My review of Dale Herspring's Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power

[Ski]

It was.

I had a document (now lost) from the USAF that, in a nutshell, said:

"No way in hell, it would have been nice to talk with us first before you spouted off."

I know I sent a copy of it to a friend, I'll see if he still has it...but this was in 01-02...

It has always amazed me that this "wisdom" of 96 hours was never challenged. It's an arbitrary number with absolute consequences, and thus meaningless.
If the leadership cannot get the basics right, then its hardly surprising that the rest goes to rats fairly early on.

[SteveMetz]

It was.

I had a document (now lost) from the USAF that, in a nutshell, said:

"No way in hell, it would have been nice to talk with us first before you spouted off."

I know I sent a copy of it to a friend, I'll see if he still has it...but this was in 01-02...

I nearly fell off of my bar stool once when I read an interview with Shinseki in which he said, "Imagine how differently Somalia would have turned out if we'd been able to get a brigade there in 96 hours."

Has I been there, my answer would have been, "Sir, not one whit different."

Speed may kill but, as we later found out in Iraq, killing doesn't automatically bring strategic success in a stabilization campaign.

[Tom Odom]

I nearly fell off of my bar stool once when I read an interview with Shinseki in which he said, "Imagine how differently Somalia would have turned out if we'd been able to get a brigade there in 96 hours."

Has I been there, my answer would have been, "Sir, not one whit different."

Speed may kill but, as we later found out in Iraq, killing doesn't automatically bring strategic success in a stabilization campaign.

Exactly...and there is the benefit from having a delay before you cross the LD. Desert Storm took 6 months; those 6 months were used wisely. Somalia was on the other hand driven by a desire to "get there" as a demonstration that light forces can be strategic (in some quarters). They can but you have to think about where you are putting them. I "voted" for an ACR in 1992 when Somalia was under discussion. So did everyone else who had been to Somalia.

It has never been about pure speed; it is about speed while maintaining inititiative and flexibility. In some cases airborne forces are the ticket depending on what you are doing. Other cases you need heavier. Advocating speed for speed's sake is rushing to one's own funeral.

Tom

[Ken White]

immediately clear. For example, we contended during the Reagan years that we would put ten Divisions in Europe within ten days. Most thinking people knew it couldn't be done -- we did not then have the sealift to do it. Fortunately, a lot of non-thinking people believed it.

The 96 hours BTW isn't all that arbitrary. It's predicated on the assembly and launch of the 82d Div ready BCT (when they're home ) and flight time with existing lift. It's doable. Been done, in fact.

[Eden]

Transformation was not about light forces. It was about making 'medium' weight forces deployable - 96 hours any where in the world. In fact, one of the earlier names for what became the SBCT was the Medium Brigade Combat Team. I can remember thinking when I first heard about it that no 'medium' organization in the history of warfare has ever survived for long: the logic of war inevitably drives it to become either lighter or heavier.

[Ken White]

Transformation was not about light forces. It was about making 'medium' weight forces deployable - 96 hours any where in the world. In fact, one of the earlier names for what became the SBCT was the Medium Brigade Combat Team. I can remember thinking when I first heard about it that no 'medium' organization in the history of warfare has ever survived for long: the logic of war inevitably drives it to become either lighter or heavier.

for the time. Had the same thought as you on the 'medium' bit -- a concept of which I'm not a fan...

If I may garble my syntax a tad.

[selil]

I read an interview and I'm going to mangle this but I liked it... it went something like this "Every Marine deserves the equivalent of a 30mm mini-gun, with the weight of a 45, and the reliability of a k-bar. Now back in reality...."

Sorry, I thought it was a hillarious example of fantasy meets reality.

[Ron Humphrey]

It has never been about pure speed; it is about speed while maintaining inititiative and flexibility. In some cases airborne forces are the ticket depending on what you are doing. Other cases you need heavier. Advocating speed for speed's sake is rushing to one's own funeral.

Tom

Was it Wyatt Earp that said something like

Fast is fine, but accuracy is everything.

[Ski]

Right. Strategic speed means nothing unless you have the capabilities on the ground and a plan to win and reinforce peace afterwards.

You can run into a lion's den as fast as you want - but it does not escape the fact you are still in a lion's den.