Quote:

SEN. LEVIN: General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war?

GEN. SHINSEKI: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think --

SEN. LEVIN: How about a range?

GEN. SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point -- something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground- force presence.

To which Wolfowitz went public and declared the numbers "far off of the mark." Really? Indeed. How would Wolfowitz know? Did he bring all of his infinite wisdom and war experience to bear on this assessment?

And later:

SEN. Lindsay GRAHAM (Republican, S. C.): Was General Shinseki correct when you look backward that we needed more troops to secure the country, General Abizaid? GEN. ABIZAID: General Shinseki was right that a greater international force contribution, U.S. force contribution, and Iraqi force contribution should have been available immediately after major combat operations

We can parse words a hundred ways from Sunday. It doesn't really matter. If I yell at my child that a car is speeding down the road and that he should get out of the way, it doesn't really matter if I mistake a pickup truck for a car. The fact that it is a truck that is about to run over my child doesn't obviate the danger. I see the danger, yell to the child, and the child moves thus saving his life. In this case, the yelling was ignored by the much smarter Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld.

I see this whole thing fairly simply. If anyone with any degree of authority or respect whatsoever who was around Rumsfeld or Wolfowitz brought up any problems with post-invasion Iraq or made any recommendations for caution or forethought, it was required of this team to consider with the utmost gravity their decision and all of its implications in the light of their general's concerns - and, to amend the plans accordingly. If considering the counsel of my colleagues is a moral requirement of me in my daily decisions when I cannot possibly kill 4000 men, then a fortiori, it is much more so for this team. Quod erat demonstrandum.

They failed, not just strategically, but morally.