U.S. Still Waiting For Iraqi Forces To 'Stand Up'

[Mondor]

It is awfully hard to stand up a unit of any kind if you do not have people, both in leadership and rank and file positions, deserting on a large scale. It is expected that large numbers of Iraq police and military units will desert when they go home on leave. While large scale desertions are crippling to any unit they hit new units harder as there is no official or unofficial cadre that can take in new replacements and bring them up to speed.
Until the desertion issue is solved it will be near impossible to build effective units.

Having said that, it must be realized that large scale desertion is merely a single symptom of the overall condition. As Arthur Speyer pointed out in his SWJ Oct 2006 article Disarming the Local Population “In Iraq, the first responsibility of every male is to protect his family”. I would hazard to venture that most of the Iraqi security force members have family situations that if one of our service members had the same family situation he would received an expedited hardship discharge so that he could go home and take care of his family.

We should empathize with the average Iraqi security force member. Let’s put ourselves in his shoes for just a moment.

1. You joined because there was no work and your family desperately needs the money.
2. You have inadequate equipment to do your job. (uniform shirt v. body armor, an AK with three mags v. an American’s minimum of seven mags and supporting arms, and no consistent logistic support or long term medical care)
3. Your leadership is as untrained as you are and possibly corrupt.
4. Your pay is late and or less than you thought it should be.
5. Your family is in physical danger specifically because you are a member of the security forces.
6. You feel you protect your family better from home than by fighting other Iraqis in some other part of the country.

How many of us would guarantee that we would not take an “extended” leave of absence in a similar situation? During the American Civil Way the South had a similar problem. During Sherman’s march to the sea large number of troops from the effected states left the army to take care of their families. It was not unusual for a junior member of the Confederate military to have enlisted two or even three times. He would simply discharge himself to take care of some family emergency/situation and then join up again to get back into the fight.

This is the classic chicken and egg quandary, which came first? In this case you need some measurable measure of stability in order to build professional military forces, but in order to gain that stability you need professional security forces. This was/is the case in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq. How we solve it remains to be seen, but my feeling is that it can only be solved by a major change in local attitudes which will change behaviors and local conditions.