I am not disputing the desirabilty of air superiority. However, a "one trick pony" is unlikely to win in the long run. At Poiters, Edward the Black Prince need a detachment of mounted forces to complete the victory and cover the archers when they ran out of arrows.
As to M1A2s in a movement to contact, I can see Hannibal's elephants at Zama being easily avoided by Scipio's flexibile formation; or Rommel's ability to be quickly establish local superiority against the British during Operations Battle Axe and Crusader but his inability to win due to logistics shortages; or more recently, the Israeli armored counterattack against dug-in Egyptians with AT-3s in the Sinai on 8 October 1973. And, during the same 1973 period, Egyptians with SA-7s remind me of what could happen to our A-10s and Apaches. Consider 11th AHR during its 23 Mar 2003 raid on the Medina Division:
The point I was making with my references to the British victories during the Hundred Years War is that technology, in and of itself is not decisive. The British won because of skilled leadership and tactics.Neither of the regiment’s battalions had any appreciable effect on the Medina Division before they withdrew in the face of withering ground fire, and they both suffered significant damage. All 30 Apaches were hit, with one battalion’s helicopters “[o]n average . . . sporting 15-20 bullet holes each.” One Apache was lost in action and its crew captured.http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG405.1.pdf
In 1940, the French Somua S35 and Hotchkiss H39 were probably at least as good as the German Mk I and II's and the British A9 and A10 cruisers were probably better--but Gamelin, Weygand and Lord Gort were no match for Guderian, von Manstein, von Rundstedt, et. al., and the Germans always seemed to have the numbers at the right time and place.
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