Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
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A better argument was put to me today by COL Mansoor - make the guard/reserve the HIC force and keep the active force for COIN in the immediate term. Since we face no imminent HIC threat, ARNG formations should act as our strategic HIC reserve while the active force handles Iraq/Afghanistan in the coming years. Would be more in line with the likelihood of employment and better suited to current strengths.

I'm not sure I like either argument though.
emotional arguments for not doing things -- no matter how logical...

I've long (over 30 years) said that a 500K Army should have four Corps (+); each of about eight big 4-5K man Bdes (NO Divisions). One Heavy Corps (that concentrates on training itself plus the two to four more in the ArNG AND the USAR [The ArNG with all the cbt units was a political deal that should be scrubbed, it harms national flexibility and doesn't really do the Guard that big a favor]), two Infantry Corps and one Light Infantry Corps (+ six Parachute Bdes; Eur, Pac and CONUS. Inefficient but strategic entry reach provided no other way at this time). Yes, there is a difference between Infantry and light Infantry -- and the light can include Airmobile even if I don't agree with the concept. If we just have to have a Medium Corps, then scratch the light (and the Airmobile). Only makes sense to tailor the active force for what it must do and put to be needed strength in the RC; we'll likely have more than adequate time to change the structure if the hybrid war period of insability settles down in ten or twenty years.

So give COL Mansoor an Attaboy from me.

Oh, and I agreed with the rest of your comment, too...

P.S

The plus in my idea is five active and five RC ACRs...