Force Structure for Small Wars

[SWJED]

Force Structure for Small Wars by Andrew C. Pavord, Small Wars Journal

Since 9/11 the armed forces of the United States have paid a steep price to acquire proficiency in counterinsurgency operations. After going through a painful learning process the Army and Marines published the now acclaimed counterinsurgency manual and implemented a new approach in Iraq that is delivering impressive results. It is now a logical time to consider how to redesign combat units to reflect these lessons and prepare for the small wars of the future.

This article will argue that counterinsurgency brigades should be added to the U.S. Army's force structure. Lacking forces specially trained and equipped for counterinsurgency, the Army has fought the war on terror with conventional units adapted to counterinsurgency operations. For most units, the transition from conventional organization and tactics to the very different and challenging tasks of counterinsurgency was traumatic. The costs of poor organization for counterinsurgency, in terms of battlefield mistakes and the misallocation of resources, were substantial. To provide the optimal force for fighting insurgencies the Army should develop Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) that are specifically organized, equipped, and trained for the complex challenges of counterinsurgency operations...

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Pavord serves in the Virginia Army National Guard. His deployments include Desert Storm as the assistant operations officer of the 372nd Military Police Battalion, Bosnia as Chief of Plans for the 29th Infantry Division, and Afghanistan as Executive Officer of the 3-116 Infantry battalion. He earned a Ph.D in political science from Johns Hopkins University in 1995.

[Cavguy]

I see a few observations here -

First, just because we didn't do well in the past doesn't mean we won't do the same in the future. I don't buy his argument that we will abandon COIN following Iraq/Afghanistan - we don't have the Cold War to run back to. Not that there isn't a risk, but it's unlikely.

Second, I don't get his last recommendation about moving the COIN mission to the Reserve Components.

COIN is by default a long (years long) process. How can the reserve component handle the long deployments implicit in his recommendation? Secondly, there is zero evidence to suggest RC units are better at COIN - I can attest to some experience that they were in many ways worse at COIN. (Plenty of stones to be thrown all around though)

A better argument was put to me today by COL Mansoor - make the guard/reserve the HIC force and keep the active force for COIN in the immediate term. Since we face no imminent HIC threat, ARNG formations should act as our strategic HIC reserve while the active force handles Iraq/Afghanistan in the coming years. Would be more in line with the likelihood of employment and better suited to current strengths.

I'm not sure I like either argument though.

[Ken White]

...
A better argument was put to me today by COL Mansoor - make the guard/reserve the HIC force and keep the active force for COIN in the immediate term. Since we face no imminent HIC threat, ARNG formations should act as our strategic HIC reserve while the active force handles Iraq/Afghanistan in the coming years. Would be more in line with the likelihood of employment and better suited to current strengths.

I'm not sure I like either argument though.

emotional arguments for not doing things -- no matter how logical...

I've long (over 30 years) said that a 500K Army should have four Corps (+); each of about eight big 4-5K man Bdes (NO Divisions). One Heavy Corps (that concentrates on training itself plus the two to four more in the ArNG AND the USAR [The ArNG with all the cbt units was a political deal that should be scrubbed, it harms national flexibility and doesn't really do the Guard that big a favor]), two Infantry Corps and one Light Infantry Corps (+ six Parachute Bdes; Eur, Pac and CONUS. Inefficient but strategic entry reach provided no other way at this time). Yes, there is a difference between Infantry and light Infantry -- and the light can include Airmobile even if I don't agree with the concept. If we just have to have a Medium Corps, then scratch the light (and the Airmobile). Only makes sense to tailor the active force for what it must do and put to be needed strength in the RC; we'll likely have more than adequate time to change the structure if the hybrid war period of insability settles down in ten or twenty years.

So give COL Mansoor an Attaboy from me.

Oh, and I agreed with the rest of your comment, too...

P.S

The plus in my idea is five active and five RC ACRs...

[Ski]

Numerous interesting comments and thoughts here"

1. RC should not be focused on COIN specifically and neither should the Army. The COIN mission is one measure in decades, not years. While recruting and retention for the ARNG is still high and growing, multiple tours guarantee the slow degradation of the force (something the AC is living with right now).

2. Most importantly, stop creating and changing force structure. It's my biggest pet peeve. Being in the military is hard enough, and creating new organizations just adds to the complexity of the job. Just deploy off the MTOE, attach some medium/heavy truck companies, or create fleets of MRAP's/HMWVV's in theater to fall in on (we've done that already). Commanders and personnel should not have to worry about inactivating and activating when they are back in CONUS or home station. The wars are hard enough - stop adding unneeded complexity into the situation. Like Ken said - wait until a lull, and then change it if needs to be changed.

3. As Field Marshall Nigel Bagnell stated, "over the centuries identifying a nation's future strategic priorities has proved to be a very imprecise art, and as a result peacetime force structures have seldom proved relevant when put to the test of war."

4. The cultural differences between the AC and RC MUST be overcome and at the Major and below level, I truly believe this is the case. The old men and dinosaurs with institutional biases and grudges must pass into oblivion in order to reach the full potential of the entire Army.

5. Shifting combat structure from the USAR to the ARNG to the USAR continues to focus on the wrong problem. Just keep the structure stabilized for a while. Using combat structure out of any reserve component has significant political pressure and risks.

6. The ARNG will never get the HIC mission or the bulk of the heavy forces because the Army uses tank miles to formulate it's OPTEMPO budget. Too much money comes into the AC from this account for them to give it up outright. I think the concept has a lot of merit - I'd use III Corps as the HIC operational reserve, create an ARNG Heavy Corps (2 Divisions+ of HBCT's left) for a strategtic reserve, and use the ARNG IBCT's as an operational force to be used in the Middle East for COIN/SECFOR missions. But again, follow the money...HQDA will never let the bulk of Heavy Forces move into the RC...

Just a few thoughts from an admittedly addled mind...

[AGBrina]

I believe that the U.S. Military had figured out very well how to balance the need for counter-insurgency specialists and conventional combat forces. By the end of the Vietnam era, the Army returned to the concept of the Ranger Battalion, to be used as a more robust supplement to Special Forces. The Special Operations Wings of the Air Force -composed of EC-130s, AC-130s, CH-53s, and a souped-up version of the "Hueys"- offered potent and flexible tactical air and airlift support. Add to these forces an airborne infantry brigade (173d); and the U.S. had a potent unconventional warfare force capable of addressing a wide array of "small war" insurgencies.

Such organizations would be ideally suited for Afghanistan, where there is (at least, there was) plenty of local support for a force aimed at containing and repelling the Taliban.

By themselves, however, counter-insurgency forces would find it impossible to prevail (in fact, unlikely to survive) in Iraq. The U.S.has undertaken to invade and conquer, and to brutally subjugate a people unwilling to accept defeat and occupation. There, a lot of boots on the ground were needed, in order to discourage the greatest percentage of the population from resisting, and to convince them that resistance to the invader was futile. The Americans didn't have the number of conventional troops to do that, in a manner similar to the Soviets in Hungary ('56) or Czeckoslavakia ('68).

Iraq is not counter-insurgency; it is population control! There, we are fighting disaffected segments of a population which is trying to gain independence There, we are quelling a rebellion by the people against foreign occupation, in a manner much like the Israelis are using against the Palestinians. Our success depends upon targeted assassinations, building walls to isolate populations, and pitting one ethnic grouping against another. I would not dignify such tactics by including them in the sphere of "counter-insurgency".

Fighting regular army units of the North Vietnamese Army was more like fighting the Japanese in Burma than fighting Moros in Mindinao. (In the case of I Corps near the DMZ, the battle was more like fighting the Chinese in Korea 1952-53 or the Japanese in the Philippines 1944-45.) That's conventional warfare in rough terrain, where U.S. conventional forces were more suitable than light infantry Rangers or Special Forces-led paramilitary units.

[Cavguy]

I believe that the U.S. Military had figured out very well how to balance the need for counter-insurgency specialists and conventional combat forces. By the end of the Vietnam era, the Army returned to the concept of the Ranger Battalion, to be used as a more robust supplement to Special Forces. The Special Operations Wings of the Air Force -composed of EC-130s, AC-130s, CH-53s, and a souped-up version of the "Hueys"- offered potent and flexible tactical air and airlift support. Add to these forces an airborne infantry brigade (173d); and the U.S. had a potent unconventional warfare force capable of addressing a wide array of "small war" insurgencies.

Interesting assertion. I Am interested as to when this formation was employed in conflict, and validated in counterinsurgency, and what made it superior for that kind of environment. I am unaware of the above formation ever having been employed. Further, how would this unit be able to perform counterinsurgency (by default, getting involved with the people) over such a broad area? As a counetrguerrilla force, you may have an argument, but not counterinsurgency. Two very different missions.

Such organizations would be ideally suited for Afghanistan, where there is (at least, there was) plenty of local support for a force aimed at containing and repelling the Taliban.

Basis for this statement please.

By themselves, however, counter-insurgency forces would find it impossible to prevail (in fact, unlikely to survive) in Iraq. The U.S.has undertaken to invade and conquer, and to brutally subjugate a people unwilling to accept defeat and occupation. There, a lot of boots on the ground were needed, in order to discourage the greatest percentage of the population from resisting, and to convince them that resistance to the invader was futile. The Americans didn't have the number of conventional troops to do that, in a manner similar to the Soviets in Hungary ('56) or Czeckoslavakia ('68).

Ok, now you've gone off target. First, there ARE insurgencies in Iraq. There is a struggle against a legitimate elected government under a constitution. While I agree that some groups (Such as the 1920 Brigades) are purely anti-occupation, to distill the multiple issues in Iraq to such a silly analogy as Hungary of Czech portrays a profound ignorance of what is occuring in Iraq, which differs by province, sect, and other factors.

Iraq is not counter-insurgency; it is population control!

And since when is population control not a fundamental step in COIN? I belive Galula and Trinquier make that very clear.

Let's define COIN:

JP 1-02 and FM 3-24 state:

"Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). These definitions are a good starting point, but they do not properly highlight a key paradox: though insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been called revolutionary war or internal war, they are distinctly different types of operations. In addition, insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare."

There, we are fighting disaffected segments of a population which is trying to gain independence There, we are quelling a rebellion by the people against foreign occupation, in a manner much like the Israelis are using against the Palestinians. Our success depends upon targeted assassinations, building walls to isolate populations, and pitting one ethnic grouping against another. I would not dignify such tactics by including them in the sphere of "counter-insurgency".

This is pure tripe. While there are some elements, (mentioned earlier), there is no singular "rebellion" against occupation. What you have are various groups doing different things with different aims. Polls still show the majority of Iraqis are not for an immediate withdrawal of US Forces.

[Cavguy]

Only makes sense to tailor the active force for what it must do and put to be needed strength in the RC; we'll likely have more than adequate time to change the structure if the hybrid war period of insability settles down in ten or twenty years.

So give COL Mansoor an Attaboy from me.

Will tell him.

I still havent stopped thinking about what right should look like.

The whole argument is somewhat academic at the moment anyway. The number of BCT's engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan isn't dropping significantly anytime soon, so there's no slack in the active force to pull any off the line for HIC.

Given that the RC is our "strategic reserve" (morphed into operational reserve today), perhaps we should be training and equipping a Corps of RC for any potential HIC threats.

As I said, still mulling it over.

[Ski]

ARFORGEN does not help the situation either. If you take X amount of units out of the cycle to create a HIC strat reserve, you then speed up the cycle for the remaining units.

[Cavguy]

ARFORGEN does not help the situation either. If you take X amount of units out of the cycle to create a HIC strat reserve, you then speed up the cycle for the remaining units.

Exactly my point. Well said. Discussion is mostly academic for the next 2-3 years at least, for reasons above and several others. The recently redeployed reserve units are the best option for constituting a HIC reserve.

[Ken White]

Numerous interesting comments and thoughts here"

1. RC should not be focused on COIN specifically and neither should the Army. The COIN mission is one measure in decades, not years...

Agree with the first part. not so much with the second. Is that historical length of time due to the types of insurgencies and / or the way they were 'fought?' I don't think that decades are required.

2. Most importantly, stop creating and changing force structure. It's my biggest pet peeve...Like Ken said - wait until a lull, and then change it if needs to be changed.

True. I watched one unit in the TN ArNG go from a Tank Co to a Chemical Co to a Truck Co -- in the space of four years. While I understand we hired all these civilian 'Force Developers' and they have to do something for job justification, we've gotten ridiculous. Any force structure change ought to be locked in five year increments; miss a window and wait five more years -- with only rare exceptions. That said, I think we need not wait for a lull -- because the system will never allow one to avoid change...

3. As Field Marshall Nigel Bagnell stated, "over the centuries identifying a nation's future strategic priorities has proved to be a very imprecise art, and as a result peacetime force structures have seldom proved relevant when put to the test of war."

Also true -- and that's why it makes sense to put the heavy stuff in the RC.

4. The cultural differences between the AC and RC MUST be overcome and at the Major and below level...

True, prob is on both sides of the fence, just as it is with conventional vs. SOF.

5. Shifting combat structure from the USAR to the ARNG to the USAR continues to focus on the wrong problem. Just keep the structure stabilized for a while. Using combat structure out of any reserve component has significant political pressure and risks.

True but in many circumstances, use of the USAR is better for several reasons than is using the Guard.

6. The ARNG will never get the HIC mission or the bulk of the heavy forces because the Army uses tank miles to formulate it's OPTEMPO budget.

True on the OPTEMPO today but wasn't true in the past and need not be the way it's done. On the possibility of such a shift you may be correct but I submit the reaction is far more emotional than logical.

... Too much money comes into the AC from this account for them to give it up outright...

That, too is by design -- and designs can be changed.

...HQDA will never let the bulk of Heavy Forces move into the RC...

Possibly true. A question for Congress to ask is "Why not?" --and they should demand a logical answer that does NOT rely on todays arcane and foolish budget and allotment processes.

Just a few thoughts from an admittedly addled mind...

My mind is more addled than yours, so there!

[Ski]

Cavguy - the ARNG only has 7 HBCT's left, so the allocation for deployments are limited when looking at the current requirements versus future requirements. Of course, the ARNG could grow back to the 34 BCT's it had three years ago.

Ken

Now you are getting into the true ugliness of it all. Reforming the budgetting "system" and the allocation process will take nothing less than Congressional input, oversight and the capability to crack skulls when required.

Don't understand why you are focusing on the USAR so much - they have zero combat arms capability at present minus a single IN BN and single ATK AV BN. Would take a long time to reconstitute these units from cadre status...2-4 years is my guess. I always hear why using the USAR is better, but never the reasons why - please educate...

As an ARNG armor officer, I would love to see additional growth in HBCT's in the Guard. I just don't expect this'll happen because of too many rice bowls being shattered

[Ken White]

Exactly my point. Well said. Discussion is mostly academic for the next 2-3 years at least, for reasons above and several others. The recently redeployed reserve units are the best option for constituting a HIC reserve.

is unlikely; we've got aside from the obvious two theater problem a Roles and Missions review (and IMO this sub thread should be a big part of that discussion) and an upcoming QDR.

However, given the 18 month lag time in the Army's bureaucratic decision cycle (unless it's important to one of the Pachyderms), seems like the time to start discussing it is now...

My belief is that the Roles and Missions review and the QDR should provide the Army some guidance for the future and that the Army then needs to focus on, in order; the flawed personnel system, the flawed training system -- and then on the optimum, logical force structure; all the other stuff will flow from those three items.

There are those who will say I've got it backwards, the first two items I listed flow from the third. Don't think so. The current personnel system was designed to support a type Army (the pre 1940 model). It has had bandaids applied and a random tweak now and then but it is effectively totally obsolete and non responsive to the needs of the Army and the nation. It is in dire need of total redesign and that design needs to focus on providing effective personnel operations and support to what ever the Army of the day happens to look like...

Almost the same thing could be said of training; we have a pre 1940 system with grafts and patches. Most other Armies of any real use provide almost twice the training to new entrants that we do. Why is that? I have been embarrassed many times by US Officers and NCOs who didn't know as much as Brit, Canadian, German and Oz peons. Fix the training and the troops will cope with whatever force structure we throw at them.

ArNG and Reserve force structure needs less change; the Active force can endure change and fight a war at the same time. We did that in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and we're doing it today. Doesn't make life easier but it can be handled. Be even easier with a functional Personnel system and better training.

[Norfolk]

My belief is that the Roles and Missions review and the QDR should provide the Army some guidance for the future and that the Army then needs to focus on, in order; the flawed personnel system, the flawed training system -- and then on the optimum, logical force structure; all the other stuff will flow from those three items.

There are those who will say I've got it backwards, the first two items I listed flow from the third. Don't think so. The current personnel system was designed to support a type Army (the pre 1940 model). It has had bandaids applied and a random tweak now and then but it is effectively totally obsolete and non responsive to the needs of the Army and the nation. It is in dire need of total redesign and that design needs to focus on providing effective personnel operations and support to what ever the Army of the day happens to look like...

Almost the same thing could be said of training; we have a pre 1940 system with grafts and patches. Most other Armies of any real use provide almost twice the training to new entrants that we do. Why is that? I have been embarrassed many times by US Officers and NCOs who didn't know as much as Brit, Canadian, German and Oz peons. Fix the training and the troops will cope with whatever force structure we throw at them.

ArNG and Reserve force structure needs less change; the Active force can endure change and fight a war at the same time. We did that in WW II, Korea, Viet Nam and we're doing it today. Doesn't make life easier but it can be handled. Be even easier with a functional Personnel system and better training.

Very much agreed on these points, and would be in no position to dispute them anyway. That said, if the HIC role was mostly transferred to the RC, just how long would it take to bring said Heavy forces up to snuff in MCO? Six months? That seems like just painting a big red bull's eye on said forces prior to dispatching them to the war zone. A year? If that were sufficient for a basic grounding in MCO, how could one ensure that the major war they were to be dispatched to would still be ongoing, or even if ongoing, still in a phase in which a major intervention would lead to victory? And, just to throw a monkey in the wrench (as this is most unlikely, but I'm drawing it to try to make a point), suppose an RC HIC force was pitted against a force of near-equal, equal, or even superior fighting quality?

The latter event, as I said, is most unlikely, but it is instructive to ponder the problems that Allied forces faced when fighting an enemy that was, for the most part, still its superior in quality, though in the midst of a precipitous decline in said quality, largely due to the sheer weight of losses suffered in operations in the East. Combined-arms MCO is the most unlikely form of warfare that will have to be faced during the foreseeable future, but it is by far the most difficult to prepare for and to master. It takes not months, not a few years, but several years at least to fully come to grips with, not just "passably", but with real proficiency. The RC manoeuvre brigades sent to ODS did not go into battle, and for good reason. Even with the six months' "grace" period that the Coalition was gifted with by the Iraqis, the RC combat brigades were not up to the job. Arguably, some of the AC units were not fully up to the job, either. Good thing the Iraqis were not up to the job at all.

I fear that there is a tendency in many quarters to overestimate the MCO proficiency of many "Top Tier" Armies, and to underestimate the difficulties of achieving real and thorough proficiency in those regards. It may be that HIC forces - especially Armoured Corps - are not required to make up as much of a proportion of the Active force structure as during the Cold War. One AC Heavy Corps may well be enough. But "Medium" Corps, composed in the main of regular (not Light) Infantry Formations may be more suitable to make up the bulk of the AC force structure, as they can perform in LIC and MIC with barely skipping a beat (if properly led and trained), won't break the procurement budget, and are best suited to most of the tasks that the Army is likely to face anyway. "Light" forces are probably best restricted to dedicated Parachute and Mountain formations, for the most part, and of course SF.

But all that force structure is predicated in the main upon holding to the highest levels of leadership and training. And not least, the substantial reduction of present overeseas committments. Three "Medium" Corps (along the lines of what Ken seems to be describing), a single Heavy Corps, and several Parachute and Mountain Formations (there seems little reason, other than training funds of course, for Parachute and Mountain units and formations to not be of the same quality as Ranger Battalions); Airmobile can be handled just fine by regular Infantry Formations, when the need to perform such operations arises.

[Ken White]

... if the HIC role was mostly transferred to the RC, just how long would it take to bring said Heavy forces up to snuff in MCO? Six months?

Many variables but basically using today's training methods, from 120 days to 180. With improved training, it could be done pretty well in 90 to 120. With improved and realistic training (not likely, due to a high a casualty rate) in 60 to 90 days.

...just to throw a monkey in the wrench (as this is most unlikely, but I'm drawing it to try to make a point), suppose an RC HIC force was pitted against a force of near-equal, equal, or even superior fighting quality?

Probably the same thing that would happen if an active HIC force ran into such an opponent -- all other things being equal they'd get whupped.

... It takes not months, not a few years, but several years at least to fully come to grips with, not just "passably", but with real proficiency.

Disagree -- it takes years in peacetime the way most of us now train, in wartime in CONUS, months. Actually in war, it takes weeks to a month or so, individual dependent (see Hoffmeister, B).

...The RC manoeuvre brigades sent to ODS did not go into battle, and for good reason. Even with the six months' "grace" period that the Coalition was gifted with by the Iraqis, the RC combat brigades were not up to the job.

Having been directly involved in that fiasco, I regret to say you're incorrect -- the decision not to send them was a dumb political decision by the then CofSA and the DCSOPS at DA -- who famously said "Not in my Army..." The 48th Mech Bde got a Go from the NTC the day before the cease fire -- DA refused to certify them for deployment (a statutory requirement to preclude your concern of unready RC units in theaters) on the basis "the war's over." They were deployment capable and would've done okay -- not great but okay. The Army simply did not want that to happen so it did not (per Ski above and peacetime money flow issues; recall that to this day, the Pentagon has not been at war since 1945).

...composed in the main of regular (not Light) Infantry Formations may be more suitable to make up the bulk of the AC force structure, as they can perform in LIC and MIC with barely skipping a beat (if properly led and trained), won't break the procurement budget, and are best suited to most of the tasks that the Army is likely to face anyway. "Light" forces are probably best restricted to dedicated Parachute and Mountain formations, for the most part, and of course SF.

Agreed

...(there seems little reason, other than training funds of course, for Parachute and Mountain units and formations to not be of the same quality as Ranger Battalions); Airmobile can be handled just fine by regular Infantry Formations, when the need to perform such operations arises.

True dat.

[Ski]

Must also pile on about the Desert Storm fiasco. The 48th Brigade was ready to go, and was held up at NTC by the HQDA leadership. Even now there is great reluctance to use ARNG BCT's as "COIN" units, and the 5 BCT's we send to OIF/OEF every year are assigned ####ty SECFOR missions that the AC does not want to get involved in...

As far as creating a RC based HIC Corps - it would take about 90-120 days (if resourced properly) to get them up to speed. Remember that the American Army's Reserve Component has far more combat experience that any other Active Army in the world - minus the UK, Canada, Australia and possibly France. You can argue about what kind of experience they've learned, but just being exposed to the elephant counts a great deal against a force that has not seen combat.

I really like the idea of creating a HIC Corps+ based around III Corps and then the 7 ARNG HBCT's. Keep them out of the misama's of Iraq and Afghanistan at all costs - start flowing the resources into the ARNG so they only take 90 days to get out the door (not hard to do, I've built models with my brethren at FORSCOM and 1st Army that shows it can be done). You now have a mailed fist capable of counterattacking any state based enemy such as Iran, NK, etc...

[ipopescu]

3. As Field Marshall Nigel Bagnell stated, "over the centuries identifying a nation's future strategic priorities has proved to be a very imprecise art, and as a result peacetime force structures have seldom proved relevant when put to the test of war."

I began reading this 2001 book on defense budgets and force structure, Holding the Line, edited by Cindy Williams (currently at MIT, formerly in a high-level position at the Congressional Budget Office.) It is a compilation of the conventional wisdom regarding defense planning for the 2000-2010 period as it was viewed at that time. It seems so incredibly dated, hard to believe it's merely a decade old: the main worry was that the coming 4 trillion budget surplus may mean defense spending would rise over the 2000 level of $300 billion that DoD anticipated for the next five years. The military was said to be worried that in addition to being able to sustain one conventional Major Theater War AND multiple "lesser contingencies" (stability and peacekeeping operations, you know, stuff that doesn't require much attention in terms of dedicated resources), it may not have enough available forces for a SECOND conventional Major Theater War. No talk whatsoever of CT or COIN or irregular warfare, although the contributors (civilian and military professionals alike) proclaim with certitude that they are offering the solutions to move the military form Cold War structure to what's required in the 21st century. The recommendations suggested further cuts in structure, on the grounds that we only really need to win one MTW and do lesser interventions (by which I take to mean everything that's not MTW), so the capabilities for a potential second war could be eliminated. And our "likely" adversaries are so weak that we would surely have some overmatch left anyway, given our technological supremacy.

Thinking about how people who are kind of doing studying and writing about this stuff for a living could be proven so "wrong" (if that's the right word) over such a short period of time, I was left with a renewed appreciation for humbleness and flexibility in all efforts to design the "necessary" forces for coming wars. I fully understand why Ski and Ken talk about too much "creating and changing force structure." Constant reform and adaptation are obviously needed as threats evolve and enemies change, but I'm almost coming to believe that there are some hidden virtues in the much-maligned bureaucratic resistance to changing the way the military works.

[Cavguy]

I began reading this 2001 book on defense budgets and force structure, Holding the Line, edited by Cindy Williams (currently at MIT, formerly in a high-level position at the Congressional Budget Office.) It is a compilation of the conventional wisdom regarding defense planning for the 2000-2010 period as it was viewed at that time.

She also wrote a series of op-eds in the 2000-2001 period that argued the military was overpaid in benefits.

The non-military security studies academics has a terrible track record of their theories panning out. Wolfowitz and Feith are but two examples on the other end of the spectrum.

The fact that the whole community (who gave birth to RAND) sprung up to wargame nuclear war should add suspicion.

Of course, I'm currently enrolled in a graduate security studies program!

[SteveMetz]

I began reading this 2001 book on defense budgets and force structure, Holding the Line, edited by Cindy Williams (currently at MIT, formerly in a high-level position at the Congressional Budget Office.) It is a compilation of the conventional wisdom regarding defense planning for the 2000-2010 period as it was viewed at that time. It seems so incredibly dated, hard to believe it's merely a decade old: the main worry was that the coming 4 trillion budget surplus may mean defense spending would rise over the 2000 level of $300 billion that DoD anticipated for the next five years. The military was said to be worried that in addition to being able to sustain one conventional Major Theater War AND multiple "lesser contingencies" (stability and peacekeeping operations, you know, stuff that doesn't require much attention in terms of dedicated resources), it may not have enough available forces for a SECOND conventional Major Theater War. No talk whatsoever of CT or COIN or irregular warfare, although the contributors (civilian and military professionals alike) proclaim with certitude that they are offering the solutions to move the military form Cold War structure to what's required in the 21st century. The recommendations suggested further cuts in structure, on the grounds that we only really need to win one MTW and do lesser interventions (by which I take to mean everything that's not MTW), so the capabilities for a potential second war could be eliminated. And our "likely" adversaries are so weak that we would surely have some overmatch left anyway, given our technological supremacy.

Thinking about how people who are kind of doing studying and writing about this stuff for a living could be proven so "wrong" (if that's the right word) over such a short period of time, I was left with a renewed appreciation for humbleness and flexibility in all efforts to design the "necessary" forces for coming wars. I fully understand why Ski and Ken talk about too much "creating and changing force structure." Constant reform and adaptation are obviously needed as threats evolve and enemies change, but I'm almost coming to believe that there are some hidden virtues in the much-maligned bureaucratic resistance to changing the way the military works.

I think there is general agreement that we have a means/ends mismatch in our current defense strategy. But there are always two solutions to such a mismatch: increase your means or diminish your ends. That's the shape the debate is taking now.

I thought the contours were pretty clear at the Heritage Foundation symposium earlier that week that SECDEF addressed on Tuesday morning. One school of thought (led by Heritage and AEI) is that we need a significant increase in the defense budget for about a decade to recapitalize. People like former Senator Jim Talent at Heritage advocate 4% of GDP. People like Toim Donnelly at AEI also support a significant force size increase.

The other argument (expressed very powerfully by Chris Preble of the Cato Institute at the Heritage symposium) is that we need to diminish our commitments. Chris contends that the bulk of our defense spending is actually defending other nations that could well afford to pay for their own security rather than defending Americans. The Stanley Foundation policy brief that Frank Hoffman and I did last year, while not as extreme as the Cato position, also argued that we need to be more circumspect in what we plan and budget for. Specifically, we took issue with the scenarios that are used to justify a force increase post-Iraq and Afghanistan such as the occupation and stabilization of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, or something similar. Frank and I were not sanguine about the threat from terrorist bases in distant lands or uncontrolled nuclear weapons. We just didn't think that long term occupation and attempted social and political re-engineering of flawed states is the most effective way to address these threats.

Basically, we could build a 5 million person force, and missions would emerge to occupy them. What we need to ask ourselves is whether, in this time of mounting economic, environmental, and social challenges, we really want to underwrite the security of other nations who spend much less than we do on their own defense (and I mean on a per capita basis, not in the aggregate).

[Andy Pavord]

I have been out of town so I am a little late to the party. I would like to respond to a couple of points made.

I do not adovocate transferring the COIN mission to the Guard. I suggested that the infantry brigades in the Guard should be transformed to specialize in COIN. I would also like to see a few COIN BCTs on the active force complemented by some Guard COIN BCTs. I am not sure how many. the exact number could be determined by a strategic analysis of the potential need.

My main argument is that COIN and its variants are a specialized form of warfare. The tactics and techniques required to excel in COIN can be best developed in units that specialize in COIN. I therefore believe that the Army should develop a force of COIN BCTs in both the active and the reserve components. However, because of the uncertain nature of the threats that we face I would keep this COIN force structure relatively small. It should be big enough to ensure that tactics and techniques can be developed and tested and yet not so big that it detracts from the regular BCTs. Many politicans are supporting the idea of expanding the army. I would propse that some of this expansion could be devoted to COIN BCTs.

COIN BCTs could serve as the spearhead of the initial phase of either a stabilization campaign (after the high intensity fighting has defeated enemy regular forces) or of a counterinsurgency campaign. They could be allocated to the most critical part of the theater while regular BCTs take on the less critical areas. As the campaign continues, Guard BCTs could be deployed to replace active units.

Break to new subject:

I do not think that we can transfer the HIC mission to the Guard. HIC requires the ability to synchronize very complex systems under very demanding conditions. This takes an incredible amount of practice through high level collective training. Much more practice than Guard units can achieve in the time alloted during a normal drill year. Guard units can get there after mobilization, but it takes time. The nation needs HIC forces that can respond rapidly. Desert Shield is the case in point. I think that the case can be made that Guard units were ready by Feb 1991, but does anybody believe that Guard heavy units could have been deployed by Spt/Oct 1990? Guard heavy units are really part of the nation's strategic reserve. And given the unpredictable state of the world I think that we need them.

Break to the budget situation:

Our nation is going to run a deficit of over $500 billion dollars this year. The international capital markets will simply refuse to continue to fund our debt at this level. We will be forced to reduce spending in the near future. It is unrealistic to expect that defense will escape the budget reductions that are coming. No matter who is elected President, we should expect the defense budget to decrease significantly in the next few years.

The real question is how we will reduce defense spending. The most obvious place to start is Iraq. Shutting down America's particpation in the Iraq war would save lots of money. I am willing to bet that is where the politicians of both parties will start.

But leaving Iraq, even with its huge savings, will not be enough. We are really broke. So the Congress and the President will cut into the existing defense budget. That is where it gets interesting. All the Presidential candidates have promised to increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps. They will be reluctant to go back on those promises. They want to support our troops. So I bet they will go after our weapons and strategic programs. I am not sure if there are enough funds there to pay for the Army and Marine expansion, so they will look for other ways to cut. It will be really interesting to see what they come up with.

The hard truth is that America really has come up against its financial limitations. In the very near term, the capital markets will no longer buy American debt in the quantities required to sustain our defense spending at the current level. And that should scare us all.

[Ken White]

as we now operate but I suggest an AC HIC Corps for that rapid response and at least two ArNG / USAR HIC Corps are quite feasible IF we change the way we train. You say:

"...Guard heavy units are really part of the nation's strategic reserve. And given the unpredictable state of the world I think that we need them."

I agree -- and we need more in the RC than we have while the AC will most likely need less for the foreseeable future.

You also mentioned a strategic analysis of need. Good idea. Whether such an analysis could transcend the politics of either COIN units (doubtful IMO) or more HIC in the RC than the AC (possible, barely) remains to be seen.