CSIS 4 Oct 06 update to a report most of have read before:

Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job?
...The effort to create effective Iraqi military, national security, and police forces is marginally more successful than Iraq political and economic efforts, but scarcely the level of success the US planned even at the beginning of 2005.

• Ministry of Defense: Still very much a work in progress. Poorly organized, divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, poor planning and fiscal control capability, problems with corruption.

• The regular army, air force, and navy (130,000 claimed to be operational; real number unknown): Army (128,230 men) merging as a real force at the infantry battalion level with some light mechanized and armored elements. Beginning to emerge as real divisions and brigades, although many headquarters, command and control, combat and service support, logistic and
intelligence elements are missing or having little capability. The regular Iraqi military still cannot operate without massive MNF-I support, embedded US and other coalition advisory teams, and largely US mechanized infantry, rmor, artillery, fixed and rotary wing air support, air mobility, and logistic and service support, Air Force (740 men) is at best a small cadre of forces with token reconnaissance and air transport capability. Navy (1,130 men) is slowly emerging as capable of carrying out own patrol missions, but is severely limited in operational capability with little real support capability.

Efforts that say the regular Iraqi forces are taking the lead, and that turnover command to Iraqi forces are not cosmetic. The regular military and some paramilitary National Police units are making real progress – although most units are severely undermanned, have critical problems in officer and NCO quality and leadership, are too lightly equipped and poorly facilitized, and many are Shi’ite or Kurdish dominated.

Iraqi forces will, however, be highly dependent on US and other MNF-I support well into 2008, and probably through 2010. Only a truly radical improvement in political conciliation could reduce this dependence, and the present drift towards added civil conflict could sharply increase it.

• Ministry of Interior: Still very much a work in progress and lags behind the MoD in capability. Poorly organized, with elements more loyal to Shi’ite and Kurdish parties than nation. Poor planning and fiscal control capability, serious problems with corruption.

• The National Police (24,400 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number unknown): Some elements have been properly reorganized and are as effective as regular army units. Most still present problems in terms of both loyalty and effectiveness. Still are some ties to Shi’ite and Kurdish militias. A number of units have critical problems in officer and NCO quality and
leadership, are too lightly equipped and poorly facilitized

• Other MOI Forces (27,510 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number unknown): Most elements, like the Border Police, are just acquiring proper training and have only light equipment and poor facilities. Some elements are capable in undemanding missions. Most are underpaid,
underequipped, badly-led, and corrupt. Many are poorly facilitized.

• The Regular Police (120,190 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number probably under 100,000): Underpaid, underequipped, badly-led, and corrupt. Many will not fight or act if face a local threat. Desertion and absence rates high. Generally only function where security exists for
other reasons, or are tied to sectarian, ethnic, and tribal forces. Many are poorly facilitized.

The problems in the “trained and equipped police” forces are compounded by large number of locally recruited “police” and security forces loyal to local leaders and sectarian and ethnic factions. Various sectarian and ethnic militias are the real “police” in many areas.

• Facilities Protection Force, Pipeline Protection Force, and other limited security forces: Underpaid, underequipped, badly-led, and corrupt. Generally only function where security exists for other reasons, or are tied to sectarian, ethnic, and tribal forces.

The US and MNF-I plans that called for Iraqi forces to allow significant Coalition troop reductions in 2006 have failed, and the so-called “year of the police” has barely begun and will at best gather momentum in 2007. Real-world Iraqi dependence on the present scale of US and allied military support and advisory efforts will continue well into 2008 at the earliest and probably to 2010. Major US and allied troop reductions need to be put on hold indefinitely.

The only way to avoid this continuing dependence on the US and other outside power without greatly increasing the risk of a major civil war, and collapse of the Iraqi force development effort, would be a level of political conciliation so great as to fundamentally undermine the insurgency and end the drift towards civil war....