Contractors Doing Combat Service Support is a Bad, Bad Idea

[Cavguy]

Sometimes it's a systemic problem, as in, there is not a system in place to deal with the folks outside the wire.

Can't disagree more. It's called LOGPAC. It is simply not possible (or wise) to supply a guy on the line to the same level that is possible in the rear. You can arbitrairly reduce what is available in the rear to the same level, but to what end? Also, rear areas are for refit. If you're talking about Transition Teams, they are a special case, and may be embedded far away from coalition largesse. Comes with the territory.

Same argument. You create a set of requirements and you incur a set of costs. Even if the system works as well as it can, should we be spending resources to run generators to maintain significant ice cream stores?

I agree that some of the level is a bit much, and could be reduced. But I disagree that it's an argument against using contractors or that soldiers should go back to pulling KP. All that requires is a re-write of the contract as to what food is provided. There are valid arguments against contractors, but in the end they provide the food requirement that is contracted for. That's not their fault, it's DoD's.

I understand that both needs - for together time and for privacy -- must be managed. My original response was to an example where only one side of the equation was potentially being addressed. Elsewhere, I've pointed out that one can use MREs and hot chow alternately, to give space when needed, and bring the group together when needed.

I still fail to see where you think cohesion has been impacted in the current environment by food issues. Where is the basis behind the assertion that there is a cohesion issue in the force due to either KBR chow or MRE's? Some examples so I understand where your position comes from?

As I've never said anything approaching what you describe in the last sentence, it seems rather unfair to characterize my position in that way. That being said, while it might not be the norm for the BN to get together for a meal, there is certainly a value to doing just that on occasion. Call it a Warrior Mess Night.

Which is done regularly by units, at the end of field exercises and our formal occasions.

I guess I am primairly confounded as to what is driving your problem assessment and some of the assertions that have been made, along Old Eagle's comment. It seems you have an opinion and are looking for evidence that fits it.

For example:

1) MRE's and KBR hurt unit cohesion because of lack of shared meals
2) There is no "system" for supplying the line with hot chow.
3) That it is reasonably possible, in the security environment, to provide equal access to services/chow for all soldiers, wherever stationed.
4) There is a leadership problem in the Army specifically regarding this
5) That using combat arms troopers in CSS roles provides benefits that outweigh the opportunity costs, and would preform at a level equal to or above those with the specific MOS
6) That our supply system leadership is wanting and requires combat arms guys to run it.
7) That having unequal access to service/chow measurably impacts combat force morale, and decreases performance of CSS types who do have access to it.

Each point can be argued, but you argue with enough vigor that I am curious to the data backing your arguments. My data comes from my experiences at varying levels in the army for 11 years.

2. Based on that, the gaps in the system concern me. You can shrug them off, and maybe it is personal to me, but I doubt that it was a one-off occurrence, and based on WHY it happened, it's liable to happen more in the future, and certainly in any future where we can't rely on getting most of our folks onto large bases.

We have plenty of MRE and UGR-A support, especially heat and serve. So there isn't a "gap", the army has solutions. I also want to know why MRE's are sustainable long term. We ate MMM and MMA for the first five months of OIF without health or nutrition issues. When it became possible, the larger DFACS were set up. Contracting is usually cheaper than the long term costs of carrying the infrastructure. However, I haven't seen a cost/benefit data from a reliable source comparing the cost to the Army (short and long) of reestablishing its food service corps to do what contractors are doing now. I'm prepared to be persuaded on the economic cost.

3. Given the COIN objectives in Iraq, and given what my research has suggested insofar as disparity between groups is concerned, we are doing ourselves a strategic disservice with some of these quality of life systems. I may be a fan of gastronomy for morale, but I know that the biggest morale boost comes from being mission effective.

Show me how having steak and lobster on large FOB's affects mission effectiveness? Again, I'm looking for evidence (not anecdote) that combat performance or service support has been affected because of having an abundance of food. Or that having Baskin Robbins in the DFAC with the CSS creates a decrease on the performance or morale of line troops. Some complaining about REMF's, maybe, but I'm talking measurable impact. You can make an entirely reasonable argument that large FOB's are not helpful in COIN from an attitude standpoint, but that is not what is being argued.

4. This is the least important, but I do wonder how it will play out -- what becomes of a treat, of a morale booster, if it becomes the norm? I AM NOT MAKING A COMPARISON, but this is the problem with spoiled children. Can we afford hyper-inflation of expectations? I also think there is a difference between feeding the troops well -- good, wholesome, healthy foods -- and giving them special treats. In that way both needs are met without blunting the edge of the gastronomy for morale tool.

No real disagreement here - but soldiers adapt. In 2003, we ate crappy food over and over for months. We got over it. We liked it when KBR became available. Yay. Combat effect as long as bellies were full = zero.

It was not that there was a problem of leadership in the supply and logistics system during the Revolutionary War. It was that it was being handled by the private sector, it wasn't working, and General Washington realized that the only way to make sure it did was to make it a military responsibility -- and as such, he wanted his best man in the job.

And that is different from my WR example how? Mostly contractors were failing their job, the military assigned to support was also failing, and the SecDef/Chief of Staff appointed a high quality combat leader to fix the issue. Also, we were creating an army from scratch then, so I think the comparison may be weak when infering the performance of KBR to the performance of the private revolutionary contractors. What I resented was the implication that our leaders are somehow not measuring up, and the constant barbs on the "quality of our leadership" as if it's some monolith. We have good and bad leaders, and I wouldn't say any of the above is representative of anything culturally relevant to the force. We have much bigger fish to fry than food sevice, IMO.