The Joint Staff struggled for some months to modify the TPFDD for OIF into something acceptable to the SecDef. Rumsfeld disliked it because it didn't give him the flexibility he wanted in deploying troops in a way that complemented the diplomatic/PR campaign mounted in the run-up to war. A very rough analogy would be the German General Staff's claim to the Kaiser prior to World War I that any change to their mobilization plan would cause the whole war effort to unravel. Kaiser Bill gave in to his experts; Secretary Rumsfeld did not.

The upshot was that any effort to create a workable TPFDD was abandoned and the deployment was largely done by RFF. Again, to get back to my earlier point and the origins of this thread, I think Rumsfeld saw a deployment database as inconsistent with the ideals of the RMA and military transformation. The Request for Forces process, on the other hand, appeared to be flexible and tailorable; I suspect it also serviced his predilection for direct intervention and control of the details. I can't get inside his head, obviously, but my impression is that he saw himself as forcing a hidebound bureaucracy to move into the 21st Century, and to abide by the principles it supposedly espoused - agility, deployability, and strategic relevence.

We should also remember that Schwarzkopf turned the TPFDD on its head during Desert Shield, the difference being that we had a six-month grace period during which time we were able to partially recover from his decision.