I have avoided rejoining this thread because at some point it seems we evolve/devolve into an arcane discussion of semantics or we talk past each other.

I did, however, want to reframe the question of what we should be training/teaching our advisors, and the implications of some of the choices that have been made.

I will briefly recap some of considerations/constraints associated with the current advisor training mission (John Nagl correct me where I err).

1. MiTT TNG MSN @ Riley has approx 2 months to assemble, form, equip, and train each advisor team. This is not much time regardless the focus of the POI. (Note: Why only 60 days is explained earlier in the thread, but just accept it as a constraint for this discussion.)

2. Multiple sources (Theater and FORSCOM) provide authoritative guidance regarding directed/mandatory pre-deployment training requirements. Many tasks are basic Soldier skills. This is not inherently a bad thing since many MiTT members arrive at a low training level (the imbalance in training levels of incoming Soldiers creates risk and is being mitigated by including these tasks in each individuals pre-deployment training). Boring and redundant for some, critical for others

3. This leaves very little time to conduct "higher order" advisor training such as coordinating for joint fires and other US/Coalition capabilities, as well as, improving language, culture, and negotiation/influence skills. Couple this with the fact that not everyone is predisposed (personality and biases) to performing the advisor mission. At one point there was supposed to be an exercise early in the program to aid in identifying the ill-suited. I'm really curious as to the how many (on average) are identified and removed from the mission based on unwillingness/inability to adapt to advisor role.

4. John notes in an earlier post that his unit manning up to 13 MiTT alums out of 96 (an improvement but a far smaller % than was envisioned when FT Riley backbriefed its concept to FORSCOM in 2006).

So what is the crux of this issue....

Is it whether the mission is enduring?? The is an important question for the future, but in the short run I think we can surmise that actions to date indicate that MiTT is considered an economy of force mission (actions/resources speak louder than words).
Sidebar: I certainly concur that the IW/COIN operational theme is the most likely ground force environment we can expect for the next 20 years and that SFA is a proactive tool in that environment, but I remain skeptical that we are heading in that direction when the most compelling evidence is based on an outgoing SecDef's public comments as opposed to program decisions. Moving MiTT training to FT Polk is not an indication of an enduring mission, its just a recognition that FT Riley was going to get crowded and a new location was needed to support other programatic decisions.

Moving the mission to FT Polk to "leverage" "gain synergy" yada yada yada isn't significant either. If the training variable don't change, the outcomes are unlikely to improve.

I propose the real issue involves the training variable/equation...

60 training days +
extensive mandated pre-deployment training tasks +
shortage of experienced/qualified cadre =
advisor force that is less than it could be if resource allocation reflected rhetoric regarding priorities.

Then again... All the news I read reflects a significant improvement in IA and IP performance and proclamations of tne "near" strategic defeat of AQ in Iraq. Maybe what we are doing right now is perfectly adequate... if not perfect.

By the way the answer is.... four (Rodney Dangerfield in Back to School)

Live well and row