Military Review, Jul-Aug 08: Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare
"It is evident,” remarked Secretary of War Elihu Root at the end of the Philippine War, “that the insurrection has been brought to an end both by making a war distressing and hopeless on the one hand and by making peace attractive.”1 Root’s appraisal holds true for much of the U.S. Army’s experience in waging irregular wars. Nevertheless, there remains much confusion over the roles that persuasion and coercion play in rebellions and other internal conflicts. Having recently concluded the second in a two-volume study on the U.S. Army’s experience in waging counterinsurgency warfare, I’d like to explore the relationship between force and politics by examining three conflicts that the United States Army was involved in during the 19th and 20th centuries: the War of the Rebellion (the U.S. Civil War, 1861-1865), the Philippine War (1899-1902), and the Vietnam War (1954-1975).....