COIN v. Conventional Capability Debate

[Eden]

Division staffs are chock full of good, smart, professional people. They usually have competent, intelligent commanders. The problem, as we have transitioned to BCT structures and gotten involved in small wars, is that divisions (mostly morphed into JTFs) have less and less ability to influence the fight. Most of the resources are pushed down to the brigade level; a good chunk of the remaining forces are in self-contained, specialist task forces; logisitcs becomes routinized; there are no reserves to speak of. As a result the division becomes involved in parceling out a handful of helicopters or PSYOPs teams or whatever - there is rarely even a need to prioritize resources as the pace is slow enough that nobody ever goes without air support or MEDEVACS or ammunition. Due to human nature, the division staff and its leadership therefore begins to micromanage and meddle while turning into an information vacuum. At one point, CJTF-76 in Afghanistan had six (count 'em, six!) general officers, at least four of whom had only a single colonel to supervise.

The problem with just bagging the idea of the division is that someday we will be invited to a war involving brigades passing through each other, opposed river crossings, brigade-level deep aviation operations, commitment of reserves, terrain management, artillery that has to displace, and more targets than we can service simultaneously. Hell, maybe even integrated air defense!Some form of higher headquarters will have to do this (and be trained to do it before being called upon to execute). As others have pointed out, these are the kind of requisite warfighting skills that we are neither training for nor learning-by-doing.

[wm]

Division staffs are chock full of good, smart, professional people. They usually have competent, intelligent commanders. The problem, as we have transitioned to BCT structures and gotten involved in small wars, is that divisions (mostly morphed into JTFs) have less and less ability to influence the fight. Most of the resources are pushed down to the brigade level; a good chunk of the remaining forces are in self-contained, specialist task forces; logisitcs becomes routinized; there are no reserves to speak of. As a result the division becomes involved in parceling out a handful of helicopters or PSYOPs teams or whatever - there is rarely even a need to prioritize resources as the pace is slow enough that nobody ever goes without air support or MEDEVACS or ammunition. Due to human nature, the division staff and its leadership therefore begins to micromanage and meddle while turning into an information vacuum. At one point, CJTF-76 in Afghanistan had six (count 'em, six!) general officers, at least four of whom had only a single colonel to supervise.

The problem with just bagging the idea of the division is that someday we will be invited to a war involving brigades passing through each other, opposed river crossings, brigade-level deep aviation operations, commitment of reserves, terrain management, artillery that has to displace, and more targets than we can service simultaneously. Hell, maybe even integrated air defense!Some form of higher headquarters will have to do this (and be trained to do it before being called upon to execute). As others have pointed out, these are the kind of requisite warfighting skills that we are neither training for nor learning-by-doing.

Thanks for more transparently saying what I think Gian was after in posts 26 and 34 and I was definitely trying to get to in post 28.

[Ken White]

...The problem with just bagging the idea of the division is that someday we will be invited to a war involving brigades passing through each other, opposed river crossings, brigade-level deep aviation operations, commitment of reserves, terrain management, artillery that has to displace, and more targets than we can service simultaneously. Hell, maybe even integrated air defense!Some form of higher headquarters will have to do this (and be trained to do it before being called upon to execute)...

the BCT and below theater -- or Army, situation dependent -- level. I believe that a Hq on the original WW II concept of the Corps (fairly small, tactically oriented, no fixed units) with an as required two or three button an able to control two to six BCT is doable. Need to continue to tweak the log processes, obviously.

...As others have pointed out, these are the kind of requisite warfighting skills that we are neither training for nor learning-by-doing.

WR to 'training for' makes one wonder what the Divisions here in the states are up to. Getting ready for the next trip, yeah -- but the staffs are certainly more than large enough to do multi-tasking...

[ODB]

I would like to know the counsels thoughts on the lack of divisional control in the current fight? Could this be part of the many battlespace issues? The last I checked the Army's structure is in such a way that no one directly leads more than 4 men. For this we will look at a divisions structure, CG has how many direct subordinates? A fire team leader has how many direct subordinates? In theatre today what is the structure? Who really answers to who from the BCT level up? Then throw into the mix how many direct subordinates does the BCT commander have? IMO if your going to bump the BCT commander to a 1 star then he should have 2 full birds below him (kinda like a division). I cannot believe I just said that!!!!! Additionally then we must bump my SF brothers as well. (Officers and enlisted) Unfortunately in todays politically correct Army many will only deal with you if your of certain rank.

I have to ask this here. Why are units not training thier basic (conventional) tasks during their non-deployment time? This past off rotation for us we went back to the basics. Started with weapons, every weapons system in our MTOE was trained and shot (pistols to 81 mm mortars), day and night. Then we went and did basic FM 7-8 battle drill live fires. Imagine that an SF team doing movement to contact, through the woods day and night. Somewhere along the way we had leaders realize we were getting away from training the basics and needed to get back to it. As I look at the multitude of problems that ones are griping about my question is what are they doing to fix it? Why are they not doing their, wait here it comes, METL tasks? I gather by what is being said, we have thrown out our METL tasks and are doing our own thing? I understand repeat rotations, but I'm sorry if we can do it in six months between rotations why can't it be done in 12 months? Before someone says we have more resources and money, one might want to know that every piece of land here except 1 training area (for an entire SF group) has been given to the BCTs. Any training we want to conduct at home station we have to beg, borrow, and grease the palms of the BCTs. Figure that one out!

Maybe I am to simple minded and naive to look at this and that is why I think the way I do, but then again maybe others are too quick to not take the hard road. Yes I love family time and down time, but I love my life and my brothers lives even more. It is our job to train and be prepared for whatever is required of us. If this means a few more days or weeks away from the family then that is what it is. That is what we are paid (not enough) to do and what is expected of us. Man how I wish I could be SMA for a day!!!