Fallujah

[Tom Odom]

Just a recent history lesson:

At 1600, TF 2-2 once again began its assault south. As Newell’s task force started its attack, 1 MAR DIV, adhering strictly to its SOP, ordered a communications security (COMSEC) change. Reynolds was adamant that, “both [he] and my staff (TOC battle crew-CPT Tom Mitchel and CPT Erik Krivda) attempted to work through RCT-7 to get the COMSEC change postponed until after the battle. A key lesson that I learned while being an OC (observer controller) at Fort Polk,” Reynolds stated, “was that one should never change COMSEC hours prior to or during an attack, unfortunately I learned it again, but this time in combat.”22 In the end, Newell and Reynolds made the decision to keep their task force on their old COMSEC until the current attack ended. The TF 2-2 TOC would relay messages to RCT-7.

This history lesson uses the Combat Studies Institute's Occasional Paper #20, Operation al-Fajr: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations, by Matt M. Matthews, as its center point. OP 20 centers on the role of 2 Army heavy task forces in the final battle for Fallujah, an operation largely regarded as a Marine fight. TFs 2-2 and 2-7 of the 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division played critical roles in the operations against fanatical resistance inside Fallujah. In the case of 2-2, the army battalion with its organic armor and firepower transformed from a supporting role to the main of effort of the Marines RCT-7.

I offer this paper for several reasons. As stated above, Fallujah was not just a Marine fight; it was a joint Marine-Army effort and needs to be seen as such. For those of us who have operated in a joint or combined role, the problems, their work arounds, and the successes enjoyed by the Marines and Soldiers in this fight should sound very familiar.

COMMUNICATIONS

C2 across service boundaries is never easy. Fallujah was no exception. Consider:

We would have liked to move the TOC . . . the problem was just connection with the Marine Corps. That was our big fear, that we would lose connectivity . . .We had a landline phone, not a TA-312, but we normally used it just as regular DSN (defense switched network) line. But the problem was that our version of that phone was a newer version and was not compatible with the Marine Corps’ version of the DSN phone. So, if we picked up the phone to talk to the G4 or the regimental 4, we couldn’t talk. So, we had to get a Marine Corps version of it and be tied in [to a] landline to the other Marine battalions and tied into the Marine regimental headquarters that way.

So, therefore, we were limited in how we could move. One other major difficulty identified in the TF 2-2 TOC was the Marines use of Microsoft Chat. Krivda reported: The other major factor was that they [RCT-7] used a Microsoft Chat to do a lot of their instant messaging, even between battalions, the regiment and division. In some aspects, it was really great, particularly for intel. We could get a lot of information fast; disseminate it, print and save it and a lot of spot reports, we could keep from different sectors, whether it was 1/3 or 1/8 Marines. So, we could inform our guys of what was going on. The problem was that the Marines have some kind of wireless capability that they could put [in] their TAC out north of Fallujah and still talk off the Internet laptop. We just didn’t have that capability. We had set up a satellite system that would tie in that way. It was mounted out of two Humvees, basically. We could mount it on a roof if we were in an abandoned building, and that’s where we basically stayed the whole time. The TAC could move back and forth but, again, with the majority of regimental communications not on FM traffic, it was on this instant messenger stuff; the regimental traffic was very quiet. So that was something that was difficult to keep up with. We did update a lot on FM, but a lot different than the Marines did. So we would take it off Blue Force Tracker and we would update it at the TOC and send it forward to the regiment. Or, every now and then, they would call or the regimental commander would come into sector and talk face to face with Lieutenant Colonel Newell.41

Communications regardless of means is an area of friction in any operation. If you have any doubts of that, ask any S-6. When we are looking at joint or combined operations, those standard problems rapidly multiply. The key as shown in this study is usually person-to-person coordination and communication between tactical leaders. By all indications in OP 20, commander-to-commander and staff-to-staff communications in this fight remained excellent even when the supporting communications means did not mesh.

HEAVY-LIGHT OPERATIONS

The fight Fallujah echoes many of the same problems we have seen in such operations. Notably Major Reynolds as indicated in the introduction remembered much of what he learned as an OC at the JRTC. To others it seems as if they were somewhat surprised by the difficulties and the benefits of true heavy-light cooperation on an urban battlefield. Consider:

I have a picture in mind of a tank parked next to a building; the tank commander is unwilling to get off his vehicle to go inside because it’s a pain in the butt and disconnects him from his crew. The infantryman inside the building is unwilling to go outside and stand on the tank to talk to the TC (mainly because he has never seen a tank this close and is scared to death he will shoot the cannon while he is standing there, but also because he would have to expose himself to small arms fire while he was out there). The end result is they stand 10 yards apart and yell at each other over the sounds of the fight and the whine of the tank engine.37

Although some (wrongly in my opinion) say that MOUT is an infantry centric mission, it is truly a combined arms fight. Many a battalion and brigade commander has learned that the hard way. Fallujah reemphasized that fundamental.

LEADERSHIP

In closing this introduction, I ask you to look at OP 20 from the leadership perspective. Marine or Army, officer or NCO, adaptive leadership played a large part in winning the fight for Fallujah. Matthews correctly points out that the Marine leaders went out of their way to make their Army comrades feel they were truly part of the team, especially in the planning effort. Where the leaders truly shone was when the planning ended and the fight began. Both Marine regiments had difficulty in their initial breaching efforts. Both Army TFs played significant roles in overcoming those difficulties. Neither Marine nor Army tactical leaders forgot their brothers-in-arms' contributions. Consider:

Shupp was convinced that TF 2-7 had performed magnificently in Fallujah, and was shocked that a popular book about the battle failed to mention their contributions and achievements. “It’s terrible,” Shupp stated, “because the true heroes of that fight were not mentioned. They’re all my sons, and 2-7 was incredible. No one can ever take that away from them. We could not have had that success if it wasn’t for that Army battalion: their mortars, their maintenance, their fighting capability inside that city.”

Best

Tom