If you assume that the ideal COIN company would have to:
*be able to defend itself against any reasonable threat for a limited period
*be able to match the enemy's mobility over rough terrain for extended periods
*be able to bring to bear selected 'non-military' expertise as required
*possess superlative reconnaissance skills
then I believe the organizational question (number of men, number of sub-units, types of weapons, etc) becomes almost trivial. The real questions become:
*How do I retain those things which give me an edge in combat (dominant firepower, night vision, better communications, etc) while remaining agile enough to outmaneuver or pursue the enemy?
*What required skills can be imparted to infantrymen in a reasonable amount of time, and which will have to be provided from outside the unit?
Solutions generally fall into three areas: training, technology, and logistics.
The training bit is not easy, but it is simple. We have more than enough experience and historical example to compile the specialized skills that would come in handy for your typical COIN effort. Some of these could be 'organic' to the unit (simple tracking, interrogation, or forensic techniques, for example). Others, such as civil engineering, contracting, language, would probably have to be provided by either experts in the headquarters squad, attachments, or reachback.
I'm not a big believer in technological solutions, but technology is our big advantage in the asymmetric fight, and needs to be exploited in COIN. The danger is in projecting too far out - "all we need is cold fusion in a thimble to make this work" - but we don't need to go all "Starship Troopers". Lighter, better batteries, for instance, or more bandwidth, or a reliable translation program, are all within reach.
All this ties into logistics. We are still woefully roadbound. In Iraq this is less of a problem than it is in Afghanistan. Frankly, I don't have any solutions in my back pocket or I'd share them. The fact is, once our infantry jumps off the helicopter they almost immediately become immobile compared to the enemy we face. The only way we can force him to fight is to surround him or surprise him. The latter seems to be inordinately difficult, while the latter requires more troops than we have avaialable. So solving the problem of how to keep the boys in batteries, water, food, and ammo, without tying them to helicopter landing zones or putting 120 pounds on their backs, seems to me a much more important issue than any question of organization.
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