First and foremost – thanks much for the input so far. It is helping us focus our efforts and shape further discussion and research…

Our (USMC) Canadian Army LNO dropped off an article (not online) titled Military Command: The Compression of Levels of Command by Henning Frantzen. This article appeared in a 2004 edition of Challenge and Change for the Military – New Missions, Old Problems. This journal is published by the School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University and the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. While much of the article addresses the items discussed above on this thread – it does break down the reasons for compression into five distinct categories – Multinational nature of operations, limited commitment, media, the nature of conflicts (internal, irregular), and technology. I can’t break copyright nor desire to “retype" the entire article – so here is a bulletized summary:

  • Military doctrines, for the most part, separate the levels of war between strategic, operational and tactical. Of these, only the strategic level is explicitly concerned with politics. The operational and tactical level is concerned with fighting.
  • While most recognize the Clausewitzian thesis that war is a continuation of policy… it is often taken for granted that the political issues are concerned with the decision to wage war, the objectives and resources necessary for war and the constraints and limitations facing military commanders.
  • Compression of levels of war blurs this traditional understanding – the levels are being merged.
  • The result is that commanders seem to spend less time on actual command (formal definition) and more time and energy struggling with political affairs.
  • The best that commanders can now hope for is that they contribute to a political success rather than military victory.
  • The first reason for compression of the levels is the multinational character of current military operations. This results in a reduction of military commanders’ authority due to national restrictions and limitations. Issues that under other circumstances are strictly military are transformed into complex issues of international affairs and traditional levels of command seemingly do not apply.
  • The second reason for compression (merger of politics and military) is the limited commitment with which we engage in contemporary conflicts and war. They tend to rank lower on the security agenda and the issues of risk and casualties develop a high priority.
  • The third reason contributing to compression is media scrutiny and the speed by which information is broadcast and then has an effect on public opinion and political decision-makers. Military operations cannot be conducted separately from the world of civilians. Military judgments and reasoning are increasingly questioned by civil society and military commanders cannot exercise their profession in a vacuum.
  • All that said, the more important source of compression is the nature of current conflicts – internal wars of various sorts… Because these wars are fought within civil society it is much harder to separate military aspects from political aspects… The objective of the intervention – situation conducive to peace – demands more than a military victory.
  • The decentralized character of these conflicts drives operations down to the company and battalion level rather than corps and division. While operations are not just political all tactical decisions cannot be made without considering their potential political effect.
  • The fifth source of compression refers to new ideas on how to organize and command military power for future conflicts. The Strategic Corporal is one example… Experiments with strategic corporals and network-centric warfare are ways of dealing with new technological opportunities… Technology offers the opportunity of micro-management.
  • Concepts for command should be adjusted to reflect the changes caused by compression and to deal with the associated issue.