The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[selil]

I was waiting for someone to ask him what an "indian police officer" was. Transgender I understand, but transethnic?

Try being a blond, blue eyed, pale skinned former Marine working on an Indian reservation. It was one of the most fun, rewarding, awesome jobs I've ever had.

[Norfolk]

I'll get a sock and make a Kilcullen puppet if that would help. It might look like Lambchop, but we'll just have to work through that.

Steve, I'm the resident sock puppet on these boards. Certain members just pull the strings on certain threads, and I respond instaneously, no act of free will on my part necessary.

Ron: I don't listen to Paul Harvey anymore, or his son. Back in the day he was great to listen to, but nowadays his show has just gotten strange at times.

JJackson:

I too rather wonder about that. That said, how independent or autonomous of tribal sheiks or other local leadership are these small groups, or at least how susceptible/vulnerable to persuasion/coercion are they? If these minor groups are or can be brought under the more or less sway of tribal or other local leaders, then perhaps the Hydra can be restrained, sort of, depending of course upon the circumstances of said leaders. Especially with regards to their access to, or at least freedom from, centralized political power.

[soldiernolongeriniraq]

"Excellent points! But I am hurt that you felt you had to tell me a Glock is handgun!! I carry a Model 27 (the subcompact .40)"

Sorry, Steve. When I sat next to you on the panel at Colorado Springs, I didn't notice the telltale bulge of a Model 27.

If I see you again, I'll pad you down first!

C

[120mm]

Excellent points! But I am hurt that you felt you had to tell me a Glock is handgun!! I carry a Model 27 (the subcompact .40)

A Glock in leather? Tres gauche!!!!

[SteveMetz]

A Glock in leather? Tres gauche!!!!

I own about a dozen holsters in every material but fighter pilot skin. I like that shoulder holster for when I'm deep in the woods flyfishing since I wear waders with a belt.

[Tom Odom]

I own about a dozen holsters in every material but fighter pilot skin. I like that shoulder holster for when I'm deep in the woods flyfishing since I wear waders with a belt.

them must be tuff flies...

wadda ya use for the fish?

[SteveMetz]

them must be tuff flies...

wadda ya use for the fish?

I prefer a dry Adams with a C4 trailer

[Shek]

In the New Yorker article written by George Packer "Knowing The Enemy", Dr. Killcullen refers to a list he made of the sources of information available to the Vietnamense villager in 1966 (10, 5 of which the government controlled) vs. the Afghan villager in 2006 (25, 5 of which the government controlled). I've looked through some of his papers and presentations and haven't come across these lists spelled out. Does anyone have these lists? Thanks.

[Onion]

I wonder if Dr. Kilcullen has read Bernard B. Fall's Street Without Joy

[120mm]

Important parts of the Roman Imperial road network are still operative today (or at least the routes those Roman roads first followed). This re-emphasizes my point that if the road network is important enough to the economy/economic well being of the people, they will do a lot to defend/maintain it on their own.

My wife and I spent November 2007 driving around southwest Spain, including a trip to Gibralter, where we drove on some of those roads.

Plus, our house in Germany was just north of the Limes, where there are still roads, walls and a couple of Roman fortifications still standing, or reproduced.

[J Wolfsberger]

Can We Defeat the Taliban? from from The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.

(I didn't find any other posts referencing either the book or the article.)

[Cavguy]

Can We Defeat the Taliban? from from The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.

(I didn't find any other posts referencing either the book or the article.)

I'm in the midst of the book. Kilcullen is as always a good writer, and unloads on the Bush administration execution of GWOT as alienating many who did not need to be alienated, at least not all at the same time.

Some good and timely insights, but my initial impression this is a book that will not stand the test of time simply because it is rooted in the specific political issues of today. I'll reserve judgment to the end though.

[William F. Owen]

Having known David back when he was a serving Lt Col, and finding him an eminently sensible young chap, I have been very worried about some of things attributed to him, and the COIN poster boy image, some built for him. However, I found this which I think accurately portrays his actual contribution and the critical fact that everything we know about insurgencies we have know for a very long time.

I don't agree with all he says, but he is mostly correct, which is more than good enough and shows the benefit of studying military history and doing the research.

...and more here.

[davidbfpo]

Wilf,

Next week David Kilcullen is in London, talking at his book launch at IISS and I plan to be there. The more I listen and read the more I am impressed.

davidbfpo

[MCalvin]

CNAS hosted Kilcullen last month to discuss his book with David Ignatius. Video of the discussion is available here.

I agree with davidbfpo. Kilcullen's explanation of the four-part cycle of an insurgency with both local and global components, along with his explanation of the "accidental guerrilla" syndrome, seem to me the most comprehensive and well-developed and relevant extension of classical counterinsurgency theory that I've come across. I've only ever studied it from an academic perspective and have never been a practitioner (so my perspective is highly limited), but his use of experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere seems to add strong support to his arguments.

I found his short discussion on lexicon in the beginning of the book valuable as well. He describes why he chooses to use the term takfiri, as opposed to salafi or others, to refer to the hard-core of ideologically driven enemies that we are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Worth the short read (pages xviii-xix)

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

that comes from being a little bit outside the system and the ability to say things that everybody's thinking...” from the Charlie Rose interview.

Having attended events to hear him speak on several occasions and being fortunate enough to interact with him socially, I believe that Kilcullen's greatest advantage is that he is plain spoken (mad props to someone who at a HASC hearing uses the term “kick their asses”), typically calls things the way he sees them, does not come off as a pretentious know-it-all, is careful in his proposals in that they may or may not work, and and is not protecting a career.

@ Mcalvin: totally agree, if one reads nothing more of his book, the intro alone should provide one with plenty of food for thought.

[Cavguy]

Chapter 2 on "full spectrum COIN" in Afghanistan is worth the price of the book alone, in my view.

[SWJED]

Chapter 2 on "full spectrum COIN" in Afghanistan is worth the price of the book alone, in my view.

ditto.

[goesh]

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/...7133284.column

- mere opinion, but there always seems to be an assumption that with leadership attrition, the replacements that step up somehow bring with them talent and capability equal to the decedents, that power vacums and voids are almost instantly filled and few beats are skipped. I would say there are accidental geurrillas with capable commanders and those without. If our strategic interest is truly longitudinal, then let the drones fly.

[davidbfpo]

Kilcullen gave a very relaxed talk at IISS, with all his books being sold and this was his second talk that day (the other was at Chatham House). His comments on the strategic decisions in the GWOT were stimulating; those on five times as many accountants in the DoD that State's FSO were telling and some snippets dropped in, e.g. Arab oil is really Shia oil. Or that Denmark was one of the best performing COIN in Afghanistan, as they had no COIN "baggage". That in Pakistan the focus should not be on the army, but the police and para-military forces. Now that would IMHO be a radical change.

Many here will know he is direct. When talking to a mainly UK audience regarding (USA and or Western) intervention and conclude: we know how to do it; should we do it?; engagement is a better option and it was best to stay out. I can hear Ken cheering and others.

So I'm looking forward to reading the book.

da