Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
You also have to put Atlee's comments in the context of their times. There was a very real fear (brought on by some of the reactions to aerial bombardment during World war I and the writings of Douhet et.al.) that air power could easily break the will of the people to continue fighting. That fear played into the hands of those who also wanted to see social breakdown just around the corner (another outgrowth of WW I and the Bolshevik coup in Russia...not to mention the virtual anarchy that played out in Germany).
Sure, although those fears were much higher in the Twenties (especially in Britain, were Sir Henry Wilson and many other soldiers and politicians thought revolution was right around the corner).

Was it likely that German attacks on population centers could bring about the result feared by Atlee? No. There are far too many counter-examples out there (Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo). But was his fear real given the context of his times (in other words...was it real to him)? Sure. No one knew what air power could or couldn't do in 1940.
Yes, that's what I found interesting about this, that it runs counter to every other example of strategic bombing, which seems to strengthen the will of the bombed nation. But both Germany and Japan, I would think, had a more homogeneous and unified population, partly due to totalitarianism.

The reviewer did say something along the lines of "every evaluation at the time found that a serious breakdown in public order in the East End was only narrowly averted." It's this attempt (completely unconsciously by the Germans) to use strategic bombing to exploit pre-existing social divisions that stands out. It would make for great counter-factual history if nothing else.