One of the consequences of both the Gulf War decision to call up RC personnel using derivative UICs and the subsequent Rumsfeld understaffed Army was to require the call up of all sorts of RC (USAR and NG) units - CA, CS, and CSS for multiple tours well beyond what they thought they were signing up for. Can you clarify?
Cheers
JohnT[/QUOTE]
JohnT
Agreed Gulf War I required the call up; per the Powell Doctrine that Ken loves so much
Gulf War 2 (OIF) required call ups but Rumsfeld view if a transformational military was built on the theory of short war. That means contractors. You supposedly did not have to disrupt the American life style and you could exercise greater executive control of foreign policy and military force. Remember all the hype about transformation in 2001 pre-9/11? It was all about projecting power quickly without any increase in actual force structure.
Where that "vision" (my use of quotes is plain sacarsm) failed was that there would be a need for repeated call ups of those forces on top of all those contractors. In other words, you paid both ways: you paid for high contract costs because you had stripped capacity to sustain the force from the actiual force and you still needed call ups for the long haul
Absolutely!From Ken:Thus my suggestion that we'd be better off trying to change the organizations and equipment to minimize the need for contractor support rather than trying to change human nature by executive diktat.
Tom
Bookmarks