The author's entire article hinges on the assertion that we are fostering retribalization and that using tribes to assert control over their lands is a bad thing. While the author cites historical examples of why retribalization is a bad thing, he fails to explain why those apply to the current circumstances. On the contrary, he points out that the examples that he cites are significantly different. And he provides no explanation for why using the tribes is a bad thing. He merely points out that the Sheiks are making money and I guess we are to infer that profit is evil, so the policy is inherently bad because it generates profits.

The author advocates a policy "to subordinate the tribes to the state." He implies that this is not part of our current effort. It is. There are conditions tied to the money that we hand out, specifically measures to integrate security forces into the ISF. There are significant C2 arrangements made between ISF, CF, and the tribal security forces. The impression that one gets from reading this article is that we're just strolling into tribal territory once per month to deliver a suitcase of money. I wonder how the author's opinion would change if he knew what he were talking about.

The author states that "the tribes feeding off the surge must be weaned from U.S. assistance and linked firmly to Baghdad as their source of support." I really don't see how that is any better or worse than tribes getting money from us. If the current policy leads to retribalization, then how would this new policy not?

And this is what really baffles me: "The surge has changed the situation not by itself but only in conjunction with several other developments." So we should assume that our efforts thus far are a failure because the conditions were better? That's like me saying the last two Red Sox World Series championships didn't count because they had home field advantage. Huh?