Interesting statement, and one worth discussing-The U.S. Army’s new strategy in Iraq—launched in February 2007, along with a surge of 25,000 additional American troops—qualifies neither as particularly new nor even as a strategy.
One way of expressing strategy is in ends, ways and means. Did any of these change? When did they change and why did they change? Did they change all at once, or over time? Were they explicit changes or implicit changes that became explicit over time. Was it a combination of bottom up changes that were codified into something else at the right time? Was it sausage? Does it matter?
I think over time we've gotten much more pragmatic about our ends, probably an acceptance of realism over idealism - meaning we'll settle for a more acceptable outcome vs. the ideal outcome. Again I emphasize that happened over time and that realization allowed us to adjust our expectations some.
With regards to "ways" I think those have also shifted over time. It was not an overnight shift, but it was codified in the MNF-I CDR's guidance I saw early in 2007, and that did have an effect. I believe it changed the way units approached their mission before they arrived vs. the 3-4 month adaptation curve I saw in previous units. It changed the subordinate commander's intent, and that changed the operational and tactical focus, and the allocation of resources - at least that is what I attribute s the cause - I say that after having asked several BCT and TF CDRs if it made a difference in the way they saw their key tasks - nothing new there - its doctrine. However, the codification of a change in guidance into the CDR's intent combined with other environmental factors - the increase in means (U.S. and Iraqi) and some misteps by the enemy facilitated a shift in "ways" on a scale that registered. Its not mono causal, but a CDR's understanding and intuition of when to shift operational focus is his responsibility - had it failed, had he erred in his judgment the CDR would certainly be held accountable.
An increase in troop end strength and an increase in funding is certainly a strategic increase in means. The decision to focus that increase primarily in MND-B is an operational increase in means - and it is also a change in ways. Baghdad was regarded as decisive for a number of reasons from credibility of the Iraqi government and our continued efforts (our domestic will) there, to countering the focus of enemy efforts, to providing the center of Iraqi government an air of increased security where political issues could be brought up and addressed in an environment that showed the potential for progress.
So if an expression of strategy is ends, ways and means, and one of those changed significantly, then did the strategy change? It may have been sausage over time, but we did not realize and codify it until about 2007. We hang the mark there for some good reasons.
WRT risk in Army capabilities and capacities - there is always risk. We cannot and should not count on policy to produce objectives that conform to the expectations for which we have spent the most $$ preparing. Its the other way around. Yes, we must be full spectrum, but in order to secure the policy objective with available resources we may be required to accept risk in other parts of the spectrum at various times. It is our job to point out those risks, but it is also our job to accept them (and mitigate where possible) once the policy objective has been decided.
Post policy objective I believe we will balance out - it will not be as before where we were absent a portion of the spectrum - we will and should move to account for those missing capabilities. As such we will not look as we did in 2000. We will and should be a bit different. We are working toward what we've always said we must do - provide ready and relevant land power, the operational environment has caused us to redefine some what is relevant to those types of conflicts we anticipate, and as such we are changing some to ensure our readiness to meet the challenges we may be called on in pursuit of policy.
Best, Rob
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