DO is dead, hail Enhanced Company Operations!
Last edited by Jedburgh; 06-26-2008 at 08:10 PM. Reason: Edited content, added link.
What is perhaps more interesting Fuchs, is the statement I remember reading about earlier that said the platoon was the smallest element for independent level operations.
I think that when the price tag came in for the gear required to outfit everyone in a DO fashion, it was simply too much.
I can believe a price tag -- but not in dollars...
Sure, there's a cost -- but the operative phrase was, as Fuchs pointed out "not comfortable with." That's partly a matter of trust, partly a matter of perception and tradition, partly (mostly?) a fear of what could go wrong. Anyway you slice it, it is, IMO, a regression. A really sad one I hate to see at that...
I think that anyone who said "the platoon was the smallest element for independent level operations" was stating their preference, not a fact. I'd also suggest that appears to me to be a very cautious, even over-cautious, approach to warfare.
Long ago on a galaxy far away, I worked with a unit in combat that refused to go anywhere or do anything in less than Company strength. After a few months I went to another unit that routinely operated at Platoon level and never hesitated to kick out Squads or even Fire Teams (and also to ignore the directive that one could not operate out of range of US Artillery) The only two firm rules in that unit was that one could not stay in one place for 24 hours, you had to move even if it was only tens of meters; and never to do the same thing twice. Other than that, Units were left alone to do their jobs. No doubt in my mind which was the more effective unit. Surprisingly -- or not -- the latter unit had lower casualties overall...
A regression indeed. Maybe it is brought on in part by the same concerns that leave us encumbered with too many "pillows" that prevent us from outmatching the mobility of the current crop of bad guys.
Maybe it is because folks choose to ignore the solid lessons that line our collective history of modern war, from the LRDG, LRRPs, RLI, and on and on. We are talking about some brave men who faced daunting odds, and not always because the enemy was tough to find, but because if he found you he could bring in airpower to hunt you down, or he was also very adept at moving and fighting light.
Maybe it's because we'd need to get a whole lot better at training to the basics, which you and I agree is something not done well. The basics are so, so critical to the business of indpendent operations.
I'm not sure the highers ups can stomach another Lone Survivor scenario.
Regrettably, I'm afraid your last two paragrpaphs
sum it up pretty well. We'll see. One can always hope a change will occur and trickle down...
Mixed Feelings
Glad the Death Certificate has been written for DO; sad that the USMC has found it easier to go to "Enhanced Company Operations". Granted, the USMC has perhaps the best Rifle Company layout in the business, and there are a lot of (other) Infantrymen out there who experience a noticeable Pavlovian response to Marine Infantry TO&E's. But I just don't understand why the USMC doesn't feel comfortable using Platoons to go out and whack the enemy; use your Squads to find em', then bring in the rest of the Platoon to finish 'em. And if things go really wrong, you've got a Platoon (or at least the remnants thereof) to fight your way out, not just a Squad.
But using an entire Company? The enemy will see (or hear) you coming long before you can get to grips with them. Enhanced Company Operations or not (whatever that is) still ends up tending to sacrifice or at least compromise the most important tactical attributes that small-units require (and should exploit to the max when possible) - surprise and agility.
Before I finish, I just want to to make clear that this wasn't a swipe at the Marines, or any other Army that prefers to use Companies where Platoons will do. As anyone can see in places from Fallujah to Garmser, the Marines are unsurpassed at getting it right at the tactical level, combining as they do all Arms right down to Battalion/MEU-level in a way that noone else does, and giving them a battlefield superiority that few can match at that level. I'm just saying that given all this, it does not make any sense that the Marines would see fit to be satisfied with this and not go whole hog to achieve tactical superiority and dominance at all tactical levels, from Battalion all the way down. Something just doesn't fit here. Why?
Sad day for me. I have often said that the closest thing to General Gavins's Air Cavalry division was the Marine Air Ground Task force. Gavin's concept of Amoeba warfare was very close to DO operations and I hoped the Marines might prove this out. It is a double loss in a way because it would not just work in LIC but HIC it was the closest thing to one universal theory of combat that would work anywhere, anytime that I have ever seen or read about. General Robert Scales wrote a nice piece about how this might have worked but he didn't call it DO. General Van Ripper seems to have written something too can not remember but I think it went under the name of Precision Maneuver. Looks like it dosen't matter anymore
"precision engagement"
I don't know its details, though.
Do not read into this article. My take is the focus will be for Companies to start taking over many of the functions usually reserved for battalions. In my experience in Iraq company FOBs operated semi-independently from Battalion HQ. They relied upon the battalion for logistical support but had all the requirements in place to handle operations. Even to the point of conducting limited targeting.
The effort to place intel cells at the company level just reinforces this effort. Put the tools to accomplish the mission at the lowest level.
Just my two cents.
That's a valid approach as long as resources are not seriously limited. It's likely effective but not very efficient, though.Originally Posted by Crusoe
Combat effectiveness
trumps efficiency. Totally. Unless one can safely remain a theorist...
It seems as you (as American?) didn't quite get the "resources" thing in my post.
I got it...
I just ignored it...
Priorities are priorities. Effectiveness is the priority, efficiency will ALWAYS be second...
Other than in theory, of course.
And so the KingTiger was born...
Proving that effectiveness in the secondary
mission of defense versus little or none in the primary mission of offensive maneuver isn't truly effective?
Got to admire the efficiency of production in spite of obstacles though.
No, the Tigers are just a standard negative example for use on people who prefer effectiveness over efficiency.
Under condition of scarce resources, there's no greater foolishness than to prefer effectiveness over efficiency, as effectiveness at one point without efficiency costs a lot elsewhere.
To have intelligence and other support personnel at all combat companies is fine as long as it can be afforded, but a terrible idea if this needs to be bought with inefficient cuts elsewhere.
It's a classic limited field of view problem. Most people just look at the reinforced point and don't understand the costs.
Even if the army can afford it - can the nation afford to have an army with such behavioral patterns?
Or maybe the state's going broke meanwhile, and the nation has a balance deficit larger than its defence spending because military macro-economic consumption replaced much macro-economic investment?
But efficient force structure is already off topic, far away from DO.
(Actually it isn't, but it is off topic like we discuss it.)
This has been a process tested in theory and on the ground. Take a look at the past few years in Iraq. The type of combat we face requires increased resources at lower levels. This is done as an adjustment from previous force levels and the competing demands are managed. The decision is made to reduce structure somewhere to increase it somewhere else. I would argue that the past few years has seen an increase in effectiveness and efficiency during our operations in Iraq.
As for behavioral patterns, I am lost on that comment. Are we (Americans) not trying to maximize are current structure? Dare I say it, trying to be more efficient
We're sort of saying the same thing...
Since it wasn't fully effective, it was obviously inefficient as well...METT-TC applies. Always. Currently it is affordable, it is effective and it is certainly not a permanent, embed it in the TOE thing -- and I don't think anyone's seriously suggesting that. No need for it in full scale conventional combat for example.To have intelligence and other support personnel at all combat companies is fine as long as it can be afforded, but a terrible idea if this needs to be bought with inefficient cuts elsewhere.It has for the past 233 plus years (some of our habits pre-date the departure of the British). Whether that will be true in the future remains to be seen though I suspect your children's children will be the ones who see it, not you or I.Even if the army can afford it - can the nation afford to have an army with such behavioral patterns?Perhaps or maybe we've just outsmarted ourselves again. We do that frequently...Or maybe the state's going broke meanwhile, and the nation has a balance deficit larger than its defence spending because military macro-economic consumption replaced much macro-economic investment?Not necessarily...But efficient force structure is already off topic, far away from DO.(Actually it isn't, but it is off topic like we discuss it.)
I'm not sure. If I understand the proposal correctly, it sounds sort of like an attempt to push the MAGTF concept down to company level.
Did anyone else get that impression?
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
Maybe in some ways it is the MAGTF concept, although I don't see the "air" piece of the task force being incorporated at a company level. I'm think DO was a bit of a reach at this point, so the decision to focus on company level operations is a good one. It seems like more of a natural progression to develop the enhanced companies before working on distributed platoons and squads. After all, a company HQ with better embedded logistics and intel support and its an operations capability would be better able to support distributed operations in the future. I know MCCDC said DO was dead, but I really can see it being a natural outgrowth of ECO.
Where can I find more info on TSULC? Sounds like it would be a great course to push some of our ANGLICO NCOs through, but this is the first I've ever heard of it. We've been trying to get slots to the Army's RSLC as a substitute.
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