The major issues are that the GPMG is a tad tempermental mechanically and people who handle it exclusively do a better job than those to whom it is part time effort, it's too heavy to function well in an Infantry platoon, it complicates ammo resupply and that added firepower is only rarely needed at that level.Only Ranger platoons have three guns; whether one has two or three, the issues at platoon level remain. I'd also note that your solution would significantly increase ammo usage which is far from an unalloyed good thing.*If* I were in charge, the company commander would have a heavy weapons group of say, 3 GPMG's (heck, you can even say they are in the "sustained fire role") and 3 60mm Mortars. Each platoon still gets their 2 or 3 MGs. Thus a support by fire position could have the 3 company GPMGs, plus a rifle platoon with 2 or 3 more, for a total of 5 or 6.That's not the issue, knowing how to employ them is easy, it's the actual employment that is the issue. * The Platoon leader isn't the problem, the weapons squad leader and the vagaries of reassignment within the platoon are a part of the problem, finicky belt feds, massed fires, ammo resupply and coherent training are some other parts. It is easier to train a MG platoon to use their guns effectively en masse and to farm the Squads to rifle platoons as needed than it is to centralize fragmented and not trained together squads when that is required -- and in a high intensity conflict that will be the norm. At the risk of cycling Gian here, let me point out that we HAVE to organize and train to do high intensity combat, we can always scale down to do the easier COIN stuff when it's required....and if our infantry platoon leaders don't know how to employ belt-fed MGs, then we had better'd teach them, because they are about one sniper's bullet away from company command.
I'd also suggest that the use of automatic weapons fire in the suppressive mode in urban COIN situations is not always advisable.No argument from me -- I voted against the 5.56 over 44 years ago. You need to talk to PM Soldier and BG R. Mark Brown.Oh, and on the last note, I have been quite disappointed to see how the "great rifle caliber debate" has panned out. The competition between 6.8 and 6.5 only served to stall the process long enough for the "5.56 is good enough" idea to find a voice...We pay top dollar for this stuff - we can do a little better than just "OK"?
P.S.
When you talk to Brown, don't forget to tell him you're fully aware that we forced the 5.56 on a reluctant NATO and then signed a STANAG saying we'd stick with it, that we've sold a lot of weapons and ammo worldwide, that you know how many millions of rounds are in Depots in Europe, Okinawa and Korea as well as on the PrePo ships at Diego Garcia, Guam and elsewhere and that you fully understand the costs involved in a switch as well as the length of time and the training penalty it would take to do that.
P.P.S
* Our training of new entries, officer and enlisted is better than it's ever been but it still isn't good enough. However, as I said, employment is the problem. Next time you see a platoon running a live fire, try this; listen to the two guns, do they fire alternately; does one pick up the rate of fire while the other reloads, all automatically and without command? Then, ask them to place their beaten zone on a reverse slope as you would have to do if attacking a defender who used a reverse slope defense. After that, ask them to do a set up for night final protective fires. If they can do all that, you have just seen an unusually good Weapons Squad leader's product...
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