My personal experience (Afghanistan 2006-2007) partially supports the conclusion that PRTs are 'underfunded and undermanned'. About half the PRTs in Afghanistan were run by non-US nations and they were of dubious effectiveness. The US PRTs were much better funded and for the most part better manned, but I don't think they were more effective for that reason alone. They were more effective because they were subordinate to the local maneuver commander and therefore better integrated into the overall security/stabilization effort. Beyond that, though, I have a few observations:

1. The most important determinant of a PRTs success was the commander. Good ones overcame the shortages and operated effectively; bad ones did not. This may be a blinding flash of the obvious, but it gets back to the 'sexiness' of PRT command. Some of the US PRT commanders were hacks, bodies swept up in our desperate attempt to fully man the operation. They were not 'hand-picked' in the same sense that battalion commanders or even primary staff officers were. You get what you pay for.

2. There were too many PRTs. A lot of our coalition partners wanted the prestige of running a PRT. It was a nice place to run the flag up every day, and it was 'liberal-friendly' in a way that attack helicopters or infantry battalions are not. So we sprinkled PRTs around without much thought as to where they could do the most good, given limited resources. They also became a drain on the maneuver elements because they had to be protected at all costs. Security has to come first, or else PRTs become little more than targets.

3. Having a large number of PRTs in a country with no infrastructure, no money, and no government dissipates resources. Schools were built with no teachers, roads were built to nowhere, and bridges were built when there was no traffic to speak of. It would have been much better to concentrate our efforts - either geographically or in a particular sector - than to spread our largesse too thin.

4. I'm a skeptic that PRTs actually win hearts and minds. Maybe agnostic would be a better term. I have yet to see any convincing evidence that the locals are bought so easily. At best, they earn tolerance. At worst, in a tribal society, they make as many enemies as they do friends.

5. Way down on my list of concerns would be the number of non-military 'experts' assigned to the PRTs. Many of those that did show up were ill-suited to the assignment, lacking maturity, cultural awareness, or the ability/willingness to adapt their expertise to local conditions.