A Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats:
An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency
In the early 20th Century the debacle of Gallipoli convinced many
military theorists that amphibious operations were impossibly difficult
and inherently doomed to failure. Assessing the nature of the anticipated
conflict in the Pacific, the Marine Corps concluded that the United States
could not afford the luxury of avoiding that which was incredibly
difficult. Rather than avoiding the problem, the Navy-Marine Corps
team attacked it. The result was a Tentative Manual for Landing
Operations published in 1934.
Acknowledging that there was still much
to learn, this manual would be refined through numerous exercises and
experiences until 1940.
This document provided a common framework
for further exploration and refinement of the tactics, techniques and
procedures that would be creatively—and successfully—applied on a
global scale.
Today we face a similar situation in regard to irregular threats. The
problems associated with countering irregular threats are complex,
dynamic, and daunting. Their solutions require a long-term,
comprehensive approach in the application of the instruments of
national power and influence. While we are naturally predisposed
toward quick and decisive conflict resolution, our conventional military
preeminence virtually guarantees adversaries will resort to irregular
means. The Marine Corps must attack these problems in partnership
with the joint and interagency communities and our multinational allies.
Marines must approach counterinsurgency prepared to combat armed
adversaries as well as influencing the environment through the use of
information, humanitarian aid, economic advice and a boost toward
good governance. This pamphlet provides insights into a Marine Corps
Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats. It is
intended to
stimulate innovation and creativity in preparing for, designing, and
executing operations against future security challenges.
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