New article on the CRC in the Washington Post today. Not much new in it, but I did find a link to the real S/CRS web site with a lot of good information on CRC, etc.
It's at: http://www.crs.state.gov/
By the way, I hinted at an upcoming event/action on S/CRS & CRC in an early post on this. This is apparently still in the works, but I don't know if or when it will happen. It's not my event. I just wanted to close the loop on that.
New article on the CRC in the Washington Post today. Not much new in it, but I did find a link to the real S/CRS web site with a lot of good information on CRC, etc.
It's at: http://www.crs.state.gov/
I had an uh oh moment when I read the following:
FEMA? Currently FEMA is run over by military law enforcement types rather than emergency managers and response types. If FEMA can't figure out the difference between fire hoses and bullets what do you think the chance an International version is going to do better?There's a job for you at the Civilian Response Corps, the State Department unit designed to deploy with or shortly after U.S. troops in world hot spots. The corps is designed to be a kind of international Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. officials said, an agency that would take charge of entities including local police, courts, the banking system and airports after states collapse or governments are defeated. President Bush's fiscal 2009 budget proposal allocates funds to expand what until now has been little more than a pilot project.
Unfortunately while they talk about "soft power" versus "guns and steel" they are implementing it as a form of military response."We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military," Gates said in a November speech. "Based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former director of CIA and now as secretary of defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use 'soft power' and for better integrating it with 'hard power.' "
Egads. As the NRF is moving it's way through the halls of inadequacy I'm amazed that what appeared to be a good idea is already being squished before it is born. I like the idea of a civilian response corps... Where are the civilians?
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
All,
I tagged this with the PRT discussion, but this work is evolving into an argument for a more robust PRT effort (more funding and more manpower) and supported by a Civilian Reserve Corps that is established within USAID, once USAID has been removed from the Department of State and actually given some teeth to do reconstruction / nation building in cooperation with DOD and DOS. Here's a quick run down:
I enlisted in the Army Reservists last year and have not looked back since. I am approaching my first deployment to Iraq and am aiming to finish this paper on the aspects of a Civilian Reserve Corps in support of the PRTs "underfunded and undermanned" effort within the next few weeks. I'm basing this on my observation that there are thousands of Americans (40,000 apply to the State Department every year for foreign service or civil service positions, but only 20% get picked up) who also want to do their part for their country in a non-military, non-peace corps, nation building capacity.
This is a long and ardous paper, but if anyone has any recommendations, I would greatly appreciate them!
Best,
PRT interest
Well, for better or for worse, the paper is done. Here are the conclusions I reach:
1. H.R. 1084 and S. 613 do much in beginning the framework for a CRC; however, stronger legislation is needed to insure that C/CRS has the coordination capabilities across 18 USG agencies
2. Funding, the fact that the administration requested about $240 million (up from $7 million in '07) suggests that they're taking a hard look at this, but...
3. More funding is necessary (as always). The Congressional Budget Office and Gary Russell (C/CRS) suggest that approximately $600 million is needed, with an appropriated $75 million per year after that based off a 4,250 Readiness Response Corps (ARC, SRC, and CRC).
4. I favor a more robust, stratified CRC. The currently legislation calls for 500 within a year following the passage of the law with an eventual goal of 2,000 private sector individuals who would sign up for 4 years and deploy for at least 1. I am trying to make the argument that there is a population of Americans out there who want to serve their country in a non-military capacity in Iraq or Afghanistan to assist in nation building. Using just those who apply to DOS every year: that's between 20,000-40,000.
5. As a former intern (DOS '05, who's already been cleared), it baffles me that there is no mechanism, similar to the Peace Corps, to engage a younger demographic, train and develop them for a future life of civil service. Again, modeled on a Peace Corps contract, but in augmentation of the PRT efforts, I have found numerous college degree holdoing, 22 - 50 yr old professionals who want to get involved, but just don't know how.
6. Therefore, I advocate double the number of the CRC to 4,000 with 1,000 slots reserved for training and developing the next generation of civil servants. I estimate (still working on this) that it would cost a couple hundred million more for a grand total of: $750 - 800 million.
7. This should take the strain off DOD, DOD civilians, and give the PRTs a recruiting pool to replace the 800 folks doing a hell of a job over there with qualified/experienced professionals.
8. There are many training venues: NDU, Navy Post Graduate School, FSI, and even the MCAC (3 week Civil Affairs course for mobilized reservists at Ft. Bragg). Even though the consensus is that a 20 week CA AIT is superior to a 3 week crash course, a more robust curriculum using these 4 sites can be established over the course of 4-5 months.
9. 1 year deployment + 5 months training
10. The CRC CANNOT be a function of the DOD. Even though the DOD has significant resources, the essense (Plato throwback) of the CRC is not military. It is soft power and therefore a function of the State Department. The prejudice against the DOD from NGO's both national and international is palpable.
11. Thus, there is a niche for a fully funded CRC in DOS under the C/CRS for long term and short term policy measures.
Thoughts?
Hey PRT interest,
Interesting conclusions. Thanks.
Nothing that more money or people can't fix, eh? I'm being a bit snide, but would be interested in seeing more attention played to inter-agency coordination issues. I know they're thorny, but they're real. Policy change helps, but it's more than that.
question - what happened with the USAID angle you mentioned in a previous post? Has that been deep-sixed?
Regarding number 5, I posted earlier about volunteers for peace. I wasn't aware it was so large and I don't know anything more than I posted, but it does seem like an attempt to mirror or replace the Peace Corps.
Regarding 10, has the CRC been recently proposed to be part of the DOD? I thought that was settled awhile ago.
not only the NGOs...
That's a serious comment by me, BTW. That really needs work -- and yes, I know DoD is a big part of any solution to that disconnect.
Also seriously; good points in your post. I'm not conversant enough with the details of the effort to make intelligent comments but the points you raise make sense to me.
PRT Interest,
If possible, could you share your paper? I'm interested in your discussion on the topic having spent some digital ink in the area myself.
A couple of quick comments on your conclusions.
First, soft power isn't the exclusive domain of the State Department. Soft Power, as it was envisioned sixty years ago before the "soft power", or "public diplomacy" for matter, was coined, was the domain of USG and was outside of the State Department's control. Your comment is common and endemic but also damaging and self-limiting. The belief that it's State's role is a manifestation of the last couple of decades.
Second, you mention ARC and SRC, but your conclusions focus on CRC. CRS is, by design and necessarily, a whole of USG coordinating body that provides a hub for mobilizing and tasking experienced and very capable professionals already on the USG payroll across the USG. Was this an oversight in your summary or do you intentionally focus more on the "temp help"?
Third, requirements today an into the forseeable future means personnel system changes and USG-wide departmental support for joint activities are required. This means a Goldwater-Nichols-style change to require cross-polination if you will, to the betterment of USG not only in foreign response but arguably domestic response as well. Have you looked at that?
Fourth, despite CRS objections to the Peace Corps analogy, I understand your concept despite its connotations. I suggest, as would CRS, using a descriptive model based on the National Guard instead. Regardless, you don't mention, which may be in your paper but absent from your summary, job and other protections NG personnel enjoy but haven't been worked out for CRC. Perhaps this is why you used the Peace Corps as an example, but many more qualified individuals will have jobs and families they need to think about and require knowing they'll have a job when they return from their deployment. NG has Soldier Sailor Relief Act / Servicemembers Relief Act. Do you propose anything for CRC?
Just my $0.05 (inflation and fuel surcharge).
-Matt
Again, this is a work in progress, so thank you so much for your feedback.
For this paper, I wanted to see if there was a "niche" capacity for a private sector (non-USG employee) CRC. Apparently, the ARC and SRC are only for USG interagency employees. Having studied the "evolution" of the IC and the NSC, I can see where much more needs to be done in terms of inter-agency coordination, command and control, etc... For now, that is a management issue that I don't even want to touch. Here I am concentrating on a concrete argument on behalf of a more robust, stratified CRC.
Regarding the DOD issue: apparently the only thing that is holding up S. 613 in the Senate is one Senator put a hold on it, which is a rule of the Senate that gives Senators the ability to delay debate of the issue on the floor. From mentions posted on this thread and from conversations with staffers in some of the committees relevant to this issue, that Senator believes a CRC is a function of the DOD, namely because DOD has the resources... However, the Congressional Budget Office seems to be confident that this legislation WILL pass by the end of the fiscal year. It probably will be snuck into the Defense spending bill so it will go through, but the big concern that it will be a poorly funded attempt and will ultimately flop...
Regarding the Peace Corps analogy, many others brought up the NG idea. The issue I have with it (again, I'm 24, so think young professionals) is that my generation loves to call the shots. They'll go, but on their terms, like a Peace Corps contract (2 years). But they have to be able to be deployed like the NG, so I guess, ya you're right, this needs to be more of a hybrid approach.
Unlike the PC, which throws you out in the middle of nowhere, members of the CRC could hypothetically add to a more robust PRT effort since it is "underfunded and understaffed" (HASC report). But where do you find them?
For starters, I'd go through the old DOS and DOD interns... These folks (yep, I'm one of them) have already been cleared and have obviously expressed some interest in serving their country. It just seems odd to me that the USG has spent time recruting, screening, selecting, clearing, training, and placing interns at high levels of government and then says "thanks." Or worse yet..."dear sir or madam either you don't have a master's degree or are not a US citizen" so you can't serve in the civil or foreign service. It is absolutely frustrating, and I wonder how many people have been turned off by that approach. Just getting a rejection letter from iraqjobs.gov or usajobs.gov takes at least 6 months and there is no clear indication why you are not selected for a position so you can improve the next time around. Now I fully understand that you don't want to throw novices at a serious situation like what the PRTs are facing; however, who is going to take the place of the 800working in Iraq now? They can't be there forever and it seems like the USG is scrambling to find "suitable" candidates.
So I am hoping that the idea of a more robust, stratified CRC will win over some thinkers. Instead of just 2,000 private sector members (first responders, city managers, etc...), I'd like to double that number to provide the PRTs with flexibility. This doubled number would include 1,000 mid-senior level private sector personnel and 1,000 entry-level slots. So there would be 3,000 mid-senior level private sector experienced members and 1,000 entry level to augment the 2,000 SRC (USG employees) and 250 ARC (USG employees) for a grand total of 6,250 members in a READINESS RESPONSE CORPS, which hopefully, can augment the PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS in the future...
Gotta run, but I'll address the other comments in my next post. Please by all means chew this logic apart. Thank you again for all your feedback.
Lastly, I'll figure out a way to make the paper available through the admin or whomever.
Best!
The common consensus was that USAID lacked the legislative and budgetary teeth to effectively deploy a CRC (right now that right belongs to the secretary of state who confers with the adminstrator of USAID, but I guess the CRC would be directly under the direction of the coordinator for reconstruction and stability).
The point here, again, is to work with what's already on the table with this subject.
The ethos behind it is that the USG HAS to look outside the USG to find the right manpower because it seems like everyone in the USG is tasked-out.
I guess the ideal CONTRACT one would sign would be a 4 year term with a 1 year deployment. So 4-5 months training and then 12 months overseas - 16-17 months active duty before returning to "Reserve" status and kept on retainer with a small monthly stipend similar to the DOD reserve system.
Hi PRT interest,
You might want to rethink how closely you are modelling it on he HR policies of the DOD reserve system. Part of he problem has been a systemic strain on reserve units being called up, so this may cause a problem with recruitment. I would suggest you look more at the Canadian reserve system and adopt something along those lines. The key differences are:
I would suggest that some HR policies along these lines would be more likely to get top notch people interested since, after their initial tour, they won't have their careers yanked apart by unexpected deployments.
- While you can be called up, active deployment is purely voluntary.
- You are paid a "wage" rate, not a retainer, and expected to "work" for X hours per month.
Also, since we are talking about primarily non-kinetic expertise, a large amount of that can be tapped via reach-back centres by people who do not wish to physically deploy.
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Why bother with building a voluntary system when Congress has the power to order a conscripted "civilian corps" into place? The Health Care Personnel Delivery System can serve as a model for expanding conscription to necessary civilian fields of expertise. People will certainly complain, of course, but that's not something that can't be solved by decent pay, a little bit of ribbon, or a medal. And heck, if they want to be political about it, the Democratic Congress can target rural townships because of the proclaimed patriotism of the right IOT to decimate the local political leadership of the Republican Party (tongue-in-cheek ).
When I am weaker than you, I ask you for freedom because that is according to your principles; when I am stronger than you, I take away your freedom because that is according to my principles. - Louis Veuillot
Dr. Tyrrell and American Pride,
Very good points. Apparently, the Italians and the New Zealand PRTs are "role models" according to the HASC report, and I've heard that the Candadians have a very effective mechanism for humanitarian/reconstruction/stability ops once deployed. I guess the key face that I'm basing this work on is:
-there is a "universe" (to use a campaign phrase) of Americans who want to deploy in a non-military capacity to assist the military in humanitarian, reconstuction, and stability operations, but they lack a mechanism to do so...
Now the Peace Corps brags about taking anyone 18-83 (it's on their website), and I actually went through Army BCT with a 42 year old grandmother (she was the best soldier in our company), so obviously I think a "voluntary" deployment system may work the best, but it also has to be open to a wide variety of people from entry level to senior managment (maybe not 83 years old, but I'd say 55 maybe older?).
How are the Aussies at this type of stuff? Namely, humanitarian/peace keeping missions? I've done some research in the policy behind them deploying to East Timor, but I don't really know the mechanism behind it.
Regards,
The paper will be finished hopefully soon. I am trying to make an economic argument that based on the past expeditures on COIN operations through just hard power that produces negotiable results, a better (less expensive) investment can be made on the soft power side vis-a-vis DOS, C/CRS, and a CRC...
To do so, (sigh) I'm looking at all sorts of COIN theory and trying to establish the following:
The less expensive, but more ruthless the COIN campaign (i.e. Rome and the Jews in 132 c.e.) the more effective. However, looking at the British experience in Malaysia and our recent successes in Iraq, it can be argued that tangible results are a direct product of utilizing a "joint command program" through both soft and hard power.
There is a ton written on the Brits being worried about how much the Boer War cost per week ($200 million in total according to the UK Defense Ministry, but I don't know if that's 1902 pounds or adjusted for inflation) actually in the NYT. Similarly, apparently the NYT is quoting that Iraq is costing the US $5,000 per second:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/op...23kristof.html
So, after all of that, I believe that there is no "inexpensive" solution to COIN strategy; however, an investment in soft power approaches catagorically does not lead to diminishing returns...
And I'm spent.
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