaged with a mechanized force. I would hazard to guess that none of you would make a Stryker unit your main effort in a frontal assault against an enemy tank brigade of T72s and T82s.

Much has been talked about the lack of mobility of heavy armor in the MOUT fight. I disagree, as someone who was on both tanks and bradleys in Fallujah, Ramadi, Khalidiyah, and Al Qaim. Mobility is often not restricted as much by the capabilites of the platform as they are the competency of the crew. I've taken tanks on hills and mountain trails that motorized forces said they could not traverse with little difficulty. It goes back to the training piece Mr. Jones alluded to.

In the end, I agree that the Stryker improves mobility to the fight. The MGS will improve lethality for Stryker units. It is not a replacement for heavy armor. It's just one more tool for the Army to use to get troopies into the fight.

The Stryker concept is based on the infantry squad. It brings infantry units to an OBJ fresh to fight and allows them to be protected. Too much emphasis has been made on the false concept that Stryker Brigades were designed to fufill a similar role to mech units, which is not the case. They are meant to bridge the gap between the light and heavy force, and if augmented properly with ADA, MP, aviation (this problem will go away once aviation becomes organic to the SBCTs), can fight in major combat operations. SBCTs would have been the perfect force to follow 3ID, having the mobility to keep the LOCs open, the protection and firepower to destroy the Fedayeen threat, and the infantry to clear urban terrain.

[RTK]

RTK,
This statement is false. Unit mechanics can perform all the tasks necessary to maintain these; however, by design, the maintenance teams are much smaller, which then requires additional contracted support. The only exception to this is during the initial training and fielding, when the mechanics aren't qualified, and when the repair involves a part that is still under warranty - the warranty part is no different from any other vehicle that has a warranty on it (the unit mechanic could work on it, but it would void the warranty).

Then based on your last statement it is not a completely false statement. Once the warranties wear out on the vehicles, who is going to maintain those parts? After working with and talking to both 1/25ID and 172nd SBCT in Mosul, the units were having a more difficult time in this arena than they had anticipated.

The RSTA squadron is one battalion sized element in an SBCT. When you build the SBCT around ISR sensor platforms as we've done with the SBCT you become a reconnaissance organization. LRAS3 is a Scout Surveillance System, inherent in which is a reconnaissance mission. They're also pretty standard in even the infantry Stryker companies. I was attempting to highlight that if we're going to have this equipment in infantry units then perhaps we need to start training infantry soldiers on the fundamentals of reconnaissance and ISR planning. I have not seen a competency in this area among infantry units, save for LRS-C, yet.

Additionally, while we're on the Stryker subject, I'm not a big fan of generic mortar systems that have to be dismounted from the vehicle in order to employ. Any mobility gained by the flatform is lost when you have to dismount a 120mm system to fire it.

As for Strykers as a system for destroying the Fedayeen threat; Proper planning, foresight, and some COIN training beforehand would have helped that, whether the units were in tanks, Brads, strykers, M1114s, or dismounted. Prior to us going into OIF I our primary concern was not of insurgent groups but of wandering refugees and other dislocated civilians. That's where our focus before hitting the dirt berm was. 2ACR was responsible for the mission you spoke of following 3IDs push and they were wheeled as well.

As COL(ret) T.X . Hammes would readily tell you, firepower and maneuver won't necessarily win or negate the enemy's strengths in Gen 4 warfare. Knowing your threat and mitigating or neutralizing his effects on the local populace will.

[Shek]

Then based on your last statement it is not a completely false statement. Once the warranties wear out on the vehicles, who is going to maintain those parts? After working with and talking to both 1/25ID and 172nd SBCT in Mosul, the units were having a more difficult time in this arena than they had anticipated.

The RSTA squadron is one battalion sized element in an SBCT. When you build the SBCT around ISR sensor platforms as we've done with the SBCT you become a reconnaissance organization. LRAS3 is a Scout Surveillance System, inherent in which is a reconnaissance mission. They're also pretty standard in even the infantry Stryker companies. I was attempting to highlight that if we're going to have this equipment in infantry units then perhaps we need to start training infantry soldiers on the fundamentals of reconnaissance and ISR planning. I have not seen a competency in this area among infantry units, save for LRS-C, yet.

Additionally, while we're on the Stryker subject, I'm not a big fan of generic mortar systems that have to be dismounted from the vehicle in order to employ. Any mobility gained by the flatform is lost when you have to dismount a 120mm system to fire it.

As for Strykers as a system for destroying the Fedayeen threat; Proper planning, foresight, and some COIN training beforehand would have helped that, whether the units were in tanks, Brads, strykers, M1114s, or dismounted. Prior to us going into OIF I our primary concern was not of insurgent groups but of wandering refugees and other dislocated civilians. That's where our focus before hitting the dirt berm was. 2ACR was responsible for the mission you spoke of following 3IDs push and they were wheeled as well.

As COL(ret) T.X . Hammes would readily tell you, firepower and maneuver won't necessarily win or negate the enemy's strengths in Gen 4 warfare. Knowing your threat and mitigating or neutralizing his effects on the local populace will.

RTK,
Whoever you are getting your information from is giving you bad information. The SBCT is not built around the RSTA or the LRAS3. Infantry rifle companies do not have LRAS3. As far as the warranties go, soldiers know how to maintain the items that are warrantied - the issue is that a contractor from the company that supplies the item must be the one working on it. For example, the engine in the Stryker is the exact same as the FMTV (minus the turbo). However, for a certain time period, we couldn't perform certain maintenance tasks on the engines in the Stryker even though the 63s were hanging parts on the FMTV engines.

Next, you don't need to ground mount your 120mm mortars anymore because the MC-B has been fielded.

Lastly, you are conflating COIN with asymmetrical threats/irregular threats or however you want to label the Fedayeen.

[Uboat509]

I was in the 2ACR shortly after they reformed as light cav (HMMWVs instead of Tanks and Bradlys). It was not a popular concept. Most of the guys in the unit hated it either because they were left over infantry from one of the units that formed the regiment and they distrusted vehicles, or because they were veterans from the regiments experiences in the Gulf War and patrolling the Fulda gap. The rumor was that after Gen. Sulivan retired the regiment would be disbanded or given back their armor. Back then they were trying to write the doctrine and it really seemed that no one had any idea what to do with light cav. They were far to light for the armor guys' tastes and far to big with too few dismounts for the infantry guys. The main focus for us back then was "expand the lodgment". That was where the 82nd would jump in and do an airfield seizure and then we would land on that airfield and roll right off into the fight and expand the area around the airfield. We practiced it a lot. At the time there were also rumors of new weapons systems that we might get. One of those was the Armored Gun System which was a sort of light tank and if I am not mistaken one of the progenitors of the MGS. I bring all this ancient history up because one of the saving graces for the light cav concept was the fact that they could be loaded onto a C130, landed anywhere that a C130 could land and then rolled off the aircraft and straight into the fight. I thought that that was the purpose of the Stryker, upgrade the armor protection and mobility of the HMMWV but maintain its rapid deployability. I was told that the reason that they went with .50 Cals and MK19s instead of retaining the 25MMs was to ensure that they could fit into the C130 and then roll into the fight like the HMMWVs. Then I learned that they in fact cannot just roll off the bird into the fight. Apparently there are a number of things that must done in order to fit it into the bird and the once it rolls off the bird before it can get into the fight. So if I am understanding this correctly then what we have in the Stryker is a vehicle that is neither as heavily armed and armored as the Bradly but not as rapidly deployable as the HMMWV. So my question is what is the point?

SFC W

[RTK]

RTK,
Whoever you are getting your information from is giving you bad information. The SBCT is not built around the RSTA or the LRAS3. Infantry rifle companies do not have LRAS3. As far as the warranties go, soldiers know how to maintain the items that are warrantied - the issue is that a contractor from the company that supplies the item must be the one working on it. For example, the engine in the Stryker is the exact same as the FMTV (minus the turbo). However, for a certain time period, we couldn't perform certain maintenance tasks on the engines in the Stryker even though the 63s were hanging parts on the FMTV engines.

Next, you don't need to ground mount your 120mm mortars anymore because the MC-B has been fielded.

Lastly, you are conflating COIN with asymmetrical threats/irregular threats or however you want to label the Fedayeen.

Never said it was built aroudn the RSTA. I said ISR systems. Surely LRAS isn't the only ISR asset in the SBCT, as the sensor platforms in the SBCT were the highly touted and much celebrated additions that, at the risk of talking about systems we shouldn't talk about, we won't. I acknowledge your point about SBCTs formed around squad sized elements. A secondary focus, if you will, is the ISR platforms, particularly EW, SBCTs have that other BDE organizations either don't have or didn't have when the SBCTs first were established.

Whether we wanted to call Fedayeen asymmetric threats or insurgents; when little dudes pop out of the woodwork wearing civilian clothes (not many adhered to the black pajama uniform) it doesn't matter what you call them. They're still a problem that needs to be addressed whose effect on the battlefield will not be negated by a piece of equipment.

[Stu-6]

. . . So if I am understanding this correctly then what we have in the Stryker is a vehicle that is neither as heavily armed and armored as the Bradly but not as rapidly deployable as the HMMWV. So my question is what is the point?

I agree with your what is the point comment, Strykers are ok for some things but they seem to have a lot of limitations especially when you consider all of the money we put into the program. We could have gotten a lot of the same capabilities at not even half the cost if we had just modernized some of our old M113.

[Shek]

I was in the 2ACR shortly after they reformed as light cav (HMMWVs instead of Tanks and Bradlys). It was not a popular concept. Most of the guys in the unit hated it either because they were left over infantry from one of the units that formed the regiment and they distrusted vehicles, or because they were veterans from the regiments experiences in the Gulf War and patrolling the Fulda gap. The rumor was that after Gen. Sulivan retired the regiment would be disbanded or given back their armor. Back then they were trying to write the doctrine and it really seemed that no one had any idea what to do with light cav. They were far to light for the armor guys' tastes and far to big with too few dismounts for the infantry guys. The main focus for us back then was "expand the lodgment". That was where the 82nd would jump in and do an airfield seizure and then we would land on that airfield and roll right off into the fight and expand the area around the airfield. We practiced it a lot. At the time there were also rumors of new weapons systems that we might get. One of those was the Armored Gun System which was a sort of light tank and if I am not mistaken one of the progenitors of the MGS. I bring all this ancient history up because one of the saving graces for the light cav concept was the fact that they could be loaded onto a C130, landed anywhere that a C130 could land and then rolled off the aircraft and straight into the fight. I thought that that was the purpose of the Stryker, upgrade the armor protection and mobility of the HMMWV but maintain its rapid deployability. I was told that the reason that they went with .50 Cals and MK19s instead of retaining the 25MMs was to ensure that they could fit into the C130 and then roll into the fight like the HMMWVs. Then I learned that they in fact cannot just roll off the bird into the fight. Apparently there are a number of things that must done in order to fit it into the bird and the once it rolls off the bird before it can get into the fight. So if I am understanding this correctly then what we have in the Stryker is a vehicle that is neither as heavily armed and armored as the Bradly but not as rapidly deployable as the HMMWV. So my question is what is the point?

SFC W

SFC W,
A Stryker unit doesn't have a forced entry mission. It will airland on a secure airfield and then consolidate and organize for the follow-on mission. Bottomline, it was never intended to be a "fight from the ramp" organization. That being said, most of the vehicles in the Stryker organization are ready to fight with their full capability (minus any add-on RPG protection - which was never part of the requirement for airland missions) within two minutes of offloading a C130.

Cheers.

Shek