In response to Norfolk:

I think we need something heavier than Gendarme or Carbineri. I advocate a motorized infantry formation capable of defeating platoon or company (-) insurgent concentrations.

I do not agree that COIN is the "apprentice" level of war. If it were so easy why are we having so much difficulty with it? We were not able to master it in Vietnam in 64/65 or in Iraq in 03/04.

I do not know if COIN or HIC is more difficult. I do know that they are different. At the Soldier level, many of the tasks are very similar. I would also agree that an attack on a fortified position is a more difficult operation than a cordon and search. However, COIN adds the "police" element and policing is hard. It also adds information operations, political analysis, economic development, etc.

At the battalion staff level the differences are stark. The type of staff functions performed in COIN are radically different than those performed in HIC. For the S2 terain and target analysis is very different from analyzing insurgent networks. For the S3, planning a deliberate attack is very different than planning patrols and coordinating them with information operations. For the S4, supplying a battalion in contact is very different than operating log support for a FOB and supporting reconstruction efforts.

I believe that our force structure needs to recognize these differences. We need a relatively small force that can specialize in COIN in order to develop the tactics and techniques of COIN to their highest level.