Armies decline after winning a war?

[Gian P Gentile]

Ken, you are right, you did not mention the Surge. Still your point as I understand it is that by having the Army eschew coin and irregular war since the end of Vietnam has caused the, to use your words, "ongoing problems" in Iraq; Yes?

And with this clarification of your position I still disagree with it. The point I made in my previous post was that no amount of competent combat outfits practicing good coin methods even as far back as 2004 can make up for a failed strategy; that strategy was a lack of enough troops to occupy and rebuild a foreign land in the midst of a civil war.

But we keep trying to rescue the war in Iraq from its impossibility by compensating our inability to reconcile strategic ends with means by the notion that that is no longer necessary because there has been a different and imporved set of coin operating methods with the Surge. It is as if we are elevating simple coin tactics to the level of high strategy as an attempt to replace the failed strategy that came before.

That is why I spend so much of my energy commenting on these things. I am not personalizing things; I am trying to make an argument that shows there is not systemic and significant differences between Surge and pre-Surge forces. Since many folks out there believe there is it is necessary on my part to highlight which units are usually called as the exceptions, then argue why I seem them as not.

Not personal at all, just business; albeit a deadly business because we are talking about what I see as the strategic viability of the US Army. You and I will also disagree on the Army's condition; I see it is as much worse than you do. I hope I am wrong, but I worry that I am right.

[Ken White]

Ken, you are right, you did not mention the Surge. Still your point as I understand it is that by having the Army eschew coin and irregular war since the end of Vietnam has caused the, to use your words, "ongoing problems" in Iraq; Yes?

No, that did not cause the problems. Failures in strategic thinking at the National and CentCom levels (I fault the latter most) plus Bremer 'caused' the problems. Failure to include Occupation, Nation building and COIN in Army doctrine and training merely exacerbated those problems and caused additional casualties and a too lengthy adjustment to an insurgency that we blithely walked into and then unwittingly encouraged to expand.

And with this clarification of your position I still disagree with it. The point I made in my previous post was that no amount of competent combat outfits practicing good coin methods even as far back as 2004 can make up for a failed strategy; that strategy was a lack of enough troops to occupy and rebuild a foreign land in the midst of a civil war.

As noted, your clarification was erroneous but that's of little import. I disagree with you on the strategic failure and doubt more troops would have had much effect. The strategic failure was engendered by not listening to a number of people with experience in the area who fairly accurately predicted what would occur and the failure per se was to not be prepared for the insurrection that Saddam publicly told us he was preparing. That's where the doctrinal and training failure contributed to and magnified but did not cause the current 'problems.'

But we keep trying to rescue the war in Iraq from its impossibility by compensating our inability to reconcile strategic ends with means by the notion that that is no longer necessary because there has been a different and imporved set of coin operating methods with the Surge. It is as if we are elevating simple coin tactics to the level of high strategy as an attempt to replace the failed strategy that came before.

I see a lot of talk along that line in the public media but ignore it because with rare exceptions they're pretty well clueless. I see little of it in professional publications -- including Military Review which I've been reading almost every month for over 50 years -- so I don't think many who count share that view of the surge.

That is why I spend so much of my energy commenting on these things. I am not personalizing things; I am trying to make an argument that shows there is not systemic and significant differences between Surge and pre-Surge forces. Since many folks out there believe there is it is necessary on my part to highlight which units are usually called as the exceptions, then argue why I seem them as not.

Admittedly some do see it that way but my sensing is they're a minority and have pet rocks. Regardless, you frequently name people in what appears to be a derisory manner and I think that dilutes the effectiveness of your message

...You and I will also disagree on the Army's condition; I see it is as much worse than you do. I hope I am wrong, but I worry that I am right.

True. I see it as bad but not catastrophic nor even approaching that point, it's been worse three times in my lifetime. I've also have watched the Army rebound and reorient a few times. It does that pretty well...