I saw most of the DP briefs that came out of the work group on where it would rest and why. They were of course .ppt deep and without the value of context from participating. However, Tom makes a great observation above. Moving the mission outside of a purely FORSCOM locale to a shared TRADOC and FORSCOM venue has some real value
- it puts us in a better position to close the instituional loop
Not so much... don't see how the move to Polk in any way enhances institutional support and development of advisor capability. Mission still belongs to FORSCOM and TRADOC remains in supporting train-the-trainer role for new cadre (upon request)
- it puts it a location where Advisro training can be integrated with units conducting their pre deployment MREs- perhaps even allowing som initial coordination that might better acheive unity of effort. It would also expose commanders and TTs to some of the frictions each other encounter before they head out the door. Everything from sustainment, to QRF.
This has some temporal value, in that a team (a small proportion of the total) get to "play" in the box with a BCT. That said the MiTT will know virtually nothing about what a MiTT really does -- hence BCT might learn wrong lessons. Value for MiTTs marginal same can be said for BCTs. Not to mention what about when IZ and AFG spool down, over the long term these are two separate activities competing for the same training space. Does Polk have the most to spare in the long run???
- if done right (and I have every reason to beleive the JRTC folks will do just that) it will help get after expectations management.
Just not sure, who's expectations? BCTs, MiTT members, DA Staff, press?? Why do we assume that Polk will somehow attract a qualified cadre?
- in terms of resources it places far more then we'll see at any purely FORSCOM post - no matter how good home station is I've never seen the avialabity of resources or quality of training you find at a CTC.
OK, but... what is it that we think is missing from the MiTT training today? My impression is that the shortcomings are more in line with language, culture, negotiatio/influence, nuts and bolts of how to teach and influence as opposed to a good training environment
-it may have changed, but my experience at JRTC was more focused on people then my experience at NTC - so while the physical terrain may favor NTC, the human terrain I think favors JRTC
Here we agree, at least partially... the shortfalls in advisor training have little to do with climatology or terrain... and everything to do with mindset and development of the skills mentioned above. Heck we can acclimate a team in theater. Knox is looking better
- In late 03 and early 04 I did NTC and JRTC almost back to back with 1/25th. JRTC provided a more rich experience in a number of relevant ways. NTC had its pluses as well, but looking back I favor the JRTC. While JRTC may have lots of scrub pine and forests, consider what the effects are on command. low visibility, poor comms, cover and concealment for ambushes etc. offer similiar challenges to those of built up areas in terms of fog and friction.
Again the shortfall isn't experience in a CTC rotation. OK JRTC gives better MRE just not pertinent to the topic
-we say it'll be hard to get quality folks to move down there, but let me ask what is one of the most sought after jobs for post company command? Its an OC at the CTCs. Where do most of your foot and motorized IN, as well as a growing number of other combat arms officers and SNCOs? JRTC. The question is not the location its relevancy. Make serving as an advisor instructor as valuable as an OC and they will go.
Agreed, but here is a caveat... this issue was identified early in the process by senior personnel. The question was whether to give key developmental credit to MiTT participation. The worry was whether it would be more of a deterent to the best volunteering since it would limit chances to get S3 XO time. Hence decision made to give credit but not consider KD for assignment purposes. Mixed message... Answer might be Advisor OC gets big ups in board deliberations, but Soldiers won't believe until they see the trends in board results (4 year lag). Only viable means to remedy in the interim is for assignment officers to play the bad guy in the near-term
Best, Rob
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