It did some things that needed doing, no question but as is true of anything of that magnitude, it carried unintended consequences; too many, I believe. While no one can think of everything, in my observation big omnibus laws and government reorganizations on a massive scale almost invariably introduce more problems than they solve (witness the DNI and DHS).

G-N gave too much power to the CJCS (who, luck of the draw, may or may not be up to the job. As we have seen... ) and allowed DoD to both deliberately and inadvertently become the point man for the USG overseas -- that is NOT a good thing, among other things because it badly skews both interagency relationships and funding.

My fear is that a civilian agency variant in an attempt to foster better interagency cooperation would create another layer of bureaucracy and do as much or more harm than good. The partisan division in Congress at this time would have a terrible impact on what was done.

Today, the problem with getting interagency cooperation is partly the power of the Executive being diluted by Congress who will react to things like the AFGE and the AFSA disagreeing with directives; the Intel community and others fighting turf battles behind the scenes (not always... ); and other such borderline criminal foolishness. As an aside, anyone who thinks the Bush 43 Presidency has been one massive executive power grab obviously wasn't around when FDR was in town. Point is that outside an existential threat like WW II, partisan bickering and foiling political opponents while raking in $$$ for the districts is far more important to most in Congress than is the good of the United States or supporting and defending the Constitution. Not that the Executive is error free, they aren't but most of the problems trace to Congress and the way it does business.

The other factors impeding that cooperation are structural -- with a Federal structure and (compared to many nations) little government direct involvement in most activities, we do not have agencies with the size and depth to do much in other nations -- partly agency specific cultural and mostly turf oriented. Congress fosters and encourages both those factors; the former by some on ideological grounds, the latter by most because it gives said Congroids power -- all they have to do is pick up the phone and suggest something, hinting of a fund or program blockage and every Agency in the USG falls over its feet trying to comply. Sad business.

It's all about partisanship, egos and $$$

Contrary to what some here will tell you, I'm too young to have gone to Haiti or Nicaragua with Smedley and Herman but I'm old enough to have talked to guys that went and their forays, in their day, were routinely press-bashed and railed against in Congress. Point of that is I think the cost benefit ratio discrepancy in Afghanistan and Iraq is more a matter of scale than anything else. I also think that a few years from now it'll look like a far better deal.