Counterinsurgency Education Request

[Cavguy]

I am wondering why the need or fascination we all seem to have for 'short' and 'simplicity'. There is simply no correlation between the fact that these attributes make a text more digestible to 'average' folks and the utility, accuracy, validity and worth of the thoughts that the texts contain.

First, excellent and detailed post, I don't have a lot of time to respond right now. I don't disagree, I'd love everyone to read lots of detailed texts with complex background.

Not everyone's a scholar or a reader.

“The reality is that what we about here in Iraq is multidimensional, and it cannot be simplified if none of it fits easily into in nice neat terms. Any search for the neat and tidy allows those who don’t really understand it, even in the simplest terms, to get us into dangerous situations ”

Completely agree - consider this I read last night from H.R. McMaster -

Colonel McMaster sat in his makeshift office and said, “It is so damn complex. If you ever think you have the solution to this, you’re wrong, and you’re dangerous. You have to keep listening and thinking and being critical and self-critical. Remember General Nivelle, in the First World War, at Verdun? He said he had the solution, and then destroyed the French Army until it mutinied.”

To my mind this precisely highlights the problem with 'short and simple'. These problems are anything but 'short and simple' and reductionism to make them such is a flawed idea. You end up with the perception of understanding, but actually have something quite different, which is dangerous.

Yes, but .... is someone with a limited knowledge truly more dangerous than someone with a deep knowledge?

I share some of Steve's concerns with many of the so called 'cold war' texts, but not because of their age. After all, Callwell and Gwynne are far older, but still have considerable utility in aiding understanding in many areas.

Good point, we still read Saint Carl, Sun Tzu, Lawrence, etc. - they are all dated but have good points. I'm not saying either of the discussed works are to that level - but I pulled relevant and tactical points from them, and contextualized them within my experience.

My concern, and with Galula in particular, is that simple advice is taken way out of the context it was derived and them slavishly applied at levels and in places where it clearly has little or no practical utility.

This is really a risk with almost any "how to" work, and not an argument for not reading them.

Time and time again I have seen people take simple blandishments, derived from observations of a finite tactical level problem over one year in a specific AO (with unique culture, terrain, political history etc), and try and extrapolate meaning at the high operational and low strategic end of the present conflict spectrum. It is ludicrous and it simply does not work. Yes, Galula can offer some pointers to a company commander owning a piece of dirt at the tactical level. But I believe he has very little of practical use beyond motherhood statements after that.

Agreed. Going back to the OT - the poster was wanting to instruct COIN at the small unit level - not shape MNC-I policy.

In order to address our current set of problems (particularly within the ITO), I believe that is well past time for people to look beyond the deification of Saint Robert. It is time to seek wider readings from people who have actually engaged in dealing with issues akin to our current problem set. And this must mean at levels other than the tactical. As an example Robert Kromer is one who springs to mind off the top of my head. (NB, I am not sanctioning / endorsing everything that Kromer wrote, merely pointing out that he worked at a level of the Vietnam war more akin to where most of our current problems lie).

Same problems Steve noted with Kormer. Great stuff - but hardly current.

Even FM 3-24 doesn't really address that. People like Galula and Trinquier because they do that - tell you "how to" at the tactical and even operational level, even if dated and written for a specific time and place. The wisdom to sort the wheat from chaff seems to be most of the complaint.

Regarding contemporary writings, I tend to agree with the posts previously. I have not yet seen the new edited work by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian , I have one on order and have some hope that it might be step in the right direction. Steve Metz's SSI monograph last year also springs to mind- I thought it was a good contribution.

No dig on Steve's Monograph, but these works aren't on the same plane. They are not not a manual on "how to" or principles for tactical execution of COIN in a modern environment based on learning or distillation of knowledge. Most officers and soldiers have neither the time nor inclination to read long and detailed works on a subject, and time is also a constraint for those in the deployment cycle. People want short because they can use short, and I think some knowledge applied imperfectly is better than detailed knowledge unapplied. I know it was for me as a commander.

I would love it if everyone loved long books, deep thoughts, and analysis, and as professionals (esp officers) we should. But wishing won't make it so. I think being armed with a little knowledge is better than none - largely because it also works as a gateway to more learning.

I never read Galula or Trinquier before my last deployment, but I have since (and wish I had before), and realized that I did most of what they advocated, adjusted for Iraq and where I was. The little I had read specifically on COIN before deploying the second time took me a long way when pared with my experience.

I am increasingly thinking that many are sitting around waiting for someone else to 'do something'. I put myself somewhat in this category at the moment. The situation will only change when one of us finds the time (and courage perhaps) to go out there and try and write a book.

Agreed, unfortunately these things tend to come out after the conflict. I don't think many academics could write the update to Galula or Trinquier - they don't have the tactical cred or experience. Galula and Trinquier had extensive tactical and operational execution experience in Vietnam and Algeria, which both increased the quality of their works and more importantly the credibility of them with the audience.

So I agree we have to do it, but few of us currently have the time. (Rob Thornton seems to have lots of time to type - )

In the mean time we can all continue to amuse ourselves with journal articles and anodyne powerpoint presentations at conferences replete with dubious analogies....

I may resemble that remark. But .... those articles and powerpoints started me on a path to more complexity - Kilcullen's 28 Articles was extremely important when it came out to me - framed much of what I had learned, and gave me some new things to think about that sparked further research and reading.