More PRTs or More personnel on PRTs

[Eden]

My personal experience (Afghanistan 2006-2007) partially supports the conclusion that PRTs are 'underfunded and undermanned'. About half the PRTs in Afghanistan were run by non-US nations and they were of dubious effectiveness. The US PRTs were much better funded and for the most part better manned, but I don't think they were more effective for that reason alone. They were more effective because they were subordinate to the local maneuver commander and therefore better integrated into the overall security/stabilization effort. Beyond that, though, I have a few observations:

1. The most important determinant of a PRTs success was the commander. Good ones overcame the shortages and operated effectively; bad ones did not. This may be a blinding flash of the obvious, but it gets back to the 'sexiness' of PRT command. Some of the US PRT commanders were hacks, bodies swept up in our desperate attempt to fully man the operation. They were not 'hand-picked' in the same sense that battalion commanders or even primary staff officers were. You get what you pay for.

2. There were too many PRTs. A lot of our coalition partners wanted the prestige of running a PRT. It was a nice place to run the flag up every day, and it was 'liberal-friendly' in a way that attack helicopters or infantry battalions are not. So we sprinkled PRTs around without much thought as to where they could do the most good, given limited resources. They also became a drain on the maneuver elements because they had to be protected at all costs. Security has to come first, or else PRTs become little more than targets.

3. Having a large number of PRTs in a country with no infrastructure, no money, and no government dissipates resources. Schools were built with no teachers, roads were built to nowhere, and bridges were built when there was no traffic to speak of. It would have been much better to concentrate our efforts - either geographically or in a particular sector - than to spread our largesse too thin.

4. I'm a skeptic that PRTs actually win hearts and minds. Maybe agnostic would be a better term. I have yet to see any convincing evidence that the locals are bought so easily. At best, they earn tolerance. At worst, in a tribal society, they make as many enemies as they do friends.

5. Way down on my list of concerns would be the number of non-military 'experts' assigned to the PRTs. Many of those that did show up were ill-suited to the assignment, lacking maturity, cultural awareness, or the ability/willingness to adapt their expertise to local conditions.

[Stan]

My personal experience (Afghanistan 2006-2007) partially supports the conclusion that PRTs are 'underfunded and undermanned'. About half the PRTs in Afghanistan were run by non-US nations and they were of dubious effectiveness. The US PRTs were much better funded and for the most part better manned, but I don't think they were more effective for that reason alone. They were more effective because they were subordinate to the local maneuver commander and therefore better integrated into the overall security/stabilization effort. Beyond that, though, I have a few observations:

Hey Eden !
Some great salient points. Having also observed PRTs since their infancy in 2002, I’d have to conclude we’ve come a long, long way. I never found them to be undermanned (I guess you’d need access to their mission profile and the financial aspects of individual contracts to adequately determine if they were up to the task at hand, or undermanned and underfunded).

1. The most important determinant of a PRTs success was the commander. Good ones overcame the shortages and operated effectively; bad ones did not. This may be a blinding flash of the obvious, but it gets back to the 'sexiness' of PRT command. Some of the US PRT commanders were hacks, bodies swept up in our desperate attempt to fully man the operation. They were not 'hand-picked' in the same sense that battalion commanders or even primary staff officers were. You get what you pay for.

Fully concur with you. The team leader is key with small teams. I sincerely doubt that any of the local commanders had the luxury of hand picking his/her team. If you ever served in Africa, you’d come to realize setting up a team with locals from scratch (even if they like the fact you’re there) is nothing short of a nightmare. Let’s face facts we’re not going to find jobless civil engineers, electricians and plumbers in the middle of nowhere. So, it is indeed little more than sweeping able and willing bodies together and trying to figure out their strengths and weaknesses (as a leader), all the while trying to keep them protected. With our exit strategy, those folks take over, and hopefully with not only will, but a little more experience.

2. There were too many PRTs. A lot of our coalition partners wanted the prestige of running a PRT. It was a nice place to run the flag up every day, and it was 'liberal-friendly' in a way that attack helicopters or infantry battalions are not. So we sprinkled PRTs around without much thought as to where they could do the most good, given limited resources. They also became a drain on the maneuver elements because they had to be protected at all costs. Security has to come first, or else PRTs become little more than targets.

Of all the teams that came and went, I don’t think I ever wanted much to do with them, yet alone run their day-to-day business. I feel the PRTs that were “sprinkled around” had more to do with the locations, environment and limited resources. No sense in sending a team into a combat zone knowing they won’t do much hunkered down behind a dirt mound most of the day. Better to get the church builders to any ol’ church, but at least out of immediate harm’s way. You’re certainly right though, most of the critical comments regarding PRTs at Bahgram translated into extra work, even for off-duty EOD personnel.

3. Having a large number of PRTs in a country with no infrastructure, no money, and no government dissipates resources. Schools were built with no teachers, roads were built to nowhere, and bridges were built when there was no traffic to speak of. It would have been much better to concentrate our efforts - either geographically or in a particular sector - than to spread our largesse too thin.

I kinda sorta agree, but how would we attract priests and schoolteachers to return to a sand lot with no buildings ? Is it the chicken or the egg

4. I'm a skeptic that PRTs actually win hearts and minds. Maybe agnostic would be a better term. I have yet to see any convincing evidence that the locals are bought so easily. At best, they earn tolerance. At worst, in a tribal society, they make as many enemies as they do friends.

I reckon we could just dump the PRT program and return to the days of Civil Affairs and PSYOPS. At the very least we’d now have armed, real, qualified and very capable soldiers performing specific CA missions. Not sure there’s much reason to further worry about gaining enemies and friends (talk about a cynical NCO).

5. Way down on my list of concerns would be the number of non-military 'experts' assigned to the PRTs. Many of those that did show up were ill-suited to the assignment, lacking maturity, cultural awareness, or the ability/willingness to adapt their expertise to local conditions.

Difficult to pin that one down. The local commander or team leader obviously has to decide between his pick-up basketball team, or nothing at all. You’re not going to find all the mature senior members with cultural awareness, abilities and willingness all in one basket. Hell, we can’t even get 6 Arabic-speaking Anthropologists to form a team of specialists

Regards, Stan