The Pakistan Army has always been psyched to believe that “one Pakistani is equal to ten Indians”.

This has been repeatedly debunked in all the wars fought between India and Pakistan.

While the outcome of wars is debatable, 1971 and 1965’s Battle of Assal Uttar (the physical graveyard of Patton tanks which were superior to anything India had) gave Pakistan no leeway to cover up their inadequacy at combat unlike the fact wherein Pakistan’s Operation Grand Slam is not discussed in history, military or otherwise or for that matter, any other debacle, not even the 1971 fiasco of their own making (except in general vague and defensive terms)!!

That apart, Musharraf has a chip on his shoulder. He is a Mohajir and hence non martial as per the British classification. And yet he was the COAS. In addition, he pipped Khatak (a blue blooded Pathan and a martial race man) to the post of COAS. He also had a personal grievance to settle. Gen. Zia chose Gen. Musharraf (then a Brigadier) in 1987 to command a newly-raised Special Services Group (SSG) base at Khapalu in the Siachen area. To please Gen. Zia, Gen. Musharraf with his SSG commandos launched an attack on an Indian post at Bilfond La in September, 1987, and was beaten back.

Therefore, Kargil.

Mujahideens were not used as a front. They were used as porters. The whole campaign of Pakistan was excellent so long as it was confined to the sand model discussions (sand table). As is wont with all Generals, the logistic aspect was given short shrift. That is where the Waterloo manifested. No re-supply, NO victory! No medevac, low morale! The diary of a Pakistani officer indicated that Allah alone was the panacea! That does not work in real life!

More later since I was there!