Vietnam War Collection: books plus

[AGBrina]

If...If...If...If !!!

If the ports of Haiphong and Vinh Thinh had been closed by the U.S. Navy in 1965, and not left open until 1972....

If the B-52s had leveled North Vietnam's Transportation and Power Distribution networks in 1965, and not limited to low risk missions over South Vietneam and Laos until after the election of 1972....

If the U.S. Marines had been used as a mobile amphious force to interdict and destroy up and down the Vietnamese coastline, rather than to defend the DMZ....

But most of all...

If the Marxist-sympathizing and Democratically-controlled Congress had allocated just a fourth of the funds lavished on the Israelis in 1974 toward the South Vietnamese instead....

South Vietnam would have become as great a testament to American resolve as South Korea. The military which fought in Vietnam was better-prepared, better-supported, and better-led than the one which fought in Korea.

The Vietnamese War was not a "small war" either, although the typical battle was fought with company-sized units. At the Tet Offensive of 1968, General Weyand had 9 maneuver Divisions at his disposal. Colonel Rheault had almost 100,000 indigenous and Special Forces under his command. And the ARVN had over a million men.

The mistakes which affected the outcome of the war were not made at Khe Sanh or at MAAC-V. They were not made at the War College and certainly not at the Infantry School! They were made in the Oval Office, on Capital Hill and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

[Steve Blair]

If...If...If...If !!!

If the ports of Haiphong and Vinh Thinh had been closed by the U.S. Navy in 1965, and not left open until 1972....

If the B-52s had leveled North Vietnam's Transportation and Power Distribution networks in 1965, and not limited to low risk missions over South Vietneam and Laos until after the election of 1972....

If the U.S. Marines had been used as a mobile amphious force to interdict and destroy up and down the Vietnamese coastline, rather than to defend the DMZ....

Closing the ports that early wouldn't have made much difference, because the North wasn't engaged in a major conventional offensive (the rail routes from China were more significant during the early periods, as was the land route from Cambodian ports). Nor would bombing the transportation network, because there wasn't much of one to bomb and it wasn't being used heavily for the war effort at that time. It was different in 1972 because the North chose to launch a conventional offensive that required much more in the way of supplies than their earlier campaigns and thus exposed them to interdiction and airpower. Operations prior to the Easter Offensive used minimal supplies (an average of five truckloads per NVA DIVISION if memory serves), so there wasn't much to bomb.

The Marines would have been better used in the IV Corps CTZ where they could have focused on population security (and training ARVN in similar techniques). It just so happened that they were the first large US force deployed and once they got in I Corps CTZ they were more or less stuck there.

[William F. Owen]

This shows quite clearly in Westmoreland's lukewarm reception of intelligence provided by SOG teams working the Trail in Laos and (later) Cambodia. The same goes for at least parts of his staff as well. SOG had the potential to deliver incredible intelligence, but it was often wasted by people who didn't have a good understanding of what they had.

I concur to a degree. In the early days, the product delivered by OPS-35 was pretty variable, and only covered a very small AO. By 1968, B-52 strikes were being put in based on OPS-35 product.

...however, and I say this as a man with many friends who served in the OPS-35 Recon Teams, the role of the NSA in Laos (Angry Talker, and Polaris 2) has never really been researched. As far as I can tell, most of the targets run in 1969/70 were based on Angry Talker intercepts.

....Congress had allocated just a fourth of the funds lavished on the Israelis in 1974 toward the South Vietnamese instead....

What crippled ARVN was oil prices. Giving ARVN more equipment (which was what the IDF needed to replace 1973 losses - (and US support broke the will of Jordan and Egypt to continue by military means) ARVN just lacked training and mostly combat power across the board. Giving RVN more M113s and F4E's would not have altered the military outcome.

However, it would have saved Cambodia! - a nation truly betrayed by the US Congress and a few other people. I've never wanted to talk to Jane Fonda about Hanoi, but I would love to chat about Cambodia!

[Dayuhan]

If...If...If...If !!!

If the ports of Haiphong and Vinh Thinh had been closed by the U.S. Navy in 1965, and not left open until 1972....

If the B-52s had leveled North Vietnam's Transportation and Power Distribution networks in 1965, and not limited to low risk missions over South Vietneam and Laos until after the election of 1972....

If the U.S. Marines had been used as a mobile amphious force to interdict and destroy up and down the Vietnamese coastline, rather than to defend the DMZ....

But most of all...

If the Marxist-sympathizing and Democratically-controlled Congress had allocated just a fourth of the funds lavished on the Israelis in 1974 toward the South Vietnamese instead....

Here's an even bigger if... what about IF we'd actually listened to these rather prescient conclusions from 1951 (cited by jmm on another thread):

In October 1951, the student conclusions to their study of US policy in Southeast Asia were presented to the college. Although opinions were somewhat divided, a large majority opposed any major US involvement. The conclusions of the majority could be summarized as follows:

(1) The United States had probably made a serious mistake in agreeing with its allies to allow French power to be restored in Indochina. As a colonial power, France had done little to develop indigenous civilian and military leaders and civil servants in preparation for the countries' eventual independence.

(2) Indochina was of only secondary strategic importance to the United States. The economic and military value of Vietnam, the most important state in the region, was not impressive. Politically and socially, Vietnam was obviously entering an unstable period with uncertain consequences. In any event, it did not warrant the commitment of US forces to its defense.

(3) General war planning by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) envisioned a strategic defense in the Pacific, drawing the US forward defense line to include Japan, South Korea, and the offshore island chain (Okinawa-Taiwan-the Philippines). But in Southeast Asia, the line was drawn through the Isthmus of Kra on the mainland, excluding all of Indochina and most of Thailand. Thus, the Strait of Malacca and populous, richly endowed Indonesia were considered to be the prime strategic targets of the region.

(4) Militarily, the region in general and Vietnam in particular would be an extremely difficult operational area, especially for US forces. Unlike the relatively narrow Korean peninsula, Vietnam presented very long land and coastal borders that would be almost impossible to seal against infiltration and difficult to defend against overt military agression. Much of the region was covered with dense jungle and much was mountainous. Weather, terrain and geographic conformation combined to present formidable obstacles for military operations and logistic support.

(5) Politically and psychologically, the United States, if it were to become involved, would have to operate under severe disadvatages, for it would inherit the taint of European colonialism. The United States should not become involved in the area beyond providing materiel ["-iel", not "-ial"] military aid.

"US Policy in Southeast Asia". Reports of Student Committees #13-17 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: US Army War College, 1951), cited in Bruce Palmer Jr, The 25-Year War (1984) - with HT to Ken White for suggesting this book.

The bold portions are added by me, emphasis probably unnecessary. At least somebody was looking at the situation clearly. Pity nobody listened.

[Tukhachevskii]

There a chapter in Cold War Hot which basically applies Westmoreland's "plan" and posits a US victory. There's also an alternative COIN plan based upon Thompson's recommendations that leads to a US victory.

[Dayuhan]

There a chapter in Cold War Hot which basically applies Westmoreland's "plan" and posits a US victory. There's also an alternative COIN plan based upon Thompson's recommendations that leads to a US victory.

The realm of the hypothetical is a marvelously flexible place.

[Ken White]

Alternative history leads to really dangerous fantasies...

[Steve Blair]

As does cherry-picking historical analysis to find one opinion that you happen to agree with.... Especially these days, when every two-bit joker with a blogspot account is suddenly considered an expert...

[jmm99]

of Vietnam (about a decade after the fact) is found in his forward to Infantry Magazine (Garland), A Distant Challenge:

A Distant Challenge: The U.S. Infantryman in Vietnam, 1967-1972
Infantry Magazine
LTC Albert N. Garland, USA (Ret.)

Foreward

Indeed, history may judge that American aid to South Vietnam constituted one of man's more noble crusades, one that had less to do with the domino theory and a strategic interest for the United States than with the simple equation of a strong nation helping an aspiring nation to reach a point where it had some reasonable chance to achieve and keep a degree of freedom and humanv dignity. It remains a fact that few countries have ever engaged in such idealistic magnanimity; and no gain or attempted gain for human freedom can be discounted.

Although in the end a political default, it is now clearly evident that there was an ironic strategic dividend to our presence in Vietnam; namely the impact of the American military "holding the line" for ten years against communist pressures on Southeast Asia thus provided for the Asian countries (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) a shield and hence a breathing spell toward development of greater political matrurity and self confidence as nations. It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world.

William C. Westmoreland
April 1983

Leaving aside the rhetoric, GEN Westmoreland came to see Southeast Asia (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) as the prize, which Vietnam helped to preserve from communism.

PS: We won the Southeast Asian War Games.

Regards

Mike