As a former Artilleryman (switched to MI this month), I agree that FA is in trouble as a branch. Officers, NCO's, and Soldiers are not universally pleased with non-standard ILO missions, but do them because that is their duty. We've lost a lot of the FA technical skills that are highly perishable. But does that mean all the branches are in trouble?

Our infantrymen and tanks are fighting as squads, platoons, and companies/troops, not as battalions/squadrons, brigades, and divisions; but in reality, squads and teams actually fight the war, so is this an overly bad thing? It may make higher level commanders rusty, but for the trigger puller who only sees the men to his left and right, the experience he is gaining in OIF/OEF is immense. Can anyone better attest to this?

This article points out that some units were fighting COIN before it became sexy and official. I drove around Iraq throughout 2006, and I never saw any Combat Outposts. A couple patrol bases, but not the forward presence we have now. We went many a convoy without seeing any US troops (other than the other convoys). If not original, "The Surge" changed the Army-wide mindset, and made it the new stategy. The data I read about IEDs on convoys shows that something new is working, as attacks are WAY down from my time there. That is a great thing, regardless of who gets credit for it.

From the article:
"Critics of this decision ought to ask themselves: If Abrams had chosen otherwise, would the ground phase of the 1991 Gulf War have been completed in four days? Would the 2003 drive to Baghdad have been accomplished in three weeks?"

Just some Monday morning quarterbacking, and in no way an insult to any of those Soldiers who fought in the invasion, but would we now trade a longer invasion for a shorter occupation? If Abrams had chosen otherwise, would there have been a plan B for after capturing Baghdad?