I would argue that no one in the US military has a serious understanding of the effects the loss of control of the air would have on every service...
It would be like every war in history in which dominance had to be established on the field of battle rather than in garrison training. In most recent memory, it would be like WWII, where air superiority did not exist for the Allies, at least not in the beginning of the war.

The notion that superiority in one aspect of combat can exist and can be perpetuated ad infinitum is what is new. With respect to air power, it can likely be traced to the fact that since WWII the US has not had to face an opponent that had a creditable air capability.

On the other hand, one could look at the post-VN Army situation in Europe as an example of having to prepare for war as the inferior force. Ask any BNCO assigned to EUCOM in the 80s what it was like to wargame the Fulda Gap, and they'll tell you of the dismal prospects they faced in the event of a war there. Or ask an arty guy how he feels about the prospect of war against North Korea.

As we face a world where a) resources applied to the military are going to be increasingly restrained, and b) the picture of future war is increasingly murky, the Air Force argument that it must always maintain superiority through the application of unconstrained resources just can't work. To the extent that the firings of CSAF and SAF were related to an unchanged/ing attitude (as expressed by the request for more money for F-22s) as regards the USAF role in war reflects this fact.

There is going to have to be cultural adaptation in USAF to the fact that they will have to make more out of less, and that any future war will be a fight.

Regards,
Jill